Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship
Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship

Volume 1 Number 1
August 2016
Yangon, Myanmar

Published by
PANSODAN BOOKS
© 2016 Pansodan Books

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
The Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship စိုးစွဲတံဆိုင်ရာ သိစပ်မင်နှံ is a new, open access, digital journal of humanities and social sciences. It aims at fostering the development of vigorous, critical and independent research of the highest quality on Burma by scholars both in Burma and abroad. The editors are inspired by the example of the Journal of the Burma Research Society, disbanded in the late 1970s, and by the current need for a broad, eclectic forum for new scholarship on Burma. The editors particularly encourage submissions in any one of the languages of Burma. Submissions are also welcomed in any major language of world scholarship. The Journal will be published in Burmese, English or (when feasible) one of the minority written languages of Burma, with a full text or summary translations in a second language.

The editors hope to promote scholarly excellence by a system of peer review, editorial advice, mentoring, and by supplying authors with digital copies of related research not easily otherwise available to them. We envision publishing bi-annually, often on particular themes selected by the editors and announced in advance.

We encourage submissions by young scholars and aspiring amateurs as well as established academics. All authors’ work will be held in the strictest confidence by the editors and their identities will be protected under a pen name if they so wish. We hope that the Journal of Burmese Scholarship will help both create and display the fruits of a growing, independent, and assertive scholarly community.

We would like to thank the donor organizations that have made this project possible: Yale University, The Open Society Institute, Burma Project, The Henry Luce Foundation. In addition, we would like to thank Kwena Chokoe for the layout and design, Ye Hein Aung for translation, and Nance Cunningham and Aung Soe Min of Pansodan Books for publishing this work.
Advisory board:

Aung Soe Min
Bo Bo Lasin
Michael Charney
Nance Cunningham
Min Zin
Naw May Oo (Mutraw)
Saw Tun
James Scott
Soe Myint Aung
Tharaphi Than
Ardeth Thawnghmung
Ma Thida
Tun Myint
Alicia Turner
Zali Win

Issue Editor:

Ardeth Thawnghmung

Managing Editor:

Alicia Turner
# Table of Contents

Introduction to the New Journal  
James Scott (James Scott)

Introduction to the Special Issue on Poverty  
Ardeth Thawnghmung

Small Scale Fishermen in Rakhine State  
Saw Eh Htoo

Poverty and Migration from Burma:  
Within and Without Midi Z’s Films  
Wen-Chin Chang

“Fragmented Sovereignty” over Property Institutions:  
Developmental Impacts on the Chin Hill Communities  
SiuSue Mark

Poverty and Health in Contemporary Burma  
Dr. Ne Lynn Zaw  
Mollie Pepper

On the Frontier of Urbanization:  
Informal Settlements in Yangon, Myanmar  
Eben I. Forbes
It is with great pride that we present this, the first issue, of the *Journal of Burmese Scholarship* (Thi saq myin hnan သိစပ်မင်နှံ့) to public intellectuals and scholars of Burma. We hope, with this and the issues to come, to make a significant contribution to the many admirable efforts now underway in Myanmar to create a vibrant, daring, and critical public sphere of the highest standards.

The formula that we begin with is designed to foster a long-lasting intellectual community and civil debate around critical themes of central concern to Myanmar’s public life and future development. Each issue of the *Journal* is the culmination of one or more thematic workshops bringing together scholars, journalists, novelists, poets, scientists, and public intellectuals who have had something original and important to say on the topic. At a workshop, these participants present their work to one another, absorb what the other participants have to say through discussion and debate and then revise their own work accordingly. The result, in Burmese and in English, is then edited and published, both digitally and physically. It is especially fitting, then, that our first thematic issue is devoted to poverty in Myanmar, its sources, its extent and,
above all, the lived experience of poverty among ordinary citizens.

It is our intention to let the light come in from any and all intellectual windows: the arts, fiction, verse, lyrics, social science, economics, anthropology, history, memoirs. Our premise is that no discipline or specialty has a monopoly on truth or insight, and that the more carefully crafted perspectives we can accommodate the more light we will shed.

Among the other themes/workshops either underway or contemplated are:

1. Intellectuals, Technocrats and Rulers
2. Military Memoirs and Burmese History
3. Popular History from Below and Marginality
4. The Development of Burmese Arts and Letters 1930-2010
5. Student Activism: Aspirations, Representation and Prospects from Colonialism to the "Opening."
6. Federalism, Ethnic Identity, and Nationalism

In some respects we see ourselves as reviving, under a new name, the precious tradition of the *Journal of the Burma Research Society*, founded in 1910 and abolished in 1979 by the military regime. For the better part of a century, that journal was an open forum for scholars, professional and amateur, Burmese and non-Burmese, historians, social scientists, literary critiques, archeologists and we value the opportunity to recreate, for a new era, the open bazaar of quality work that its journal represented. The idea for such a journal arose in October 2011 at a meeting of seven Burmese scholars in the diaspora and three Western scholars of Burma, before the "opening." Once it became clear that political conditions might allow us to operate in Myanmar with open participation, we
added six members to the organizing committee and now plan to publish a physical journal based in Yangon.

We have all observed, first-hand, the tremendous intellectual energy and organizational initiatives (little societies, discussion groups, NGOs, charities, etc.) that have burst into the open over the past several years. We hope that our small initiative will contribute in a small way to this hopeful and energetic public culture.
Introduction to a New Academic Journal in Burma

The Journal of Burmese Scholarship (သိစပ်မင်နှံ ့) ဦးတရရိုး (James Scott)
ဦးတရရိုး ရှင် ျား၊ %ူထုအသိပညာ ရှင်ျား ့ ၏ အသိပညာဆိုင်ရာ ထည့်ဝင်/ျားပင်မ+စ်ပါသည်။ အထက်တ+ာ်မပပါ အ%ုပ်ရုံတဆွးတနွးပွဲျားွင် အဆိုပါပုဂAို%ျားှ ိိိ့ ၏ သုတသနရ%ဒ်ျား ကိုစာ်း+်ကကားမ.င်း၊ အမ.ားစာ်းရှင်ျား၏ စာ်းျားကိုနားတထာင်ဖပီး ပါဝင်တဆွးတနွးတပးမ.င်း့ မ+င့်အူက်ကကစွာ ပါဝင်%ုပ်ကိုင်.ဲ့ပါသည်။ ဤတဆွးတနွးပွဲ့ ၏ရ%ဒ်အမ+စ်၊ +်ကကားင်သွင်းတဆွးတနွး.ဲ့တသာ စာ်းျားကိုမန်ာ ဘာသာ၊ အဂဂ%ိပ် ဘာသာ့မ+င့် စုစည်းည်းမ+်င်ဆက်မ.င်းသည် ဤ ဂျာနယ်၏ အဓိက%ုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ပင်မ+စ်ပါသည်။ %က်ရှိမန်ာနိုင်ငံ၏အတမ.အတနနှင့် ဆီတ%ျာ်စွာပင် ဂျာနယ်၏ မန်ာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဆင်းရဲွဲတ/နှင့်ပ်သက်၍ တ%့%ာ သုံးသပ်င်မပ ထားတသာ စာ်းျားမ+စ်ပါသည်။

ဤနိုင်ငံ၏ စုစည်းတ+ာ်မပရာွင် ဘာသာရပ် စ်.ု ရ/တထာင့် စ်.ုည်းကိုသာတFာင်းတပးမ.င်းထက်စုံ%င်Gတသာရ/မင်.ျက်ျားကိုအတရာင် အတသွးစုံစုံ%င်%င်မ+င့် င်မပ%ိုပါသည်။

ဤ ဂျာနယ်ကနဦးတရွး.ျယ်ထားတသာ သုတသနတ.ါင်းစဉ်ျားှာ- 1. အသိပညာရှင်အ်ပညာရှင်ျား၊ ပညာ်သူနှင့် အုပ်.ျုပ်သူျား
၂။ စစ်+က်ဆိုင်ရာပုဂျား၏ ဘဝျား နှင့် မန်ာ့သိုင်း ၃။ တအာက်တမ.နင်းမပားႀျားနှင့် ပင်တရစီး သိုင်းတကကာင်းေျားေျားနှင့် မပည်သူ ့ ဘဝအတမ.အတနကိုကိုယ်စားမပု/ျား ၄။ ၁၉၃၀ေှ ၂၀၁၀အထိ မန်ာစာတပနှင့် အနုပညာ ိုးက်မ+စ်တပား/၅။ ကို/ိုနီတ.်ှသည် မန်ာ့တနွဦးတ.်အထိ တကျာင်းသား/ပ်ရှား/၆။ +က်ဒရယ်ဝါဒ၊ ိုင်းရင်းသားသရုပ်%ကQဏာနှင့် အျိုးသားတရးဝါဒ ၇။ ကို/ိုနီတ.်ှ ျက်တှာက်တ.်အထိ အကျဉ်း တထာင်ျားနှင့် အကျဉ်းတထာင်အတမ.မပု စာတပျား စ်နည်းဆိုရပါGင် က*န်တာ်ို ့ ဂျာနယ်သည် ၁၉၁၀ .ုနှစ် ွင်ည် တထာင်ဖပီး ၁၉၇၉.ုနှစ်ွင်စစ်အာဏာရှင် အစိုးရ၏+ျက် သိ်းမ.င်း ကို.ံ.ဲ့ရတသာ မန်ာနိုင်ငံသုတသန အသင်း ဂျာနယ်၏တနရာွင် အစား ထိုးမ+ည့်ဆည်းတပးရန် ရည်သန်ပါသည်။ မန်ာ နိုင်ငံ သုတသီ ျားျား ွင် သုတသီ ျား၊ က*်းကျင် သူ ျား၊ အတပျာ််းသုတသီျား၊ တဒသ.ံမန်ာိုင်းရင်း သား ျား နှင့် တဒသ.ံ ဟု်သူျား၊ သိုင်း ပညာရှင် ျား၊ %ူ/ သိပွံ ပညာ ရှင် ျား၊ စာတပ တဝ+န်တရး ပညာရှင်ျား၊ တရှး တဟာင်းသုတသန ပညာရှင်ျား၏အသိဉာဏ်ပညာ ဆိုင်ရာဆုံ မ+စ်.ဲ့ဖပီး ထိုးအသိ ပညာ
ဦးတရရိုး

တရတ.်ကို မပန်%ည် ထွန်းပ%ာတစ်ရန်က*န်တာ်ို ့ ဂျာနယ်က နိုင်ငံကာ အရည်အတသွားီ သုတသန စားမ+င့် ပါဝင်မ+ည့်ဆည်း%ိုပါသည်။ ဤဂျာနယ်ကို ထု်တဝရန် စိ်ကူးရ ၁၂၀၁၁ ုနှစ်တအာက်ိုဘာ%ွင် မ+စ်ပါသည်။ မန်ာတနွဦးဟု တ.0ဆိုတသာမန်ာနိုင်ငံ၏ မပုမပင်တမပာင်း%ဲတသာနိုင်ငံတရးအတများအရှိန်အဟုန်မ+င့် စင်ီွင်မပည်ပတရာက် မန်ာသုတသီ၇ တူနာမန်ာ့ အတရးတ%့%ာသူအတနာက်ိုင်းသုတသီ သုံးဦးို တွ ့ ဆုံကကရာှ အစမပု.ဲ့ပါသည်။ ဗိုက်တမပာင်း%ဲ%ာတသာနိုင်ငံတရးအတများအရ က*န်တာ်ို့ ဂျာနယ်၏ မုပ်ငန်းတဆာင်ာ ျားကို မန်ာနိုင်ငံွင် အတများစိုက်ရန် အတများအတနျားအရ က*န်တာ်ို့ ဂျာနယ်၏ မုပ်တဆာင်ရန် စိုင်းမပင်း.ဲ့ကကပါသည်။ မပည်ွင်း အတများစိုက် NGO ျား၊ ကုသို%်မ+စ် အ+ွဲ ့ အစည်း ျား၊ စကားဝိုင်းျား၊ %ူ/တရးအသင်းအ+ွဲ ့ ျားို ့ ၏ က်ကကထက်သန်တသာအသိပညာဆိုင်ရာနှင့် အသင်းအ+ွဲ ့ ဆိုင်ရာ %/ပ်ရှားတဆာင်ရွက်/ျားကို ျက်ဝါးထင်ထင် ရ/မင်.ွင့်ရ.ဲ့ပါသည်။ ယ.ုကဲ့သို တGာ်%င့်.ျက် တရာင်မ.ည်ျား သန်း%ာ ွင်က*န်တာ်ို ့ ဂျာနယ်၏ အနည်းငယ်G တသာအသိပညာဆိုင်ရာပါဝင်/သည် မန်ာ့ အ+ွဲ ့ အစည်း၏ အနာဂ်အွက် အကျိုးတကျးFူးစ်စုံစ်ရာ သက်တရာက်%ိ့်ည်ဟု တGာ်%င့် တနပါသည်။
Introduction to the Special Issue on Poverty

Ardeth Thawng&mumung

Poverty is a dominant feature of Myanmar, which was ranked 132\textsuperscript{nd} out of 169 countries in the United Nation’s Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human Development Report in 2010. The yearly per capita income of the average citizen is roughly $1,144 USD.\textsuperscript{1} Accurate data on poverty is not available, but the latest survey conducted by the UNDP in collaboration with the Myanmar government estimated that 26.3 percent of Burmese are living under the poverty line.\textsuperscript{2} A new poverty metric, revised by the World Bank in 2014, found that there are more poor people, and almost certainly more at the extreme end of the scale, in Myanmar than its previous estimate had found.\textsuperscript{3} In addition, it found that many more Burmese are living close to the poverty line and are at

\textsuperscript{1}“Myanmar,” UNData, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=MYANMAR, (accessed September 1, 2011). Various organizations provide slightly different data on the social and economic situation in Myanmar for a variety of reasons: differing methodological guidelines; bureaucratic deficiencies; an inadequate government presence in areas controlled by one of the various armed groups; residents’ reluctance to cooperate with state authorities; official restrictions on conducting research in Burma; and residents’ distrust of outsiders.

risk of falling into poverty.

The majority of Myanmar’s population, an estimated 66 percent, is rural and depends on small-scale farming and fishing for subsistence and income. Half of the country’s agricultural production, in terms of total crop area, consists of rice paddies cultivated by small farmers who are deeply in debt. Poverty is entrenched in rural Burma, where infrastructure is spotty or nonexistent, credit and agricultural inputs are scarce, financial returns are low, and crop yields are periodically ravaged by extreme weather events. Many of those who live in urban areas also have limited access to food, clean water, electricity, and opportunities to pursue their livelihoods.

The opening of the country to limited foreign investment since 1990 has resulted in greater economic inequality in a nation that was characterized by a relatively egalitarian distribution of material living standards not so long ago. According to a marketing survey conducted in 2010, the proportion of the population corresponding to upper, upper middle, middle, lower middle, and lower class categories are, respectively: 1.5 percent, 11 percent, 20.2 percent, 25.1 percent, and 41.5 percent of the total population.

---


4 For instance, in 1982 David Steinberg argued that Burma’s “overall income distribution, although not equitable in any absolute sense, is better than any of the non-communist states of the region.” “Economic growth with equity? The Burmese experience,” *Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 4, No. 2 (Sept 1982), 142.
percent.\textsuperscript{7} The World Bank’s revised poverty guidelines indicate that inequality is much higher in urban than rural areas. The World Bank also found that a surprising number of poor people are living in urban areas, particularly in and around Yangon, which has a high cost of living and attracts large numbers of migrants and informal workers looking for new opportunities.\textsuperscript{8}

In 2011 President Thein Sein publicly acknowledged the poverty problem and announced a series of anti-poverty initiatives. These include providing low-interest agricultural loans, building infrastructure, and allowing international governmental and non-governmental organizations to provide humanitarian assistance, technical know-how, and scarce farming equipment. The plan also involved setting up committees to investigate land grabbing from farmers, and offering a variety of channels through which the nation’s poor can air their grievances.

Despite these measures, poverty has continued to pose a serious challenge to Myanmar’s transition to democracy. Most of the nation’s formal and informal investment goes into extractive industries (gas, oil, and hydroelectric power). In 2012, the total amount of investment earmarked for agriculture, livestock, and fishing enterprises (the sectors which employ most of the country’s workers) amounted to only 1.23 percent of total investments in Burma.\textsuperscript{9} Meanwhile, the raising of restrictions on open political activity has lifted the lid on frustrations and tensions that have accumulated during

\textsuperscript{7}Demographic Profile, Consumex’ 2010.
\textsuperscript{8}The World Bank characterizes these individuals as the “transition” poor: people with limited education and job skills who are employed as low-skilled and informal workers in towns and cities where high-paying jobs are in short supply and the cost of living is high.
decades of authoritarian rule. The result has been an outpouring of communal violence, a rise in land disputes, and a proliferation of protests and strikes for more rights, better wages, and improved living conditions. A common feature of these accelerating socioeconomic changes is that when they spark upheavals or violent incidents, it is the poor who are most likely to be negatively impacted because they are less able to protect themselves from physical injury, losing a loved one, or having their property seized or destroyed. Moreover, poor people have fewer resources to help them recover from such losses.

Armies of experts and academics have offered multiple reasons to explain why countries and people are poor.\textsuperscript{10} Many highlight structural conditions such as unfavorable political environments (e.g., civil war and communal violence) that prevent citizens from making a living, or official policies and practices and weak state institutional capacities that exploit the poor, fail to provide basic necessities and services (food, healthcare, education) and personal protection, and perpetuate inequality. Others highlight specific factors such as a lack of infrastructure (roads, bridges, electricity, water, low-interest agricultural loans, markets), climate change, and environmental degradation as the root causes of poverty. The finger has also been pointed at family illness and the coping strategies adopted by the poor. However, despite a wealth of statistics documenting poverty and deprivation, we know little about the lived experience or “texture” of poverty among the poor.

majority Burmans, let alone the Kayin, Kachin, Mon, Shan, Lisu, Pao and so on.

The essays collected in this inaugural issue offer illustrations of the lived experiences of poor people in urban and rural areas across Burma’s diverse geography—landscapes that range from coastal wetlands to the mountainous periphery and dry interior. The collection of essays in this volume is the outcome of a workshop held at the Central Hotel in Yangon between August 22nd and 24th, 2014. The workshop brought together scholars, educators, medical doctors, humanitarian activists, and staff from non-profit organizations, who gave presentations on poverty from multi-disciplinary perspectives. It was also attended by representatives of political parties, staff from international organizations, and farmers who offered their views and participated in the discussion. The topics presented and discussed included the impact of limited political reform on the poor under the country’s quasi-civilian government of 2011-2015; the causes and consequences of poverty in Myanmar; an assessment of anti-poverty programs run by local NGOs; the healthcare behavior of poor residents in Mon State; and the activities of rubber tappers in Mon State, small-scale fishermen in Rakhine State, bus conductors in Yangon, and the urban poor in Myanmar’s satellite towns, as these various groups all strive to make ends meet. A majority of the presenters were Myanmar citizens who were working as researchers or humanitarian activists on poverty issues at the grassroots level. However, not all of the presentations delivered at the workshop are included in this issue. Two-thirds of the presenters were unable to submit their papers for anonymous review due either to a lack of time or resources, or to adequate supervision to enable them to continue their research and present their findings in academic papers.

In this first issue of the Journal, we offer a glimpse into how ordinary Burmese cope with poverty in their daily lives. Saw Eh
Htoo’s article sheds light on how small-scale fishermen in Rakhine State manage in an environment characterized by increasingly scarce resources and uncertain weather conditions, while Dr. Ne Lynn Zaw and Mollie Pepper report on the healthcare behavior of the poor in Mon State through the first author’s first-hand experience as a medical doctor in the region. Using non-participating observation techniques and interviews, Ye Hein Aung has uncovered some little-known facts about the lives and daily activities of bus fare collectors, described as the “most detested” (by passengers) and the “lowest stratum of the population in Myanmar.” SuiSue Mark’s article highlights concerns over the impact of institutions relating to the market economy and private property on customary land-use practices in Chin State, the poorest area of Myanmar, while Eben Forbes identifies the push and pull factors that draw rural residents to urban areas and compares living conditions for poor residents in the inner city and peri-urban areas. Wen-Chin Chang’s article’s demonstrates the possibility of overcoming poverty even in the most adverse situations through the story of Midi Z (aka Chao Te-Yin), who left Myanmar at 16 in search of a better education and a brighter future in Taiwan and later become a prominent movie director in that country. She demonstrates how Midi Z’s migration and experience of living abroad has influenced the way that he portrays migrants and poverty in his films about Burma.

While the papers published in this issue attempt to cover a wide range of issues and regions, they are neither complete nor comprehensive in their scope. There are many other subjects that are worthy of consideration and research—such as poverty in conflict areas and war zones; the relationship between food, education, and drug addiction, on the one hand, and poverty on the other; or why anti-poverty programs carried out by government and non-government organizations fail or
succeed. This issue also fails to consider the ways in which the poor cope psychologically through a resort to supernatural forces, religion, and astrology, or politically in their dealings with the authorities. Despite these omissions, we hope that the articles in this issue shed light on some key topics in the wider study of poverty and will generate interest, critical discussion, and further research on a very timely and important subject that has thus far received very little attention from the policy and academic communities in Myanmar.
Introduction to the Special Issue on Poverty

Ardeth Thawngshmung

မိတ်ဆ် (UNDP)၏ လူသားဖွံဖဖိုးတိုးတ်မဖစ် အစီအစဉ် (၂၀၁၀) အထူးထုတ်စာကစာင်များနှင့် အဆင့် (၁၃၂) သာရခဲ့ကသာ မမန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမည်၍ သတင်းအချ်အလ်များို အလွန်တူ မရရှိနိုင်ကသာ်လည်း UNDP မှမမန်မာအစိုးရနှင့်ပူးကပါင်းကားခဲ့သည်ကနာ်ဆုံးစစ်တမ်းအရ ၂၆.၃% ကသာမမန်မာမပည်သူများသည် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမည်းနှင့် နီးပ်စွာကနထိုင်ရှင်သန်လျ်ရှိဖပီး ဆင်းရဲတွင်းထဲ ကရာ်လုန်းပါးမဖစ်ကန်ကာင်းကတွ်ရပါသည်။
များစူးစမ်းမှုအတွက် ခန့်မှန်းထားကသာ လူဦးကရ အများစုမှာ ကျားလ်က; သတွင် ကနထိုင်ကရဖပီး ရှင်သန်ကနထိုင်စားကသာ် ရန်နှင့် ဝင်ကငွအတွ် လုပ်ငန်းတို့ ိုမှီခိုအားထားကသည်။ နိုင်ငံ၏ စို်ပျိုးကရးထုတ်လုပ်မည်သည် သီးနှံဧရိယာအကနမဖင့်ကည့်လင်ဆန်စပါးစို်ပျိုးမဖစ်၍ စို်ပျိုးကသာ လ်သမားအများစုမှာ အကကးမှီခိုအားထားကသည်။ မမန်မာနိုင်ငံကျားလ်က; သတွင် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမသည် နိင်းစွာအမမစ်တွ်ကနဖပီးအကမခံအကဆာ်အအုံသည်ကမပာ်တိကမပာ်ျားသို့မဟုတ်လုံးဝမရှိသည့်အကနအထားတွင်မဖစ်ာအလွန်ရှားပါးကသာကချးကငွနှင့် စို်ပျိုးသွင်းအားစုများ၊ ကငွကကးအမမတ်အစွန်းနိမ့်သဲ့သို့မဟုတ်အချိန်မှန်မဖစ်ကပါ<ကနကသာလွန်ဲမပင်းထန်သည့်ရာသီဥတုများကကာင့် သီးနှံများပျ်စီးကနသည်။ ဖမိ့မပက;သတွင်ကနထိုင်သူများထဲမှအများစုသည်လည်း အစားအကသာ်၊ သန့်ရှင်းကသာကရ၊ လ်ပ်စစ်နှင့်အသ်ကမွးဝမ်းကျာင်းမဖွင့်လုပ်ငန်းများလုပ်ိုင်နိုင်ရန်အခွင့်အလမ်းများိုလ်မှန်မဖစ်ကပါသည်။ ၁၉၉၀မပည့်နှစ်စ၍န့်သတ်ထားကသာနိုင်ငံမခားရင်းနမှပ်နှံမှနည်းင်ိုမမန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ တံခါးဖွင့်ကပးလို်မခင်းကကာင့်ရုပ်ဝတ်ဆိုင်ရာကနထိုင်မအဆင့်အတန်းများအကတာ်အသင့်တန်းတူညီမရှိခဲ့သည့်နိုင်ငံတစ်နိုင်ငံတွင်ကီးမားသည့်စီးပွားကရးတန်းမတူမည်မဖစ်သည်။ ၂၀၁၀တွင်မပုလုပ်ခဲ့သည့်ကစျှာမမှင့်တင်ကရးစစ်တမ်းတစ်ခုအရအထ်တန်းလူာ၊ အထ်တန်းနီးပါးအလ်တန်းလူာ၊ အလ်တန်းလူာ၊ ကအာ်တန်းနီးပါးအလ်တန်းလူာနှင့် ကအာ်တန်းလူာတို့နှင့်ိုညီကသာမမန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏လူဦးကရအချိုးအစားမှာရာခိုင်နမှားအားမဖင့်၁၉%၁၀%၁၁%၁၂%၁၃%၂၀%၂၁%၂၂%၂၃%၂၄%၂၅%၂၆%၂၇%၂၈%၂၉%၃၀%၃၁%၃၂%၃၃%၃၄%၃၅%၃၆%၃၇%၃၈%၃၉%၄၀%
၄၁.၅%ကို အသီးသီးရှိကကပသည်။ မာဘဏ်၏ မပန်လည်မပင်ဆင်ကြောင်း သားထားကသာဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမဆိုင်ရာ လမ်းညချ်များတွင်တန်းမတူမည်မဖြစ်သည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း မပကသမှာကျးလ်ကြောင်း မမင်းမားကကာင်းညချ်နပါသည်။ ထိုအတူပင်ဖြစ်ကာင်းညချ်နပါသည်။ သူအကတာ်များများဆင်းရဲသာများမဖစ်သည်။ အထူးသမဖင့်ရန်ုန်ဖျားမဖျားကနကသာကရးကမပာင်းလုပ်သားများစွာနှင့်ကခါင်းရွ်ဗျပ်ထိုး၊ကနစား၊ပုတ်မပတ်အလုပ်သမားများအကရအတွက်သည်မပားကကာင်းကတွ့ရှိခဲ့ရပါသည်။

၂၀၁၁ခုနှစ်တွင်သမဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမဖျားတို်ဖျားလုပ်ကဆာင်ချ်များကကညာခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုလုပ်ကဆာင်ချ်များထဲတွင်အတိုးနဖန်းထားနည်းနည်းမဖင့်စို်ပျိုးကရးကချးကငွများပံ့ပိုးကပးမခင်း၊အကမခခံအကဆာ်အအုံများတည်ကဆာ်ကပးမခင်းနှင့်နိုင်ငံတာအစိုးရနှင့်အစိုးရမဟုတ်ကသာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအားလူသားချင်းစာနာကထာ်ထားမဖြင့်ရညီပံ့ပိုးများ၊နည်းပညာအညီများနှင့်ရှားပါးသည့်လုံးစ်ပစ်ည်များပံ့ပိုးကပးရန်ခွင့်မပုမခင်းတို့ပါဝင်သည်။ ဤစီမံ့န်းတွင်လုံးသမားများထံမှကမမိုစုံစမ်းစစ်ကဆးရန်ကာမတီများတည်ကထာင်မခင်းနှင့်မမန်မာ့ဆင်းရဲသားများိုဖွင့်ကမပာင်းထားမရာအဖုံဖုံချကပးမခင်းတို့လည်းပါဝင်သည်။

ထိုသို့လုပ်ကဆာင်ခဲ့ကသာလည်းမမန်မာနိုင်ငံ့အသွင်းကမပာင်းရာတွင်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမဖျားကီးမားသည့်စိန်ကခင်းမဖစ်ကနသည်။ ရင်းနှီးမမှုပ်နှံမဖြင့်များတို့ထဲမှအများစုသည်(သဘာဝဓာတ်ကငွ်း၊ကရနံနှင့်လီပ်စစ်ဦးထွ်သံဇာတတူးကဖာ်ကရး}
လုပ်ငန်းများအတွက်မဖစ်သည်။ ၂၀၁၂ခုနှစ်တွင် (နိုင်ငံတွင်းလုပ်သောအင်အားအများဆုံးအားအလုပ်ခန့်ကပ်ကသာ Wများမဖစ်သည့် စို်ပျိုးကရး၊ ကမွးမမူကရးနှင့်ကရလုပ်ငန်းဆိုင်ရာဗုမှီများတွင်ရင်းနှီးမမှုပ်နှံရန်သတ်မှတ်ထားသည့်ပမာဏသည်မများနိုင်ငံတွင်ရှိကသာရင်းနှီးမမှုပ်နှံမစုစုကပါင်းပမာဏ၏၁.၂၃%မသာရှိသည်။

dစို်ပျိုးကရးလုပ်ကဆာင်ချ်များအကပ်များများကိုဖမိုသိပ်ထားသည့်မကျနပ်ချ်များနှင့်တင်းမာများဖုံးလှပ်ကပ်သလိုမဖစ်သွားခဲ့သည်။ရလ်မှကဝါသွန်ချလို်သလိုမဖစ်ကပ်သည့်ရပ်ရွာကစာသတွင်းပဋိပညာများ၊ကမမအမငင်းပွားများတိုးပွားလာမခင်းနှင့်အခွင့်အကရးများပိုရကရးကာင်းမွန်သည့်လုပ်ခလစာနှင့်ပိုမိုကာင်းမွန်ကသာကနထိုင်မအကမခများရရှိကရးအတွက်ဆန္မပမားများနှင့်သပိတ်ကမှာ်များအလွန်များမပားမပန်းလာမခင်းတို့မဖစ်ပါသည်။

cထိုကမပာင်းလဲများကကာင့်ကမ်းတမ်းမပင်းထန်ကသာမဖစ်ရပ်များမဖစ်လာကသာအခါဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများသည်ရုပ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာထိခို်မပိုင်တွာရကသာသူတစ်ဦးဦးဆုံးရဖံးမခင်းသို့မဟုတ်မိမိတို့ပိုင်အိုးအိမ်ပစ်ည်းများိုသိမ်းဆည်းခံရမခင်းနှင့်ဖျ်ဆီးခံရမခင်းတို့မှမိမိိုိုမိုမိုမိုိုသိမ်းကမပာင်းဖင့်အနပတ်သကဘာသ်ကရာ်ခံရသူများမဖစ်လာနိုင်ကမခအလွန်များပါသည်။

dထို့အမပင်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများထံတွင်ထိုသိ့ကသာရဖံးများမှမပန်လည်နလံထူနိုင်ရန်အကထာ်အူမဖစ်မည့်အရင်းအမမစ်များလည်းပို၍နည်းတတ်ကသည်။
ပညာရှင်များစွာတို့အကကာင်းမပချ်ကပါင်းကမမာ်မမားစွာ ိုကပ်ခဲ့ကပါသည်။ သုကတသနဥမပုသူများစွာတို့နိုင်ငံသားတို့အားဝမ်းစာရှာမခင်းမှတားဆီးန့်သတ်သည့်အကကာင်းအရာများရှာကဖွကသာအခါနိုင်ငံကရးမဖင်သ်မ(ဥပမာ-မပည်တွင်းစစ်နှင့်ရပ်ရွာပထမတို့သို့ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများကခါင်းပုံမဖတ်အသုံးချကသာအစိုးရမူဝါ;များ၊အစားအကသာ်၊ျန်းမာကရးကစာင့်ကရှာ်မညီန့်သို့ကသာအကမခခံလိုအပ်ချ်များနှင့်ဝန်ကဆာင်မညီများိုပံ့ပိုးကပးရန်နှင့်လူပုဂိုလ်တစ်ဦးချင်းိုာွ်ကပးရန်ပျ်ဖပီးတန်းမတူမညီမGမညီအဖမဲသံသရာလည်ကစကသာအစိုးရဝန်ကီးဌာန၊အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏အားနည်းချ်များကကာင့်ဟူ၍မီးကမာင်းထိုးမပခဲ့ကပါသည်။
Ardeth Thawngmung

ွ်ွ်ွင်းကပြာအာင် အားထုတ်ထားပါသည်။

ဤစာတမ်းတွင်ပါဝင်သည့်စာတမ်းများသည်ရန်ုန်ဖမို ့ရှိစင်ထရ9်ဟိုတ9်တွင် ၂၀၁၄ခုနှစ်ကသဂုတ်လ ၂၂ရ်ကန့်မှ ၂၄ရ်ကန့်အထိ ျင်းခဲ့သည့်အလုပ်ရုံကဆွးကနွးပွဲတစ်ပွဲ၏ရလ်များလည်းမဖစ်ပါသည်။

ထိုအလုပ်ရုံကဆွးကနွးပွဲတွင်ပညာရှင်များ၊ပညာကရးဆိုင်ရာမ်းျင်သူများ၊ကဆးဘ်ဆိုင်ရာဆရာဝန်များနှင့်လူသားချင်းစာနာထာ်ထားမဆိုင်ရာတ်ကလပ်ရှားသူများနှင့်အစိုးရမဟုတ်ကသာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ ဝန်ထမ်းများပါဝင်ခဲ့ဖပီး ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါပါးမိုရကထားကပါင်းစုံကပါင်းစုံမှတင်မပရကဆွးကနွးခဲ့ကပါသည်။

ထိုအလုပ်ရုံကဆွးကနွးပွဲသိ့ နိုင်ငံကရးပါတီများမှ ို9်စားလှ9်များ၊ နိုင်ငံတာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့်ကတာင်သူလ9်သမားများတ်ကရာ်ခဲ့ကဖပီးမိမိတို့၏အမမင်များိုလည်း ထည့်ကဆွးကနွးခဲ့ကပါသည်။

တင်ဆ်ခဲ့ကသာစာတမ်းများနှင့်ကဆွးကနွးခဲ့ကသည့်အကကာင်းအရာများထဲတွင် ၂၀၁၁-၂၀၁၅ခုနှစ်အတွင်းမမန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အရပ်သားနီးပါးအစိုးရလ်ထ်အန့်အသတ်မဖင့်နိုင်ငံကရးမပုမပင်ကမပာင်းလဲမဖျားကရာ်မဆိုင်ရာအမပုအမူိုကလ့လာမခင်း၊မွန်မပည်န််တွင် ဆင်းရဲကသာက;သခံများ၏ ျန်းမာကရးကစာင့်ကရှာ်မဆိုင်ရာအမပုအမူိုကလ့လာမခင်း၊မွန်မပည်န််မှ ရာဘာမခစ်ကတာင်သူများ၏ ဘဝအကမခအကနများ၊ရခိုင်မပည်န််မှကရလုပ်သားင9်များ၊

ရန်ုန်ဖမိုမှ ဘတ်စားစပ9ာများနှင့်မမန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဆင်ကမခဖုံးက;သများမှဖမို့မပကနဆင်းရဲသားလူတန်းစားများစသည်တို့ပါဝင်ဖပီးတာသ့်ဘဝတစ်ကန့်တာရှင်သန်ကနထိုင်နိုင်ကရး
ရုန်းန်ကနရပုံများိုလည်း ကဆွးကနွးထားပါသည်။ တင်မပကဆွးကနွးသူအမှားမှာ မမန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများမဖစ်ကဖပီးကအာ်ကမခအဆင့်တွင်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမပိုသုကတသနပညာရှင်အမဖစ်ကသာလည်းကာင်း၊လူသားချင်းစာနာမဆိုင်ရာတ်ကလပ်ရှားသူများအကနမဖင့်ကသာလည်းကာင်း၊လ်ကတွ့လုပ်ိုင်ကနကသူများမဖစ်ပါသည်။သို့ရာတွင်အလုပ်ရုံကဆွးကနွးပွဲတွင်ကဆွးကနွးတင်ဆ်ခဲ့ကသာစာတမ်းများအားလုံးဤစာကစာင်တွင်ထည့်သွင်းကဖာ်မပနိုင်မည်မဟုတ်ပါ။တင်မပကဆွးကနွးသူသုံးပုံနှစ်ပုံသည်မိမိတို့အကနမဖင့်ကသာလည်းကာင်း၊လ်ကတွ့လုပ်ိုင်ကနကသူများမဖစ်ပါသည်။

ဤဂျာန်၏ပထမဆုံးထုတ်စာကစာင်တွင်သာမန်မမန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများနိစ်ဓူဝဘဝတွင်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမပိုမည်သို့ရင်ဆိုင်ကနကသည်ိုတစ်ကစ့တစ်ကစာင်းလှမ်း၍ကည့်နိုင်ကအာင်ပံ့ပိုးကပးထားပါသည်။

ကစာအုံးကဆာင်းပါးသည်ပို၍ရှားပါးလာသည့်ရင်းမမစ်များနှင့်ရာသီဥတုမမှန်သည့်က;သတွင်ရခိုင်မပည်န်းမှကရလုပ်သားင်တို့မည်သို့ဘဝရှင်သန်ကနကသည်ိုမီးကမာင်းထိုးမပသည်။က;ါ်တာကနလင်းကဇာ်နှင့်ကမာ်လီပပ်ပါ(Mollie Pepper)တို့မွန်မပည်န်မှဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများ၏ျန်းမာကရးကစာင့်ကရှာ်မဆိုင်ရာအမပုအမူိုပထမစာကရးသူ၏ကဆးုသမဆရာဝန်တစ်ဦးအဖစ်ကတွ့မဖစ်ရပ်များိုအကမခခံတင်မပထားပါသည်။ိုတိုင်မပါဝင်ဘဲကစာင့်ကည့်ကလ့လာသည့်နည်းစနစ်များနှင့်ကတွ့ဆုံကမးမမန်းမခင်းများိုအသုံးမပု၍လည်းရဲဟိန်းကအာင်(ခရီးသည်များအဆိုအရ)“အရွံ့မုန်းဆုံး”ဟုဆိုကသာ၊“မမန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏မပည်သူလူထုထဲတွင်အနိမ့်ဆုံးကသာလူတန်းစားအလာ”ဟုကဖာ်မပကသည့်ဘတ်စ်ားစပ်များ၏
ဘဝနှင့် တစ်ကန့်တာလုပ်ငန်းကဆာင်တာများနှင့်ပတ်သက်နည်းလှသည်အကကာင်းအချ်များလည်းကဖာ်ထုတ်ကရးသားထားပါသည်။ ဆဲစုမာ့ခ်(SiuSue Mark)ကဆာင်ပါးသည်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်အဆင်းရဲဆုံးက;သမဖစ်ကသာချင်းမပည်နှင်တွင်ရိုးရာဓကလ့အစဉ်အလာအရကမမသုံးစွဲမဖြစ်အကလ့အထများအကပြစျးစီးပွားကရးနှင့်ပုဂလိပိုင်ဆိုင်များနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းဖပီးအစိုးရဝန်ကီးဌာနအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသ်ကရာ်မနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းဖပီးစိုးရိမ်စရာအချ်များမီးကမာင်းထိုးမပထားသည်။ အီဘန်ကဖာ့စ်(Eben I. Forbes)ကျးလ်က;ကကနမပည်သူများဖမိုပျမားသိ့ဆွဲငင်တွန်းန်သည်အချ်များကဖာ်ထုတ်ဖပီးကနာ်ဖမိုတွင်နှင့်ဖမိုအစွန်အဖျားကျန်မပက;သများရှိဆင်းရဲသားများကနေထိုင်ရသည်ဘဝအကမခအကနများနှင်း9ှဉ်မပထားပါသည်။ ဝှမ်ချင်းချမ်း(Wen-Chin Chang)စာတမ်းသည်ပိုမိုကာင်းမွန်သည့်အနာဂတ်အတွ်မမန်မာနိုင်ငံိုအသ်၁၆နှစ်တွင်စွန့်ခွာခဲ့ဖပီးကနာင်တွင်ထိုင်ဝမ်နိုင်ငံတွင်နာမည်ကျာ်ရုပ်ရှင်;ါရို်တာတစ်ကာ်မဖစ်လာခဲ့သည့်မီဇ်ကခ<ကျာ်က;ရင်(Midi Z. a.k.a. Chao Te-Yin)နေုးသို့မည်ပုံလုမ်းမိုးသည်ိုစာကရးသူမှကဆွးကနွးထားပါသည်။

ဤစာကစာင်တွင်ထည့်သွင်းပုံနှိပ်ထုတ်ကဝကသာစာတမ်းများအကနမဖင့်အကကာင်းအရာများနှင့်တိုင်းက;သကီးမပည်နှင်များစွာိုပါဝင်ကအာင်အတတ်နိုင်ဆုံးကိုးစားထားကသာ်မှ}
အထူးထုတ်စာကစာင်မိတ်

လည်း အားလုံးဖပီးမပည့်စုံသည်မဆိုနိုင်ကပ။ ဥပမာ အားမဖင့် ပဋိပါ; ကသများနှင့် စစ်မဖစ်ပွာကနသည့် က;သများတွင် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမပေါင်းပါးတို့အကား ဆ်နွမ်းပျ်မပေါင်းတစ်ဖ်မှ ကည့်လင် အစိုးရနှင့် အစိုးရမဟုတ်ကသာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများလုပ်ကဆာင်ကနသည့် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမပေါင်းတို်ဖျ်ကရးအစီအစဉ်များသည်မည်သည့် အတွ်ကကာင့်ကအာင်မမင်သနည်း၊မည်သည့် အတွ်ကကာင့်မကအာင်မမင်သနည်းစသည်တို့လိုထည့်သွင်းစဉ်းစားရန်နှင့် သုကတသနလုပ်ဖိ့ကာင်းသည့်အမခားအကကာင်းအရာများစွာရှိပါကသးသည်။ ဤစာကစာင်အကနမဖင့်လည်း ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးများ၏စိတ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ အရ သဘာဝလွန်ပရကလာအင်အားများ၊ ဘာသာကရးနှင့်လ6ဏာကဗင်သိုမဟုတ်နိုင်ငံကရးအရ အားိုးရှာဖပီးနိုင်နိုင်နင်းနင်းရင်ဆိုင်ကမဖရှင်းကကသာနည်းလမ်းများိုထည့်သွင်းစဉ်းစားမခင်းမမပုနိုင်ပျ်ွ်ခဲ့ရကပသည်။ဤသို့ကသာချန်လှပများရှိကနကသာလည်း ဤစာကစာင်တွင်ပါဝင်ကသာကဆာင်းပါးများသည်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမပေါင်းနှင့်ပတ်သွားရာအလွန်မပန့်လှသည့် သုကတသနတွင်အဓကနေသည့်ကခါင်းစဉ်များိုမီးကမာင်းထိုးမပရန်ရည်ရွေ့ပါသည်။ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမပေါင်းသည်။ခုအချိန်အထိမမန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်အစိုးရနှင့်ပညာရှင်အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းများမှဂရုစို်၊ အာရုံထားကလ့လာမပေါင်းအလွန်နည်းပါးကသာဘာသာရပ်မဖစ်ပါသည်။ ထိုအလွန်အကရးကီး၍ကလ့လာသင့်သည့်အကကာင်းအရာတစ်ရပ်အကပစိတ်ဝင်ကဆွးကနွးမန်လ်သုကတသနမပုမပမခင်းမဖစ်ပါသည်။
Small Scale Fishermen in Rakhine State

ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်တွင် ရရလု်ငန်းကသည် အရရးကကီးသည့် ကဆ်ရ်ပ် ဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၀၉-၂၀၁၀ခုနှ်တွင် ပည်တွင်း အသားတင်ကုန်ထုတ်လု်မ (GDP) ၁.၆%ပ်ပီး ရမွးပမူရရးနှင့် အတွဲ၍ ဉာဏ်ဝင်ရငွအများဆုံးကို ရယူခဲ့ကာ လူဦးရရ၏ ၅%ကို အလု်ခန့်ရးနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ရရလု်ငန်းအများုကို ပမန်မြို့မြို့တွင် ရတွေ့ရှိသည်။ ၂၀၁၀ခုနှ်တွင် ရရလု်ငန်းကတွင် အသက်ရမွးဝမ်းရကျာင်းပရနသူရွင်းသုံးသိန်းခန့်ရှိသည်ဟု ရခိုင်ရရလု်ငန်းဦးီးဌာနက အမရင်ခံခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၁၃ခုနှ် ရခိုင်ုံမ်း်ရဆးရရာက်မရှင်အီရင်ခံတွင် မိသားုများအားလုံး၏ ၄%ရရလု်ငန်းနှင့်ရမွးပမူရရးလု်ငန်းတွင် အချိန်ပည့်လု်ကိုင်ရနကကသည်ဟု ဆိုသည်။ ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်တွင် ရရလု်ငန်းနှင့်ဆက််ရနရနရတွင် လု်ငန်းများတွင် လု်ကိုင်ရနသူများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ မိသားုဝင်များ၏ ခန့်မှန်းရပခုံအတွက် ၁.၂သန်း ရှိသည်။ ဤကသည် ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်တွင်ဝင်ရငွတိောင်ပီး ၂၀၁၀-၂၀၁၁ခုနှ်တွင် နိုင်ငံပခားသို့
ရာအယ်ထူးတရားဝင် တင်ို့ရရာင်းချမ်းများမှ အရမရိကန်ရ:လာ ၅ သန်း ရှာရနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။

ဤာတမ်းတွင် ဤရရလု်သားများနှင့်တ်သက်ရသာ အရကကာင်းအရာများကို လူမ)ရရး၊ လူသားရရးရာ၊ သဘာဝ၊ ဘာရရးနှင့် ရု်ိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ အရင်းအနှီးရ)ရထာင့်များမှ တင်ပထားါသည်။ ၎င်းတို့ကကုံရနရသည့် ိန်ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်တွင်ငါး မ်းရလှအများုမှာ အရသးားနှင့် အလတ်ပ ်သည့် ကမ်းနီးငါး မ်းရလှများပ ်ပီး ရရလု်သားတ်ဦးသို့မဟုတ် နှ်ဦးခန့်ပ င့်လု်ကိုင်ကကသည်။ အများုသည် အင်ဂျင်မတ်ထားသည့် သာမန်ငါး မ်းကိရိယာတို့ကိုအသုံးပုကကသည်။ လု်သားအများုသည် ရရလု်သားအရရအတွက်နှင့် ၎င်းတို့ လု်ကိုင်ွမ်းရဆာင်သည့် အလု်အရာမူတည်၍ ရလှတ်ခါထွက်တိုင်းဝင်ရငွရရှိကကသည်။ ရရှိသည့် ဝင်ရငွများကွဲပားပခားနားရသာ်လည်း ဤရ:သများမှ ရရလု်သားများ၏ ျမ်းမ)ဝင်ရငွသည် တ်ရန့လJင် ၁၀၀၀-၁၅၀၀ ကျ်ခန့် ရှိသည်။ ဤသည်မှာလည်း မ်းဆီးရမိသည့် မာဏရFတွင်မူတည်ပီး ငါးအလွန်မ်းမိရသာရန့များတွင် ၅၀၀၀-၁၅၀၀၀ ကျ်အထိရနိုင်ကကသည်။ ဤရရလု်သားများ၏ ဝင်ရငွသည် အပမဲင်ကကိုတင်ခန့်မှန်းမရနိုင်ဘဲ မ်းဆီးရမိသည့် ငါးမာဏအရFမူတည်ရနါသည်။

ရရလု်သားငယ်များသည် ရရလု်ငန်းီးွားရရးက၏ ရအာက်ရပခတွင် ရနရာယူထားပီး အရပခခံအကျဆုံးရသာအုတ်ပမ်များဟုလည်း ဆိုနိုင် ါသည်။ ထို့အပင် ရရလု်သားများအရနပင် မတည်ပငိမ် မရရာကကိုတင်ခန့်မှန်း မရနိုင်ရသာ အရပခအရနများကို ို၍ို၍ ရင်ဆိုင်ရနကက...
ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်မှ ရရလု်သားငယ်များ ရသည်။ ၎င်းတို့ လုံးဝထိန်းချု်နိုင်မ) မရှိသည် ရျးကွက်၏ သက်ရရာက်မ) သဘာဝ သယံဇာတများ ကုန်ခမ်းလာပခင်း၊ ညံ့ ျင်းသည့် အရပခခံ အရဆာက် အအုံများနှင့် ကုန်ရချာထုတ်လု်မ)နည်းညာ၊ နိုင်ငံရရး မတည်ပင်မ) ဏ်ကို အျက်သရဘာရဆာင်ွာ ခံားရန် ရသည်။

မ်းမိထားသည့် ငါးများကို ကုန်ရချာထုတ်လု်နိုင်သည့် နည်းညာနှင့် ွမ်းရည်များ မရှိပခင်းရကကာင့် အရည်အရသွား နိမ့်သည့် ရရလု်ငန်းများကို ပ်ရပီး ရခိုင်ရရလု်ငန်းက၏ ရှင်သန်မ)ကိုလည်း ရလျာ့ကျရ ါသည်။ ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်မှ ရရလု်သားများအရနပ င့် မ်းမိထားရသာ ငါးများကို မု်ရအာင်ကာကွယ်ရသာအခါသမားရိုးကျ ရရခဲထားပခင်း၊ သို့တည်းမဟုတ် အရပခာက်လှန်းပီးငါးရပခာက်လု်ပခင်းများ သာ လု်ကိုင်နိုင်ကကသည်။ ရရခဲ မဝယ်နိုင်ရသာ သူများအရနပ င့် တို့၏ ထုတ်ကုန်များ အလဟဿ ပ်သွားသည်ကိုသာ ပမင်ရန ရသည်။

တ်ခါတ်ရံတွင်ပည်ရျးကွက်များအတွက် ရည်မှန်းထားရသာ ကုန်ည်းများကို အရည်အရသွား မပည့်မ)ရကကာင့် လည်း ပငင်းယ်ခံ ကကရသည်။ ငါးမ်းလု်ငန်းထဲမှ ၁၂% (၂၈၄၇၅ တန်) သည် အလဟဿ ပ်သွားပခင်း သို့မဟုတ်ငါးမ်းပီးရနာက်ိုင်း ကုန်ရချာထုတ်လု်သည့် နည်းညာမရှိမ)၊ ငါးမ်းရလှများရှိတွင် လုံရလာက်သည့် က်ည်များ မရှိမ)၊ လမ်းန်းဆက်သွယ်ရရး ညံ့ ျင်းမ)နှင့် လJ်် ဓာတ်အားမရှိပခင်းနှင့် ရလာင်ာဆီကုန်ကျရိတ်ပမင့်မ)တို့ကို ယခင်ရရလု်ငန်းကအတွက် အခက်အခဲအပ် ရာ်ပထားခဲ့သလို အင်ဂျင်ွမ်းအားပမင့်ရသာ ရလှများကို အသုံးပုနိုင်ပခင်း
ရာအယ်ထူးနှင့် မ်းမိထားရသာ ငါးများကို ကုန်ရချာပ်ရအာင်ထုတ်လုံပခင်နှင့်သိုရလှာင်ထားပခင်၊ သယ်ယူို့ရဆာင်နိုင်ပခင်တို့သည်လည်း အကကီးမားဆုံးရသာအဟန့်အတားများပ်သည်။ ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်တွင်၂၀၀၅-၂၀၀၆ခုနှ်တွင်အရအးခန်းက်ရုံ၁၈ခုရှိခဲ့ရသာ်လည်း၂၀၁၀ခုနှ်တွင်၁၁ခုမJသာရှိရတာ့သည်။ ရရခဲက်များ၏အရရအတွက်သည်လည်း၂၀၀၅-၂၀၀၆ခုနှ်တွင်၆၀ရှိခဲ့ရာမှ၂၀၁၀ခုနှ်တွင် ၃၉က်သာ ကျန်ရတာ့သည်။ ယင်းသို့ပ်ရပခင်မှာလJ််ဓာတ်အား မရှိပခင်ရကကာင့်လု်ငန်းလည်တ်ရန်ကုန်ကျရိတ်ပမင့်မားမ)သည်အဓိကအရကကာင်းရင်းပ်ရလသည်။ ရရလု်သားများဆင်းရဲနွမ်းါးရသာအရပခအရနရရပခင်၏ရနာက်ထ်အရကကာင်းရင်းတ်ခုမှာငါးမ်းလု်ကွက်များနှင့်ကုန်သည်များအရနပင့််ရဆးရရာက်များတွင်အခွန်အခများကိုအလွန်အမင်းရာက်ကကရသည်။ ၂၀၁၂ခုနှ်အထိကုန်သည်များအရနပင့််အမ်းနှင့်ရတာင်ကုတ်ပမို့များရှိအဓိကပမို့ဝင််ရဆးရရာက်ခန်းများတွင်အခွန်အခများကိုအလွန်အမင်းရာက်ကကရသည်။ ်ရဆးရရာက်ခန်းများတွင်ကျန့်ကကာများရကကာင့်းတို့ထုတ်ကုန်၏အရည်အရသွးကိုျက်ီးရပီးလု်ငန်းလည်တ်မ)ကုန်ကျရိတ်ကိုလည်းိုမိုပမင့်မားရကာအပမတ်များရလျာ့နည်းရသည်။ ထိုကုန်ကျရိတ်များအားလုံးမှထ်ဆင့်လက်ဆင့်ကမ်းသွားရသာအခါခါးည်းခံရသည်မှာလည်းရရလု်သားများသာပ်သည်။ တင်:ါန်သို့မဟုတ်ကမ်းနီး၊ကုန်းတွင်းငါးလု်ကွက်များကိုချရးပခင်းသို့မဟုတ်ရရာင်းချပခင်းသည်လည်းုဂRလိကများကိုရရာင်းချပီးသည့်ရနာက်ထိုသူများမှရရလု်သားများထံမှအသုံးပုခရိတ်များရကာက်ခံပခင်းသည်လည်းရရလု်သားငယ်များကိုဆင်းရဲတွင်းကိုို၍ထိုးချခဲ့ရသာအချက်ပ်သည်။ ဤန်ကို သခံ်တ်နှင့်အု်ချု်မ)အာဏာများ
ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်မှ ရရလု်သားငယ်များအတွက်ရန်ုံရငွရှာရ ွသည့် နည်းလမ်းတ်ခုအပ် ၁၉၉၃ခုနှ်တွင်ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်၌ တင်မိတ်ဆက်အသုံခဲ့သည်။ ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်တွင် ရရွးရကာက်တင်ရပမ်းထားသည့် ဥရအမတ်များနှင့် ီွားရရးသမားများ၊ ရရလု်သားများအရနပင့်ငါးလု်ငန်းလိုင်င်များနှင့်တ်သက်၍ဆက်လက်၍အရချအတင်ပငင်းခုံ၊ ရဆွးရနွးမ)များရှိလာရကကာင့်၂၀၁၁ခုနှ် ဦးသိန်းိန်အိုးရဏာရလာပီးရရာက်ိုင်းတွင်ရခိုင်ိုက်ျိုးရရးနှင့်ရမွးပမူရရးဝန်ကကီးမှငါးမ်းကွက်၂ကွက်ကိုအားလုံးလု်ကိုင်နိုင်ရန် ွင့်ရးခဲ့သည့်ရလ်ကိုတင်ရရှိခဲ့သည်။ ထိုသို့ဘုံငါးမ်းကွက်သို့မဟုတ်ငါးမ်းအု်ုများကို ွင့်ရးလိုက်ပခင်းရကကာင့်ရရလု်သားများလိုက်သည့်ရိတ်များကိုရလာချရးနိုင်ခဲ့ပီးရရလု်သားအားလုံးကိုလည်းထိုငါးမ်းလု်ကွက်များအတွင်းသို့ကန့်သတ်ချယ်ပခင်းမရှိဝင်ရရာက်မ်းဆီးခွင့်ပုခဲ့သည်။ ဤသို့ရပာင်းလဲမ)တ်နှင့်အတူအမ်းနှင့်ရတာင်ကုတ်ရဆးရရးခန်းများတွင်ရိဆာင်ခဲ့ရသည့်အခွန်အခများကိုယ်ဆ်ခဲ့သပင်းရန်ကုန်ပမို့သို့ထွက်ကုန်များို့ရဆာင်ရာတွင်ကုန်ကျရိတ်များကိုလည်းရလJာ့ချရးနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။

တင်ဦးချင်းအားငါးမ်းခွင့်ကိုလွတ်လ်၍အကန့်အသတ်မဲ့ရးရသာရကကာင့်အထိဝါရင်းပမ်များကုန်ခမ်းပခင်းကိုိုမိုပမန်ရသည်ဟုအချို့ကဆိုကကရသာ်လည်းရခိုင် ရရလု်သားများအရနပင့်ငါးရင်းပမ်များကိုရါင်း၍ထိန်းသိမ်းကာကွယ်ကကရန်ဟူရသာတာဝန်သိိတ်ကိုလည်းဤမူဝါ:အသ်မ�ထည့်ရးနိုင်ခဲ့သည်ဟုအချို့ကဆိုပန်သည်။မည်သို့င်ဆိုရကာမူီးွားပ်ငါးမ်းရလှများပင့်အလွန်အကကူငါးမ်းပခင်းမှသည်ကမ်းရပခရရတိမ်တွင်ိုက်ဆွဲပခင်းအါအဝင်ိန်ရခFမ)များွာ
ရာအယ်ထူးကျန်ရန်ရသည်။ ရရလု်ငန်းဦးီးဌာနမှာလည်း ရင်းပမ်၊ လူအင်အား၊ ွမ်းရဆာင်ရည်နှင့် ထိရရာက်သည့် ရာင့်ကကည့်ရရးန်တို့မှာလည်း အကန့်အသတ်ပင်သာရှိသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ လု်ခလာအနည်းအငယ်သာရသလို ရငွရကကးဘတ်ဂျက်ံ့ိုးမ)နည်းါးသည့် ရရလု်ငန်းဦးီးဌာနအရနပင့်တားပမ်ထားရမည့် ငါးမ်းကိရိယာနှင့် ငါးလု်ငန်းနားရသည့် ငါးရ်ငါးသန်ရာသီများကိုမတားပမ်နိုင်ဲ ရရလု်သားများထံမှ တရားမဝင်ရငွယူရဟာင်းခဲ့ရသည့် ပ်ရ်များလည်းရှိါသည်။ ရရလု်သားများသည် ိန်ရခမ)များကိုရပ ရှင်းနိုင်ရန်နည်းမျိုးုံကိုရ ာ်ရဆာင်ကျင့်သုံးရနကကသည်။ ထိုနည်းများထဲတွင် မိသားုလု်အားကိုအသုံးပုပခင်း၊ ရငွတိုးရချးပခင်း၊ အပခားရသာအလု်အကိုင်များ လု်ကိုင်ပခင်းနှင့်အရရးရဖွဲ့အရပခအရပခအကကုံခဲ့လည်ပ်ရ၊ ပဿနာတက်ခဲ့လည်ပ်ရ၊ အာမခံအရနပင့်၎င်းတို့၏ရလှရှင်၊ အလု်ရှင်များထံ အကူအညီယူပခင်းတို့ဝင်သည်။ ရရလု်သားတ်ဦး၏မိသားုဝင်တိုင်းသည်လု်ငန်းထဲတွင်ါဝင်ကူညီကကရသည်။ ရကျာင်းမတက်နိုင်ရတာ့သည့်သားရယာက်ျားရလးများသည် ခင်နှင့်အတူလိုက်ငါးမ်းကကပီး မိခင်များကရတာ့ငါးကိုကုန်ရချာထုတ်သည့် လု်ငန်းဉ်တွင်ါဝင်ကကသည်။ ရရလု်ငန်းလု်သူများသည်ငါးမမ်းသည့်ကာလတွင်ပမ်တရလာက်ထင်းရကာက်ကကသည်။ အချို့ကလည်း ခင်တို့၏ရကျာင်းများမှီိုမိုရကာင်းမွန်သည့် အခွင့်အလမ်းရှိသည့်ရနရာများသိ့အပီး သို့မဟုတ် ယာယီထွက်ခွာပခင်းများပုလု်ကကသည်။ ရရလု်ငန်းက်မ)ကနှင့် ရရလု်သားငယ်များ၏ ရှင်သန်နိုင်မ)ကိုလု်ငန်းရှင် - ရရလု်သားဆက်ဆံရရးပင့်လည်း ထိန်းရကျာင်းရးသည်။ ရရလု်သားများနှင့်ကုန်သည်များသည်အချင်းချင်းအပန်အလှန်မှီခိုသည့် ဆက်နွယ်မ)များရှိရသာ်လည်း ဆက်ဆံရရးသရဘာ
ရခိုင်ပည်နယ်မှ ရရလု်သားငယ်များ

သဘာဝ အရနပ င့် တ်ရယာက်နှင့် တ်ရယာက် အပန်အလှန် အကျိုးပုပခင်းမှသည် အလွဲသုံးားပုပခင်း၊ အသုံးချပခင်းတို့အထိလည်းရှိနိုင်ပီး အပန်အလှန် ညိနWင်းနိုင်ရန် လု်ိုင်ခွင့်အရပခအရနမည်သူထံတွင် ိုရှိသည်ဟူရသာ အချက်အရFမူတည်သည်။ ရရလု်သားများ အရနပ င့်ကျန်းမာရရး၊ လူမ)ရရး၊ ဘာသာရရးနှင့် ကရလးများ ညာရရးအတွက်အရရးရFရငွရချးယူနိုင်ရန် ရငွတိုးရချးားသူများထံမှီခိုအားထားပုကကရသည်။
Small Scale Fishermen in Rakhine State

Saw Eh Htoo

The fishery sector is important for Myanmar’s economy. It constituted 7.6% of the GDP in 2009-2010, generated the fifth largest revenue (along with livestock) and employed 5% of the population (3 million people).¹ Most of the fishermen are found in Myanmar’s coastal areas in Ayeyarwaddy Region, Mon State, Tanintharyi Region and Rakhine State. This paper focuses on small-scale fishermen who earn their livelihood from the Rakhine’s coastline and marine resources.

Rakhine state is located in the Southwest of Myanmar, sharing borders with Bangladesh and Chin State in the north, Magway and Bago Regions in the east, Ayeyarwady Region in the southeast and a long stretch of coastal areas connected to the Bay of Bengal in the east. Rakhine are the largest group in Rakhine State, which is also a home to other smaller groups such as Chin, Mro, Khami, Thet, Dainet, Maramagyi, Kaman as well as Chinese, Indian and Bangladeshi decedents who describe themselves as “Rohingyas.” A majority of the population (3,188,807) living in Rakhine are Buddhists, but there are sizeable populations of Muslims, including Rohingyas who are territorially concentrated in Northern Rakhine and constituted a majority in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships and Chris-

tians, particularly among the Chin and Mro.\textsuperscript{2} There are villages located in remote islands that specialize on fishing in Rakhine State, but most of the fishermen in the coastal areas engage in farming to supplement their income.

This study uses the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) to shed light on the precarious and dangerous situations of small-scale fishermen in Rakhine State where an estimated 43% of the populations relies on fishing or a combination of fishing or aquaculture, and agriculture. It describes how small fishermen cope with their daily challenges in the presence of increased scarcity of resources. The SLF is a tool used to understand communities' livelihoods by identifying their assets along the dimensions of social, human, natural, financial and physical capital. It also situates this analysis within the larger structural context, including laws, policies, practices and the social relationships between communities and political/business elites.

The Fishery Sector In Rakhine State

Fishery is an important economic activity in Rakhine state. Various species of marine resources, shrimps and crabs are captured and farmed in Rakhine's 344 mile-long coastal areas. Fresh water fishery and prawn harvest is carried out the Kalatan, Lay Mro, Naaf and May Yu rivers. The Rakhine Department of Fishery reported that approximately 750,000 people earned their living from fishery sector in 2010. According to the Rakhine Inquiry Commission report in 2013, however, only 4% of all families are engaged in fishery and livestock sector full-time.\textsuperscript{3} Therefore estimated 1.2 million residents (those employed in fishery-related business plus their family


\textsuperscript{3}The Rakhine Inquiry Commission, Final Report of Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, Yangon, 2013.
Small Scale Fishermen

members) rely on fishery sector as a supplementary source of their livelihood in Rakhine State. The sector is the second largest revenue earner in Rakhine state and generated 5.1 million US dollars from official export in 2010-2011. Rakhine State is particularly known for hilsa and tiger prawn. In addition, Rakhine has the largest acreage of shrimp farms in the country. The data from Statistical Yearbook 2009, Livestock and Fishery Statistics (2008-09) would estimate the Rakhine contribution toward the total annual value of shrimp production and export earning in the country to be 12% whereas Dr. Nilar Myint Htoo estimates it at 18.84%. The contribution from the Rakhine State fishery sector to the national economy, compared to that of Yangon, Ayeyarwaddy and Tanintharyi Regions is relatively low given the poor road, transport and technology, and underdeveloped aquaculture activity in Rakhine State. The Rakhine Inquiry Commission noted, the boats, nets and other equipment are outdated. Few boats have modern engines or equipment. The wooden boats, built according to traditional methods, are unsafe for straying far from the coastline, limiting the catch. This further hinders the development of the sector.

Major areas of fishery activities in Rakhine state include (1) marine capture (fishery and prawn of approximately 32 different species) (2) aquaculture, mainly salt-water shrimp farming (“trap-and-hold”) (3) fresh water capture (fish, prawn

---

4Department of Fisheries, 2011 Report, Sittwe Rakhine, 8.
and crab) (4) processing, trading and transporting businesses and (5) export. Marine capture is the region’s dominant activity, which is carried out in inshore and offshore areas. The 2008 constitution gives the central government control to manage offshore activities and regional government control over fishing activities that take place in inshore and inland areas. The Freshwater Fishery Law under the SPDC regime defined areas within 5 nautical miles of the coast as inshore zone and those between 5 to 200 miles off the coast as offshore zone with the areas beyond the offshore zone as Exclusive Economic Zone. Inland water areas include seasonal flood plains and permanent inland water bodies, such as main river systems, natural lakes, reservoir and seasonal flood plains. Under the military regime that staged a coup in 1988, licenses to catch fish in inland and inshore water fishing grounds areas were auctioned off to private individuals to manage, operate and impose fees for the use of these fishing grounds, known as a “tender system” in the region. Those who won the tender, usually better-off local elites, would then pass on the cost to small-scale fishermen in the form of license fees. This was a contentious issue in the SPDC era.

The Department of Fishery in Rakhine State reported in 2010 that 15,000 registered fishing boats, accounting for about half of the fishing boats in the country. The Department of Fishery in Rakhine State categorizes small, medium and large-scale boats terms of the size of the boat, numbers of people employed and the nature of fishing equipment used. Accordingly, a small-scale boat is usually a non-powered boat (or sometimes low-power motor) operated by one person using small nets, while medium and large boats have higher-powered motor (of about 500 horsepower) and larger or more sophisticated fishing nets. The larger boats are usually 50 feet high and

---

8Htoo “Trade Liberalization,” 63.
are used for offshore fishing with nets that are between 100-500 feet and cranes for heavy lifting. The majority of fishing boats in Rakhine State, small and medium scale, are inshore fishing boats and most of them (11,286) are non-powered with “passive” fishing gears (gill nets, drift nets, long line and trap). The status of fishermen can also be further categorized according to the number of boats they own. Small-scale fisherman own a couple of boats, medium fishermen own the between 3 and 7 fishing boats, whereas large-scale fishermen own more than 7 fishing boats. Most inshore fishermen own their boats, whereas most offshore fishermen hire themselves out as workers, or use boats owned by wholesale traders.

Rakhine and Rohingyas fishermen make up a bulk of the populations in the fishing industry in Rakhine State. Prior to communal violence between Buddhists and Muslims (particularly Rohingyas) in Rakhine State in June 2012, there were a few better-off Muslims in Rakhine who owned and operated at least 5 fishing boats in the villages visited, and some of them had joint businesses with Rakhine fishery businessmen. The former were neither accepted as Myanmar’s ethnic nationality by the Myanmar government nor are they considered Bangladeshi by the Bangladesh government. The military which came to power in 1962 regarded these self-described Rohingyas as illegal immigrants and engaged in a series of campaigns to push out 100,000s of them. This sparked strong international criticism in the early 1990s and consequent inflow of international assistance to the areas.\textsuperscript{9} Rohingya probably constitute \(\frac{1}{3}\) of the populations in Rakhine state but it is difficult to know the percentage of Rohingyas who are in the lowest rung of the fishery sector in the region. Prior to the

\textsuperscript{9}For detailed information about the root causes of communal violence in Rakhine state, see Jacques Leider, “Rohingya: The Name, the Movement and the Quest for Identity,” in \textit{Nation Building in Myanmar}, (Yangon: Myanmar Egress and Myanmar Peace Center, 2014). Rakhine Inquiry Commission.
violence in 2012, a few local residents estimated that Rohingya made up a disproportionate numbers of fishermen since Rakhine Buddhists have historically shunned fishing businesses, mostly for religious reason that prohibits the killings of living beings. Rohingyas were also more willing to take wages lower than the market rate, sometimes as low as 30 percent of those paid to Rakhine workers, work harder and take more risks.\textsuperscript{10} Rohingya fishermen seem relatively poorer partly because of their larger household size and official discriminatory practices against them.\textsuperscript{11}

Major inshore fishing activities are carried out twice a month during the wane and full moon in inshore areas. The Department of Fishery imposes a fishing ban between 45 days to 2 months during the closing season. During the closed season, fishermen find employment as daily wage workers, fire wood collectors, paddy farmers and crab trappers. Offshore fishermen, on the other hand, work 10 months a year between August and May during the open fishing season. This paper focuses on inshore and inland fishery, which is the main occupation of small-scale fishermen in Rakhine State.

Methodology

Materials presented in this paper are based on the author’s observation, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with fishermen in Rakhine State since 2011 and conversations with key informants who are knowledgeable about the situations. The study is based on fishing villages in two townships in Rakhine State. Pauktaw township in Sittwe district is located on an island offshore in the Bay of Bengal while the Mrebon township in Sittwe district is situated along the Mrebon-Minbra river. In both townships, Rakhine constitute the largest group of residents, followed by Chin, Hindus,

\textsuperscript{10} Also see Rakhine Inquiry Commission Report, 2013, 36.

Small Scale Fishermen

Rohingya and Bamar. These residents rely on agriculture, fishery production, transportation and trading as their main source of income.

Approximately half of the populations in two townships under study engaged in both fishing and farming (including integrated farming) and 25% of them specialize in fishing alone (many of those living on the island); the rest specialize in farming. Different ethnic groups tend to specialize in different types of occupation. The majority of the fishermen were Rakhine (most of them Buddhist) and about 30% of them were Kamar or Rohingya. Only a few Mro or Khumi Chin work as fishermen. 90% of the Mro/Khumi residents engage in farming, hunting and extraction of forest resources in these townships.¹²

Daily Activities

Fishermen wake up in the early morning to prepare for fishing. They go out to the fishing grounds two times per month and each trip could last 8-10 days depending on the weather and the amount they caught. Sometimes they sleep in the boat near to their nets, which they have to carefully guard against stealing and cutting by other fishermen. They eat the food prepared by their family members or cooked on the boat. Some of them go out daily for squid and smaller fisheries. Generally, they return home when the volume of the catch goes down.

Every family member of the fishermen contributes toward the business. Boys who no longer attend school would usually accompany their fathers while mothers process fish. When they do not engage in fishing, fishermen repair their boats and nets. Sometime they collect the firewood along the river.

Fishermen earn money per trip, depending on the number of workers and the type of work they perform. There are between 5-10 fishermen in each boat depending on the size of

¹²Interview with a local businessman, Mrebon, March 2013.
the boat. Although the catch industry has been dominated by men, sometimes women accompany their husbands to assist them. The average wages of these workers in the area is about 1,000-1,500 kyats per day, depending on the catch. On exceptionally good days can be as high as 5,000-15,000 kyats. Some earn a standard wage, which is approximately 7,000 kyats per round for a regular worker and 12,000 kyats for the head fisher. Others get paid based on the catch. The owner of the boats would subtract the cost of petrol, food, alcohol, tobacco and allow them to keep what remains of the catch. Others are paid based on the percentage of the catch. The estimated income of these fishermen is between 30,000 and 50,000 kyats per month, well below the minimum poverty line set up by the World Bank. Fishermen sit at the lowest chain of the fish economy and are the most impoverished members of the community. In addition, the income of the fishermen is always unpredictable depending on the catch.

Local residents in Rakhine, including fishermen themselves, generally consider fishermen as poor and uneducated. They are the most marginalized members of the society, especially if they are Rohingya. About 99% of the interviewed, 10 women, 15 men and 20 young men and women from both fishing villages indicated that every fisher believed that they are “very poor.” During the interview they often used the word “poor, poverty, low class, uneducated, victim” to describe their living situations. Fishermen do not want their children to be fishermen. A few fishermen have tried to send their children to University in Yangon or Mandalay or to get vocational training for jobs such as mechanic, or driver. One fisher who is in his 50s with a son in Yangon said,

The fishing life is so difficult, so I sent my son to Kyaukphru since he passed grade four. It cost a lot for me to send my son to get good education. Now
he passed high school and is attending Law School in Yangon. I am very happy that I can change the life of my son’s generation. But I am still fisher and my life will be end up with fisher life.\textsuperscript{13}

The Sources of Fishermen’s Poverty

Income earned by the small fishermen in Rakhine state is determined by international markets, technical know-how and skill, existing fishing stocks and fees levied on fisheries products. Fish is mostly consumed fresh locally, but export quality catches are sent to Yangon. Local processing focuses on less sophisticated methods like salting and drying. Poor quality and unsold fish are processed into dried fish, ngapi (fish paste), salted fish and animal feeds and are sent to Yangon's Bayin Naung wholesale center. Many of these activities are small-scale and home-based. Dried fish are sent to central Myanmar and upland remote areas, while non-processed chilled prawn and black tiger are exported to Bangladesh.

Lack of processing technology and skills has contributed to low quality fisheries and undermined the survival of Rakhine fishery sector. Rakhine fishermen simply keep fish on ice blocks to prevent them from rotting, or dry them for salted fish. Those who cannot afford ice see their products wasted. One fisherman said,

We don’t know how to process and preserve with modern technology. We also don’t have those things. We have the knowledge passed on to us by our father and grandfather. No one teaches us about how to preserve properly that export market

\textsuperscript{13}Author’s interview, 2013, Mrebon, March 30, 2013.
can accept our product. It doesn’t mean we don’t want to do it.\textsuperscript{14}

One trader said “Rakhine fishermen are not skillful in preserving fish. Fishermen in neighboring Bangladesh can fetch higher export price for the same type of fishermen because of their processing skills.”\textsuperscript{15} Sometime the products intended for external markets were rejected because of their poor quality. The Department of Fishery in Rakhine State estimated that 12% (28,425 tons) of the captured fisheries were wasted or turned into trash due to lack of post-harvest handling technology, insufficient equipment on the fishing boats, poor road conditions and lack of electricity.\textsuperscript{16}

Poor road conditions, lack of electricity and expensive fuel have been mentioned as a major constraint in the fishery sector. It usually takes about 3-5 days to transport the products from Sittwe to Rangoon by boat, but it takes between 24-48 hours by road. Many of the products are wasted or judged unqualified/rejected due to the long transport hours between the harvest and final destination. The products that are exported from Maung Taw transit to Bangladesh however take only about 9 hours from Sittwe and 2 hours from Maung Taw and are usually sent fresh. Despite the shorter duration to Bangladesh, more fishery products are now being sent to Yangon for better prices.

Some relatively higher quality marine capture are sent to cold storage plants to be cut, cleaned and processed in chilled, frozen or dried forms and are exported to China, Thailand, Japan, Australia and EU via Rangoon sea ports through various means of transportation. Exporters have in the past processed

\textsuperscript{14}Author’s interview, March 30, 2013, Mrebon.
\textsuperscript{15}Author’s interview, April 3, 2013, Mrebon.
\textsuperscript{16}Interview, Managing Director, Department of Fishery, Rakhine state, June 6, 2011.
(basic cut, clean and freeze) these fisheries in Sittwe and other ports and transported them through Rangoon for export, but the volume of export quality fisheries traveling through Rangoon have declined due to high transaction cost. Quite a few processing and ice plants in Sittwe were shut down by 2011 due mainly to high cost of operation (lack of electricity to operate the cold storage and ice plants, US sanction, dollars devaluation which reduced earnings from export by 40%, multiple and high taxes imposed along the roads from Sittwe to Yangon, particularly at Armt and Taunggok toll gates, poor road condition and expensive diesel. Many fishery products were reported to have been wasted or quality suffered due to poor road conditions, long hours of check at the toll gates and automobile breakdowns. The numbers of cold storage were reduced from 18 in 2005/6 and to 11 in 2010. A report by Rakhine Department of Fisheries in 2010 showed that only six (three in Sittwe) were in operation and the remaining are barely surviving and considering closing. The numbers of ice plants were reduced from 60 in 2005/2006 to 39 in 2010. Because of the decline of cold storage, the majority of the fishery products were increasingly sent fresh or chilled to a shorter destination to Bangladesh via Sittwe and Maung Taw. Export to Bangladesh was considered the last option as traders prefer Yangon market which has reliable weighing system (digital scale) and predictable market with relatively better prices. Bangladesh traders offer lower prices for their products and sometimes rejected between 10-50% of the products as substandard. Recently, however, more fishery products have been sent to Yangon market due to reduced transport costs following the elimination of toll gates in Armt and Taunggok.

Rakhine region has had limited access to cheap fuel, all of which is imported from Yangon, unlike other border towns
which can rely on cheaper fuel import from Thailand or China.\textsuperscript{17} A trader complained in 2011 that transportation costs from Yangon to Mandalay (a distance of 432 miles) was 50 kyats per viss whereas it cost 300 kyats per viss to transport goods from Yangon to Rakhine.\textsuperscript{18} Diesel cost 5000 to 6000 kyats per gallon in Rakhine in 2011 whereas it cost only 3000 kyats in Yangon. In 2011 electricity cost 400 kyats per unit in Rakhine and, 50 kyats per unit in Yangon. The government has recently offered a regular supply of electricity from Kyaukphru’s Special Economic Zone at a lower rate of between 35-40 kyats per unit since 2014 but there is little prospect for the revitalization of cold storage due to the decline in fishery productions and the outflow of workers from the fishing industry to Yangon and neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{19}

The third reason for the poor condition of the fishermen has been excessive fees and taxes imposed on fishing grounds and collecting gates.\textsuperscript{20} Until 2012, traders must pay excessive taxes at two main border checkpoints in Ann and Taunggok. Delay at checkpoints damaged their product quality and increase operation costs and reduced profits, the costs of which

\textsuperscript{17}Juliet Shwe Gaung, \textit{Myanmar Times}, August 8-14, 2011.
\textsuperscript{18}The distance between Yangon and Taungup is 278 miles and the distance between Yangon and Sittwe is 512 miles.
\textsuperscript{19}Author’s Interview, U San Shan Maung, March 2016.
\textsuperscript{20}A medium inshore fishing boat, for instance, is subject to multiple taxes by different government offices. These include (1) township administration license tax, Dof license on boats and fishing implements (21000 kyats per year), (3) naval (about 1,000 kyats per catch plus some quantities of fish) (4) internal revenue (income tax at least 24,000 kyats per year), (5) tender (150,000 kyats for small boat and 250,000 kyats for large boat per year), (6) municipal tax of 7000 kyats (market tax and docking tax) per entry. A fisherman who sold a fish for 10000 kyats therefore is left with only 3000 kyats after paying 7000 kyats for docking fees and sale tax. Taxes were also imposed at toll road gates in Taunggok on products that leave Rakhine. This high cost was passed down to the producers by offering them below the market prices. Because of the complaints from the fishermen, the tollgates taxes in fact were reduced between 50% and 75% in October 2011.
were again passed down to fishermen. The tender system, or the allocation/sale of “inland” fishing grounds (which includes both inshore and inland waters in Rakhine state) to private individuals who then collect users' fees from fishermen (the amount of which is set depending on the type of fishing nets and the nature of the boats) further plunge small-scale fishermen into deeper poverty. This system was introduced in Rakhine since 1993 as a way to generate funds for local military and administrative authorities. Fishermen face an additional financial burden as a result of the allocation (sale) of previously open fishing grounds to powerful and close associates of administrative authorities who then resold these fishing rights at inflated costs. These high transaction costs were passed on to the end users, that is ordinary fishermen, in the form of expensive annual fishing fees. The tender system was said to have benefited only a small portion of people, who may or may not be in fishing businesses, but were relatives and associates of government/military authorities. Some of these license holders impose direct fees on individual end users, while others divide up the plots, which were then passed on (sold) into two or three hands before it reaches the end users.

The tender system increased the cost of doing business as large businesses bid high prices to secure fishing rights per lot and attempted to retain high profit margin by over-extracting resources and charging high prices on subcontractors. Inshore fishermen and small-scale fishermen also argue that the system undermined the welfare of the majority populations and restricted poor residents from fishing for household consumption and small extra income. Local populations reported having to pay a fine of 20,000 kyats or having their fishing equipment confiscated when they were found fishing in private plots. Some complained of having to pay three separate fees to three fishing grounds or yay kwin that were controlled
by three different license holders. These yay kwin fees cost them up to 100,000 kyats per fishing ground or 500,000 to 600,000 kyats per year for three different fishing grounds, making up the largest percentage of the production cost of fishing operation. Some ordinary fishermen mentioned they paid about 500 to 800 kyats per day for the use of these private fishing grounds since they could not afford to pay for the monthly fees. Rakhine tender license holders often had to rely on the help of the local police for enforcement due to strong resistance.

A continuing debate and discussion in Rakhine State between the administration, elected officials and businesses and fishermen on the issue of fishing licenses have resulted in the introduction of two open fishing grounds by the Rakhine Minister of Agriculture and Livestock after U Thein Sein government came to power in 2011. This initiative has eliminated middlemen between the Department of Fishery and the fishermen, under which the inshore fishermen’s association is now required to pay direct fees to the Department of Fishery, reducing the payment of individual fisherman by more than 10 times. For instance, fees that used to cost individuals 500,000 kyats now costs between 13,000 to 28,000 kyats depending on the types of fishing nets. The creation of two open common or fishing groups has generated the same amount of revenue that the Department of Fishery would have earned under the tender system (since Fishermen Association agreed to pay for the floor price set by the Department of Fishery), lowered the fees for the fishermen and allowed them unlimited access without restricting the numbers of people who could use it. Along with

---

21In Maung Taw and Buthi Taung townships, where Rohingya constitute the overwhelming majority of the populations, individuals who won the tender licenses and who were in prominent government positions (particularly DoF, Immigration, border security guard, Customs) are predominantly Rakhine Buddhists.
this new development, the elimination of various fees at the Armt and Taungok checkpoints, which reduce expenses to transport goods to Yangon have helped to lower costs.

While some argue that the ending of tender system has increased the rate of depletion of marine resources since individuals intensify efforts to catch fish due to open and unlimited access, others observe that this new policy has also instilled a sense of responsibility by Rakhine fishermen to collectively preserve fishing stocks.\textsuperscript{22} A few people credited the Rakhine State Freshwater Fisheries Law that was passed in 2014 by the Rakhine state parliament which recognizes the rights of communities to establish community fisheries organizations and associations to manage the resources as a positive measure to sustain fisheries resource.\textsuperscript{23} However, many challenges, particularly overfishing from commercial operators that are trawling inshore, remain.

Depletion of Marine Resources

Marine capture activities were intensified following the new liberalization policy in the 1994 which allowed private investors, particularly foreign offshore boats with high powered capture capacities, to work in Myanmar's relatively unexplored ocean. Fishery stocks have declined since then. The Department of Fishery decided not to issue new license on offshore boats in response to a report on the alarming rate of marine resources depletion.\textsuperscript{24} Local fishermen acknowledge declining fishery stock as one of the main challenges to their livelihood, but devised a wide variety of strategies to deal with

\textsuperscript{22}Conversation with local businessmen and Rakhine state elected members of parliament from Rakhine state, 1 June 2015.
\textsuperscript{24}Weekly Eleven, 6, July 13, 2011, 5.
the challenge. Their immediate response to the growing scarcity of resources has been to intensify the capture by using prohibited tools (such as chemical and poison) in prohibited areas and seasons.

Many inshore boats have increasingly resorted to “baby trawl,” a prohibited fishing boat/net in inshore waters, while small-scale fishermen rely on explosive implements (such as weed killing poison and electric shock) in desperate attempt to make the most out of the shrinking resources. Baby trawl is said to exacerbate declining resources because it tends to capture small fisheries unqualified for export, leading to waste, destruction of seaweeds and plantations and disruption of the spawning activities and fish habitats. It destroys other smaller nets operated by small-scale (non-mechanized) fishermen. One of the fishery officers said,

Nowadays, we all from fishery sector are suffering the effect of trawlers. Trawlers are very dangerous fishing gear and we want every fisher to stop their use. They destroy every creatures living on the sea bed and dwelling place for fish to grow again. We feel powerless to stop this practice. So we are folding our arm and looking at the destruction.25

The tender system has also contributed to the decline in fishing stocks. The need to recuperate fees forces small-scale fishermen to intensify their fishing activities. One poor fisher said,

We have never met the person who won the exclusive rights over fishing groups. If I meet them in person, I would like to tell them about our situation. The fishing ground fees have increased,

25Author’s interview with Manager, Mrebon Department of Fishery, March 22, 2013.
but the catches have decreased. The only option is that I have is to work extra hours until I can collect the right amount of fisheries.\textsuperscript{26}

Fishermen also fished during the official closing closed period between June and July. According to a fisher from Pauktaw, “We fish during the closing season. If government creates job opportunities during closing period, I guarantee that fishermen will not breach the law. Now we have no other alternative jobs and no other way to fill our stomach and mouth.”\textsuperscript{27}

The Department of Fisheries has the authority to limit fishing grounds, fishing periods, methods, net size, and catch volume for the fishing rights operations, but has limited resources, personnel, capacity, and effective monitoring system. The Department of Fisheries has a total of 1829 staff over the whole country, managing the welfare and livelihood of over 3 million in the country.\textsuperscript{28} This can be compared with over 10,000 staff in each of Forestry and Agriculture departments (the latter department, however, theoretically serves 60\% of the population). Rakhine Department of Fisheries has 115 permanent staff and 66 part-timers which, according to a Yangon based mid-level Department of Fisheries official, should be increased three times the current size to be able to effectively manage the existing workload. Consequently, the Department of Fisheries has to delegate monitoring and enforcement of fishing activities to the Myanmar navy and coast guard which also lack resources and capacity to monitor activities along the long stretches of coastal areas and are manned by underpaid and corrupt personnel. There are cases where these under paid and underfunded Department of

\textsuperscript{26}Author’s interview, Pauk Taw, March 10, 2013.
\textsuperscript{27}Author’s interview, Pauk Taw, March 10, 2013.
\textsuperscript{28}Nilar Myint Htoo, 43. Department of Fisheries, 2010, 3.
Fisheries departments accepted payments for the use of prohibited instruments and fishing activities during the open and close seasons.

The other source of environmental destruction in Rakhine area is caused by trap and hold shrimp farming practice in the region (more generally called “extensive shrimp farming”). Trap and hold shrimp farming is different from traditional catch activities but it affects the catch industry to the extent that it obtains baby prawn by trapping them from the sea. Rakhine state has the largest acreage of shrimp farms in the country, which now face similar problem of declining productivity and production. The shrimp farming was introduced under the military government to increase state revenue and budget for local military. The Rakhine military commander encouraged paddy farmers and fishermen to build shrimp ponds. Fishermen reaped huge profits during the initial years of the business. The number of shrimp farms increased every year mainly from converting paddy fields into shrimp ponds. Expansion of shrimp ponds also involved cutting mangroves that deter from baby shrimp to come in the pond. Moreover, the shrimp pond adversely affects rice fields that were now inundated with salt water. Fish can no longer lay egg in what used to be in mangrove forests.

Though the sizes vary, the majority of the shrimp farms are huge (each farm has 100 to 200 acres) and their numbers have grown until lately with financing mostly from Bangladesh. Farms are generally owned by richer persons from the village or by outsiders and are commonly located on the bank of a stream surrounded by an embankment with a

---

Small Scale Fishermen

A drainage system that trap natural baby prawn from the ocean during high tide in the spring and raise them with little or no feed for a period of about 3 and half month. The mature shrimps are filtered and harvested as they attempt to make their way toward the ocean along with the receding tide, which occurs two cycles per month. Such practice, which constitutes a major portion of salt water prawn breeding (101,945 out of total 150,000 acres in 2010) is known as traditional “trap and hold” method or extensive system based on the construction of large open holding area (the size however varies between 2 and 100 acres per holding area) through destruction of mangrove forest areas. This practice has adverse environmental consequences as farms take baby shrimp from mangroves, interrupting the spawning of shrimp in natural environments and reducing the catch for capture fisheries. As a result of these and the spread of disease, as growth in shrimp farming has slowed so has the profit margin of the shrimp farmers.30

After two decades of growth in the industry, the fishery sector (both marine capture and aquaculture) has begun to witness a gradual decline in production and productivity despite desperate effort by individuals to intensify capture through the use of prohibited fishing implements in prohibited zones and seasons and despite the government’s decision not to issue new licenses to offshore fishing boats. Enforcement against illegal fishing has largely failed as poorly paid and understaffed civil servants engaged in a myriad of corruptive networks as a way to fund themselves.

Shocks are another factor that have affected the precarious living situation this very highly volatile region. Two main shocks that affected the region are communal violence and extreme weather that have undermined the livelihood of

30Interview with shrimp farmers in Sittwe and Pauk Taw, Rakhine State, June-July, 2011.
poor fishermen in the region. Communal violence in 2012 affected the industry to the extent it restricts activities of Rohingyas fishermen who have been confined in camps.\textsuperscript{31} Fishing activities have slowed down, leading to price hike in the region. The shrimp industry was also hard hit by the Giri Cyclone that hit some of the Rakhine area in 2010. It was estimated that 50,000 acres of coastal aquaculture ponds were damaged.\textsuperscript{32}

**How Do Small-Scale Fishermen Cope with Their Precarious Living Conditions?**

The income of fishermen is not sufficient or predictable, so they must supplement their income with other activities to feed their families. Apart from fishing, they glide along the river to cut and collect the firewood from mangrove forests for family consumption and sale. Firewood is in demand in region since they do not have electricity for cooking and drying fish. The price of the firewood varies depending on the season and the availability of forest resources. For instance, the price of firewood usually increases in rainy season due to higher demand. Some fisher families pile up the firewood in summer and sell them back in rainy season. The average income from selling firewood is about 15,000 kyats per month. Some fishermen also trap mud crab along the swamped covered areas by the river. Some fishermen also work in the rice farms especially in areas that have relatively even and large fields. Most of their rice paddies are small, 1–3 acres. However, they have to build embankments to prevent sea water from flooding their fields. They usually grow salt-water resistant rice strains. Others are sometimes employed as daily wage farm workers.

\textsuperscript{31}Rakhine Inquiry Commission, 30.

\textsuperscript{32}Joffre Olivier and Moe Aung, “Prawn Value Chain Analysis, Rakhine State,” LIFT Project, 2012.
Fully utilizing family’s members’ labor is another common strategy to expand their income. The average family has five to seven members. All the members have to contribute toward the family’s daily income and are assigned different tasks in accordance with their capacity and experiences. The household head is usually the husband or father, who usually engages in outside activities, such as fishing, trading, carrying fish to the collectors’ station and attending village meeting. Men are appointed as spokespersons for their families and are found in every village meeting to represent their family and community.

Women manage all the domestic activities such as cooking, babysitting and managing budgets. Some women run home business to generate income. They sell basic consumer items and miscellaneous things. Some village alcohol shops were managed by women. Women also play a role in livestock raising activities. Women role in processing of fish is very important; processing fish and prawn are value added for the whole products. Children also have to contribute toward family economic activities during afterschool hours. They are assigned small errands and light tasks, such as fetching water, cooking, or taking care of their siblings, to assist their parents. Children often place carry mat or bamboo pole to assist their mothers in fish drying process. Sometimes boys accompany with their father in fishing. They sort fish.

Migration is another common coping mechanism. Some leave their villages to find temporary employment, while others left permanently for better economic opportunities. Many of them traveled to other parts of Myanmar or to neighboring countries.

The survival of the fishing industries and of small farmers has been maintained by the patron client relationships. Fishermen and collectors have interdependent interrelation-
ships but the nature of the relationship varies. Until 2012, the patron-client relationships extend beyond ethnic boundaries. It was not uncommon to see Rakhine serving as patron and Rohingya as clients. In some situations, the collectors rely on fisherman for regular supplies of fisheries, while the fishermen rely on collectors for fishing equipment, gas, fishing grounds and emergency loans. These patrons, many of whom are collectors, creditors, or boat owners, are responsible for weather-related losses and destruction. Before 2014, they also paid the tender fees of the fishing ground and allocated the fishing ground to the fishermen. In return, the fishermen agree to sell the fish to their respective collectors at low fixed prices. There are 3 to 5 village level collectors in the village, each of whom has 20 to 30 fisherman clients.

Lenders or patrons, who could be collectors, wholesalers or exporters, usually get repayment through 20-30% of the all the captures and the right to buy the capture (including dried fish, dried prawn) at lower than market prices. The amount, interest rate, repayment schedule and timing of loan, however, vary depending on the sources of credit and the nature of the relationships between creditors and farmers. In capture fishery, some fishermen obtain capital from money lenders usually for a period of 10 months and the interest rate usually runs between 2 and 5% per month for those with collateral (mostly gold) and between 10 to 20% for those without collateral.

Some families have become indebted because they cannot repay their debts. One fisher told the author, “We are making money for our collectors. We don’t have anything at the end of the day. But our collectors are getting rich and rich. We are just the slaves for them.”33 A few fishermen mentioned that the patrons deliberately keep fishermen indebted even if the latter

33Author’s interview, Mrebon, March 20, 2013.
are able to repay the money in order to make sure that the captured fisheries are sold to them. Despite these negative attitudes toward their patrons, most fishermen I have talked to tend to appreciate the beneficial role of the patrons.

Some fishermen, such as those in Mrebon township which is located between Sittwe and Kyaukphru, enjoy greater bargaining power over the collectors and wholesalers since they have a choice to send their products to Sittwe or Kyaukphru. Local collectors in these areas tend to be more accommodating and flexible toward the needs of the fishermen. In some extreme case, creditors take over the possessions of fishermen when they default, but in most cases, creditors usually accommodate the needs of fishermen by extending the period of the loan especially in cases of emergency and shock. One collector said,

> We have to invest our time, our money in this fishery business. We need to pay for transportation fees. If we experience bad weather, our inventory rots. We paid for their fishing ground. On the other hand, we support fisher’s family with some financial assistant. We just help them. Nevertheless, they were very happy to get money from us, but when the time to pay back money, they are complaining all the time. We already have agreement. We don’t exploit them.^{34}

Fishermen also have multi-string relationships with collectors. They rely on collectors for emergency loans for health issues, social affairs, religious affairs and education of their children. One of the fishermen said, “Our patron (village level collector) is very important for us. We have to count on him when we need something. We usually do not have cash

^{34}Author’s interview with a wholesaler, Pauk Taw, 15 March 2013.
with us all the time. So we can get loan from village level collector. We pay him back after we have sold our catch.” A village collector said “I have some fishermen client who sell their fish to my shop. I help them in financial need and they give me loyalty in return.”

Conclusion
Small-scale fishermen are the most basic building block and occupy the very bottom of the fishing economy. However, fishermen have increasingly faced precarious and unpredictable living situations. They have been adversely affected by a market that they have no control over, depletion of natural resources, poor infrastructure and processing technology and political turmoil. They have developed a variety of strategies to deal with challenges, by maintaining a stable relationship with their patrons as an insurance against crisis and emergency, using family labor, borrowing, and working additional jobs.

The situation in Rakhine state is also made worse by ongoing communal hostility and tension in the areas. It remains to be seen whether the new democratically elected government in Myanmar is able to improve the situation in such a way that would create more favorable environment for the survival of fishermen and the fishing industry.

References
Department of Fisheries, Fishery Statistics, Ministry of Livestock and Fishery, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2009-2010.
Khin Maung Soe. Trends of Development of Myanmar Fisheries: With

35Author’s interview, Mrebon, March 28, 2013.


Poverty and Migration from Burma: Within and Without Midi Z’s Films

“ဒီလိုတွင်အရမအရနမျိုးရင်ဆုံင်ကကရပီးသူတို့မျိုးစိမ်းတယ်။ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမဟာရနာက်ကရနသာဝါဆိုးကကီးတစ်ရကာင်လိုလိုက်ရနပါတာက+န်ရတာကိုရရှိဆက်ရမပးရအာင်တွန်းရနသလိုပါပဲ။ တမားမမန်မာလူငယ်အများကကီးလည်းဒီလိုအရမအရနမျိုးရင်ဆုံင်ကကရပီးသူတို့ရဲ့အိမ်ရတွကိုစွန့်ွာပီးပမို့မပတို့ဘာ့နိုင်ငံမားတို့သွားပီးဝမ်းစာရှာကကရပါတယ်။ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမဟာလွတ်ရမမာက်ဖို့ဆိုတာသူတို့ရရှိဆက်ရမပာင်းရနထိုင်ရမင်းရဲ့အဓိကအရကကာင်းရင်းမဖစ်သလိုဆိုတာကိုရလိုမင်းဟာသူတို့ရဲ့တကယ့်အမပင်းမပဆုံးဆန=မဖစ်ပါ။” (ရကျာက် (Zhao) ရဒရင်)

မီဒီဇက်(Midi Z)ရဲ့Zhao De-Yin (Kyawk Dad-Yin 趙德胤)ကိုZhao De-Yin (Kyawk Dad-Yin 趙德胤)ရဒရင်ဟုလည်းသိကကပါသည်။ ၎င်းသည်ယူနန်တရုတ်ရရှိဆက်ရမပာင်းရန်ထိုင်သူများထဲမှမမန်မာနိုင်ငံ၊ရှမ်းမပည်နယ်ရမမာက်ပိုင်းလားရာရိုပမို့တွင်၁၉၈၂ုနှစ်တွင်ရမွားဖွားဲ့ရသာစတုတော်မျိုးဆက်တစ်ဦးမဖစ်ပါသည်။ (၁၉၉၀နှစ်လည်ပိုင်းနှစ်များမတိုင်င်)မမန်မာနိုင်ငံမှများစွာရသာအမားရရှိဆက်ရမပာင်းရန်ထိုင်သူများကဲ့သို့သူတို့မိသားစုသည်ရငွရကကးဆိုတစ်မပားမှရကာက်စရာမရှိပမို့ (Wen-Chin Chang)
ဝှမ်ချင်းချန်းအငယ်ဆုံးမဖစ်ပီးအထက်တွင်အစ်ကိုအစ်မရလးဦးရှိသည်။ဖင်သည်လိုင်စင်မဲ့ရဆးဆရာတစ်ဦးမဖစ်ရသာ်လည်းကျန်းမာရရးတဲ့သူတစ်ဦးမဖစ်သည်။ထို့ရကကာင့်မိင်ကပင်လမ်းရရာင်းမင်း၊အလှူများတွင်ထမင်းဟင်းကူျက်ရပ်မင်း၊ဆိုင်များတွင်ပန်းကန်ရဆးမင်းနှင့်အမားသူများအတွက်အဝတ်ရလာရပ်မင်း၊ရတာင်ရပါထွက်ပစ်ည်းများကိုရစျးသို့ရရာင်းရန်ရတာင်ရပါထွက်ကုန်များကိုသယ်ရဆာင်မင်းနည်းတို့မဖင့်မိသားစုအတွက်အဓိကစီးပွားရရးသူမဖစ်ဲ့ပါသည်။

(ကျန်(Jiang)၂၀၁၄၊မီဒီဇက်၏မိင်နှင့်စာရရးသူရတွ့ဆုံရမးမမန်းဲ့မင်း၎င်း၏မိင်နှင့်ထိုသိ့ရတွ့ဆုံရမးမမန်းန်းတစ်ုတွင်မီဒီဇက်သည်သူကရလးဝရနိုင်ငံမှ သာမန်မပည်သူများအကကားတွင်ထိုကဲ့သို့ဆင်တူရိုးမှားဇာတ်လမ်းများကိုရမပာရလ့ရမပာထရှိရပသည်။အလုပ်အကိုင်အွင့်အလမ်းများသည်ရှားပါးပပီးများရသာအားမဖင့်လူတစ်ရယာက်၏လုပ်

နိုင်ငံမှ သာမန်မပည်သူများအကကားတွင်ထိုကဲ့သို့ဆင်တူရိုးမှားဇာတ်လမ်းများကိုရမပာရလ့ရမပာထရှိရပသည်။အလုပ်အကိုင်အွင့်အလမ်းများသည်ရှားပါးပပီးများရသာအားမဖင့်လူတစ်ရယာက်၏လုပ်
မီဒီဇက်(Midi Z)

အားသည်လည်း Kဝရှင်သန် ရနထိုင် စားရသာက်ရန် မလုံရလာက်ရပုံများစွာ ကူးစက်ံရသည့် အရမအရနသို့သာ ထပ်ဖန်တလဲလဲ ရရာက်ကုန်ကကသည်။

ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမနှင့်အမားရသာမဖစ်ရပ်များစွာတိုက်ကင်း မီဒီဇက်အသက်(၁၆)နှစ်တွင် မမန်မာနိုင်ငံမှထိုင်ဝမ်နိုင်ငံသို့ပိုမိုရကာင်းမွန်သည့်ပညာရရးနှင့်Kဝအနာဂတ်တစ်ုရှာရဖွရန် ထွက်လာဲ့သည်။ ၎င်း၏အမိရမမအမဖစ်ရသာ်လည်းရကာင်းမိသားစုဝင်ရပါင်းများစွာနှင့်မိတ်ရဆွသူငယ်ျင်းများလက်ရှိရနထိုင်ရနဆဲမဖစ်၍ရသာ်လည်းရကာင်းရမွးရပ်ဇာတိရမမအမဖစ်မမန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့်သံရယာဇဉ်မမပတ်၊ လွမ်းသည့်စိတ်နှင့်ဤနိုင်ငံအရကကာင်းပုံမပင်ဇာတ်လမ်းများကို ရမပာမပလိုသည့်စိတ်များနက်နက်ဖွင်ဖိုးပပီးနိုင်ငံများတွင် ရနထိုင်ကကသူများအတွက်မမန်မာမပည်သည်လိုဝှက်ဆန်းကျယ်ရနရသာ်လည်းရုပ်ရှင်ဇာတ်လမ်းဆန်ဆန်၊ အံ့ဩ...
ဝှမ်ချင်းချန်းဖွယ်မဖစ်ရပ်များသည်မီနိုင်ငံတွင်တရန့တာမဖစ်ပါသည်။ မီဒီဇက်သည် လူမှား၍ဓါးထိုးံဲ့ရဖူးသလိုဆိုးရွားသည့်ကားတိုက်မဖစ်ပါပီးအမားရသာသူငယ်ျင်းနှစ်ရယာက်နှင့်အတူအမဲလိုက်ရာတွင်ရိုင်ဖယ်ရသနတ်ကိုသုံးသမဖင့်တရားမဝင်လက်နက်ကိုင်ရဆာင်မဖင့်ရထာင်သုံးလကျဲ့ဖူးပါသည်။ထိုအမှတ်တရမဖစ်ရပ်များသည်သူ၏မမန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာရုပ်ရှင်ဇာတ်လမ်းအရှည်သုံးုနှင့်ဇာတ်လမ်းအတိုရပါင်းများစွာအတွက်ဖန်တီးရပးရသာအင်အားတစ်ုမဖစ်သွားဲ့သည်။ရုပ်ရှင်များမှမမန်မာမပည်သိ့အမပန်(၂၀၁၁)၊ဆင်းရဲသားများ(၂၀၁၂)နှင့်ရရဲအကျဉ်းရထာင်(၂၀၁၄)တို့မဖစ်ပပီးထိုသုံးကားလုံးသည်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမဖင့်ရရ့ရမပာင်းအရကကာင်းအရာကိုဗဟိုမပုရိုက်ကူးတင်ဆက်ထားပါသည်။

ဤစာတမ်းတွင်မီဒီဇက်၏ရုပ်ရှင်သုံးကားရပါတွင်အရမံပပီး၎င်းတို့အကကံုနှင့်အမမင်၊မမန်မာနိုင်ငံသိ့ယူနန်မှရရ့ရမပာင်းအရမျသူများအရကကာင်းစာရရးသူ၏ကိုယ်ပိုင်နားလည်မအရပါအရမံပပီးမမန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမဖင့်ရရ့ရမပာင်းရနထိုင်မဖင့်ဆိုင်ရာအရကကာင်းအရာကိုစူးစမ်းရလ့လာရန်ကကိုးစားထားပါသည်။အထူးသမဖင့်ဤစာတမ်းသည်နိုင်ငံတစ်နိုင်ငံအတွင်း၌ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမဖင့်နိုင်ငံအဆင့်(macro)ရရထာ့မှရန်ရပာ့ွဲမမ်းစိတ်မဖာသုံးသပ်မင်း၊အရကကာင်းအရင်းမဖစ်ရစသည့်အျက်များကိုရမရာ့ပပီးိုင်မာသည့်အရမဖများကိုရပးရန်ရတာ့မရည်ရွယ်ပါ။ထိုသိ့မပုမည့်အစားဤစာတမ်းသည်မမန်မာမပည်ဖွားဒါရိုက်တာတစ်ဦးသည်မိမိရဒသရပ်ရွာမှဆင်းရဲသားများ၏မဖစ်ပါး၊နိုင်ငံ၏လူမဖစ်နိုင်ငံရရးဆိုင်ရာဇာတ်ကွက်များနှင့်ယူနန်မှရရ့ရမပာင်းရနထိုင်အရမျသူများ၏အမအရန်များကိုရပြီးကကိုးစားမှုအင်အားတစ်ဦး
အက်အဲ ရနာက်ကွယ်တွင် ရှိသည် ဖွဲ့စည်းအုပ်မယန့်ဆိုင်ရာလကဏာအဂဂရပ်များကို မည်သို့ပုံရဖာ်ရိုက်ကူးမပသည့်ကို ရတွေမမင်နိုင်ရန် သူရုပ်ရှင်ကားများမှတဆင့်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမကိုရလ့လာသုံးသပ်ထားပါသည်။ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများ၏ Kဝကိုကကည့်မင်းအားမဖင့်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးဟူသည့်ရမးွန်းကို ဒါရိုက်တာမှမည်သို့ကိုင်တွယ်ပါသနည်း။ မီဒီဇက်(Midi Z)ထိုင်ဝမ်တွင်ရရ့ရမပာင်းအရမျမနှင့်ရနထိုင်မတို့သည် ၎င်း၏ရုပ်ရှင်ရိုက်ကူးမဆိုင်ရာသက်ရရာက်ပါသနည်း။ နိစဓူဝKဝတွင်ယူနန်မှရရ့ရမပာင်းရနိုင်သူများ၏လိုက်ရလျာညီရထွရနိုင်သူမဟာဗျူဟာများမှမည်သို့နည်း။ ၎င်းတို့မဟာဗျူဟာများသည် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမကိုရကျာ်လားနိုင်ရအာင်ကူညီရပးသလားသို့မဟုတ်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသည်ရရှာင်လွဲမရနိုင်ရသာကံကကမာတစ်ုပဲလား။ ထို့အမပင် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမဆိုင်ရာသုရတသနများတွင်ရရှ့ရဆာင်သူတစ်ဦးမဖစ်သည့်ရအာ်စကာလူးဝစ်(Oscar Lewis)မှတင်မပရ့ရသာ"ဆင်းရဲမင်းKဝနှင့်အမအရနများ"သည်မီဒီဇက်၏ရုပ်ရှင်များတွင်သို့မဟုတ်ယူနန်မှရရ့ရမပာင်းရနိုင်သူများ၏လက်ရတွ့Kဝများတွင်ရကာပမဲမမမံရနပါသလားသို့တည်းမဟုတ်ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမဆိုရသာအရိပ်မည်းကကီးသည်အုပ်ဆိုပ်မယန့်ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံဆိုင်ရာတန်းမတူမည်မLမရကကာင့်သာအဓိကမဖစ်ရပါရနမင်းရပလားစရသာရမးွန်းများကိုရမဖဆိုရန်ဤစာတမ်းတွင်ကကိုးစားထားပါသည်။ ရအာက်ပါကများတွင်စာရရးသူသည်မီဒီဇက်၏ရုပ်ရှင်များကိုနFင်းယှဉ်သုံးသပ်မဆိုရွးျယ်ထားသမဖင့်လူးဝစ်ရရးသားထားသည်များကိုရရွးျယ်ထားသမဖင့်လူးဝစ်၏စာရပများကိုမပန်လည်သုံးသပ်မင်းမဖင့်စတင်ပါသည်။ လူးဝစ်ကိုရရွးျယ်ရသည်မှာဆင်းရဲသားများကိုသုရတသနမပုရာတွင်ရရှ့ရဆာင်လမ်းမပပုဂbိုလ်တစ်ဦးမဖစ်ရုံမLမကစာရပရရးဟန်မဖင့်
ဝှမ်ချင်းချန်း ဇာတ်ရကာင်စရိုက်ကို သရုပ်ရဖာ်ထားရသာ မိသားစုကို ဗဟိုမပုသည့် လူး ဝစ်၏ လူမျိုးနှင့်ယဉ်ရကျးမ သရုပ်ွဲမင်း ပညာရပ်ဆိုင်ရာ စာအုပ်များနှင့် မီဒီဇက်၏ ရုပ်ရှင်များ ဆက်နွယ်ရနရသာ ရကကာင့်လည်း မဖစ်ပါသည်။ လူးဝစ်၏ စာအုပ်များထဲမှ တစ်အုပ်မဖစ်ရသာ ဆန်းစစ်ျက်မှကရလးများ (၁၉၆၁နှစ်)စာအုပ်ကို ရဟာလီးဝုဒ် ရုပ်ရှင်ကားတစ်ုအမဖစ် မင်းသားကကီး အန်တိုနီကွင်း သရုပ်ရဆာင်၍ အသက်သွင်းဲ့ကကပီးရုပ်ရှင်ကို ၁၉၇၈နှစ် နိုဝင်ာလ၁၆ရက်တွင် ပွဲဦးထွက် တင်ဆက်ပါသည်။ ဆင်းရဲမင်းဝနှင့် အရမအရနကို အရမပာင်းအလဲ မရှိရသာအရမံ သာဝအမဖစ် ရဖာ်မပမင်းရကကာင့်ရဝဖန်ံဲ့ရရသာ်လည်း လူးဝစ် စာများသည် မနုဿရဗဒတွင် ယဉ်ရကျးမ နှင့်ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ရဆာက်ပုံတို့ အန်းကန့်စပ်လျဉ်းပပီး ဆက်လက်ရဆွးရနွးမရပါင်းများစွာကို လပံ့ရဆာ်ရပါသည်။ လူးဝစ်၏ စာများကို မပန်လည်သုံးသပ်ပပီးသည့်ရနာက် စာရရးသူသည် ယူနန်မှ မမန်မာနိုင်ငံသို ရရ့ရမပာင်းရများ၊ မမန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လက်ရှိလူရရး၊ နိုင်ငံရရးအရမအရန်ဆက်နွယ်ပပီး မီဒီဇက်၏ဝနှင့် အရတွ့အကကုံကို စတင်ရလ့လာပါသည်။ မမန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် နိုင်ငံရပ်မားတွင် ရှင်သန်မဖတ်သန်းဲ့ရသည့် သူ့အရတွ့အကကုံများကို ပုံရဖာ်ရရးသားပပီး သူ့ရုပ်ရှင်သုံးကားကို ရလ့လာပါသည်။ မီဒီဇက်နှင့်လူးဝစ် အား စာရရးသူ၏ နFင်းယှဉ်သည့် သုံးသပ် ဆန်းစစ်ျက်အရ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမင်း သံသရာသည် ရပ်တန့်မင်း မရှိ ဆက်လက်တည်မပမဲမမံရနသည်ဟူရသာ လူးဝစ်၏ အဆိုနှင့် တူသရယာင်ရှိ၍ မီဒီ ဇက်၏အဓိကဇာတ်ရကာင်များသည် လူးဝစ်၏ ဇာတ်ရကာင်များကဲ့သိုပင် အက်အဲများအတွင်း စဉ်ဆက်မမပတ်ပိတ်မိရနကကြင့်
မီဒီဇက် (Midi Z) အတွက် ပထမပုဂိုလ်မှ အုပ်စုမှူး၊ ဖျင်စည်းပုံဆိုင်ရာ တန်းတူမညီးကို ရထားမပွဲ့ရသေးသော်လည်း ဒုတိယပုဂိုလ်၏ လက်ရာများတွင် ထိုအျက်ကို မရတွေ့ရရှိရလိုလျော်ကား၊ ၎င်းကိုယ်တိုင်နှင့် အမားရသာ ယူနန်မှ ရရှိမှုပေါ်ရနိုင်သူများ၏ အသက်ရွာမှုကို ရွေှေစွာဖြင့် တို့အားလုံးကို မရမှုရရှိရကာက်ရကာက်ပါရအာင် လိုက်ရာတွင်ရဲ့ရသာရာမှ မမင်းဇာတ်လမ်းများကို ပိုသိရှိအမိန့်ပွင့်မင်းရကကာင့် ရသာ်လည်းရကာင်း၊ ရုပ်ရှင်ဒါရိုက်တာသည် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှူးကို ဖြင့် ရုပ်ရှင်ထဲတွင် ရုန်းထွက် မရနိုင်သည့် ထာဝစဉ် တည်တံ့ပမဲမမှုဖင့် တင်မပေးရကာက်၊ ထိုသို့စဉ်းစားမည့်အစား ရုပ်ရှင်များကို ဆင်းရဲသူများမှ အာဏာရှိသူများအရပါစွပ်စွဲျက်၊ မရကျနပ်လျက်များကို အသံတစ်သံအမဖစ် ရဖာ်ထုတ်နိုင်သည့် နည်းလမ်းတစ့်အရန့်ဖင့်သာ ရမမင်သင့်ရကကာင်း စာရရးသူမှ အကကံမပုလိုက်ပါသည်။
Poverty and Migration from Burma: Within and Without Midi Z’s Films
Wen-Chin Chang

Ever since I was little, poverty has been chasing me like a beast, compelling me to keep on running. Many other Burmese young people face the same condition and are forced to leave their homes to cities or abroad for making a living. Escaping poverty is the main cause of their migration, and acquiring wealth is their earnest wish. (Zhao 2015:65)

Midi Z, also known as Zhao De-Yin (or Kyawk Dad-Yin 趙德胤) is a fourth-generation Yunnanese Chinese migrant born in 1982 in Lashio, northern Shan State in Burma (or Myanmar). Like the

---

1I am indebted to Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung’s careful reading of my paper and her meticulous and useful suggestions for my revision. For writing this paper, I have drawn on reports and articles on Midi Z, his Facebook page, public talks and a book by him on his filmmaking (Zhao 2015), and my interviews with him in Taipei (5 October 2014) and with his mother in Lashio (3 November 2014).

2The Yunnanese Chinese migrants (hereafter Yunnanese migrants) referred to in this paper are Han Chinese. Midi Z refers to his ancestral roots in Nanjing, China. It is not clear when the first-generation ancestor arrived in Yunnan. According to Midi Z’s mother, Midi Z’s great-grandfather migrated from Yunnan to a border place named Hemonglong in northern Shan State of Burma. Around 1968 when the Communist Party of Burma penetrated the area, the family moved from Hemonglong to Lashio (my interview with Midi Z’s mother).
great majority of the people in Burma, and most fellow migrants (prior to the mid-1990s), the family was destitute. Midi Z is the youngest child with four other siblings. His father, though an unlicensed medicine man, suffered from poor health. His mother thus provided the main economic support for the family—selling food on the street, helping cook at banquets, washing dishes in shops, washing clothes for other people and carrying mountain produce to the market for sale (Jiang 2014; my interview with Midi Z’s mother). Only four years before my interview with her, the mother had stopped working. Midi Z recalled the living conditions of his childhood in an interview:

One year’s total income was not even enough for buying a pair of Nike sneakers…. Our house was grass roofed with bamboo walls and dirt ground. Once it rained heavily, and the house collapsed…. The [one-room] house accommodated eight people—my grandfather, my parents and five kids. (Fang 2014:54).

Similar stories are commonly told among ordinary people in Burma. Job opportunities are scarce, and often one’s labor does not make ends meet. Going to the jade mines in Hpakant and engaging in drug trafficking become two of the most popular means of obtaining wealth that numerous migrant Yunnanese youths risk their lives to pursue. Nevertheless, the reality is most of the time cruel rather than merciful, repeatedly leading to drug addiction and a range of diseases and illnesses, in particular AIDS (Chang 2014b; Hughes and Ward 1997; Levy and Scott-Clark 2001; Zhao 2015; Zhou 1996:298).

Poverty and a series of incidents pushed Midi Z to leave the country at 16 in search of a better education and future in Taiwan. However, the unbroken tie with Burma as his native homeland that predicates his connection with many family
members and friends still living there, has generated a deep sense of nostalgia and also an urge to tell stories. Despite impoverishment, life in Burma also evokes many beautiful memories for him, especially of experiences in nature. Images of snakes, baby tigers and other wild animals being sold in the market often recur in his memory. While Burma may seem mysterious to the people living in developed societies, dramatic events were part of his life. He was once mistakenly knifed, had two serious car accidents and was even imprisoned for three months with two other friends for possessing unlawful firearms—using a rifle while hunting (Zhao 2014b). These memories, entangled with deep love and despair, have never faded but have transformed into a creative force for his many short films and three movies on Burma. The movies are Return to Burma (2011), Poor Folk (2012) and Ice Poison (2014), all centered on the themes of poverty and migration.

In this paper, based on Midi Z’s three movies, his life experiences and outlook, and my own understanding of Yunnanese migrants of Burma, I attempt to explore the issue of poverty and migration in Burma. More specifically, the paper does not aim to study poverty in the country from a macro-perspective by analyzing general political and economic indexes, tracing causal factors and providing concrete solutions. Instead, it looks at the poverty issue through a Burmese native director’s films, to see how he portrays the lives of poor people from his community and the underlining cultural and structural features in relation to the socio-political scenarios of the country and Yunnanese migrant’s culture of mobility. The questions addressed are: How does he deal with the question of poverty by looking at poor folk’s lives? How do Midi Z’s migration and living experiences

---

1 I have researched Yunnanese migrants in Burma, Thailand, Taiwan, Yunnan, Hong Kong and Guangzhou since 1994, with a focus on their migration history and transnational trade (Chang 2014b).
abroad (Taiwan) impact his filmmaking? What are Yunnanese migrants’ adaptive strategies in their everyday lives? Do their strategies lead them to overcome poverty, or is poverty a kind of destiny? Moreover, do we see a kind of perpetuating “culture of poverty,” which Oscar Lewis (1959, 1966a), a pioneer in poverty studies, advocates, in Midi Z’s films or in the real lives of Yunnanese migrants, or is the specter of poverty essentially attributed to structural inequality?

In the following sections, I begin by briefly reviewing Lewis’s work, which I choose for a comparative analysis of Midi Z’s movies. I select Lewis not only because he is a pioneer in the studies of the poor, but also because Midi Z’s movies relate to Lewis’s family-centered ethnographies characterized by a literary style. One of Lewis’s books—*The Children of Sanchez* (1961)—was adapted into a Hollywood film; the premiere was shown on 16 November 1978, starring Anthony Quinn. Although criticized as essentializing the poor, Lewis’s work has aroused continuous discussions on the role of culture and structure in anthropology. After reviewing Lewis, I enter Midi Z’s life and work in relation to Yunnanese migration and livelihoods, and Burma’s current socio-political scenarios. I depict Midi Z’s lived experiences in Burma and abroad and look into his three movies. My comparative analysis between him and Lewis shows their similarities and differences in portraying poverty. While on the surface Midi Z’s movies seem to resemble Lewis’s advocacy for perpetuating the culture of poverty, since Midi Z’s protagonists, like Lewis’s, are constantly caught up in predicaments, the former touches on the aspect of structural inequality, which is lacking in the latter’s work. Because Midi Z’s exploration of poverty is more nuanced than Lewis’s, and he has greater awareness of his own and other Yunnanese migrants’ successful stories in their career pursuits, I suggest that the director does not intend to portray poverty as a perpetual culture in his movies; instead the movies
Poverty and Migration from Burma

could be seen as a means to voice the poor’s indictment against those in power.

“Culture Of Poverty” and Studies of the Poor

Oscar Lewis (1914-1970), an American anthropologist, began his research among poor people via a family-focused approach from the 1940s. By writing detailed and compelling stories of family lives, he succeeded in bringing the reader into the world of the poor in Mexico, Puerto Rico, New York and northern India (1951, 1959, 1961, 1964, 1966a). His theory of the poor is built on the concept of a “culture of poverty,” first introduced in *Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty*, published in 1959, then further explicated in the introductions of two other books and a journal article (1961, 1966a, 1966b). However, the concept has also generated heated disputes, criticisms and even misuse. According to Lewis, the culture of poverty is “both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society” (1966a: xliv). In other words, it is a set of coping mechanisms in the face of harsh living conditions. Furthermore, Lewis stresses that it is not confined to the economic sphere, but includes a wide range of dimensions in life: material culture, social networks, familial relations, religious life, individual values and attitudes, and so on. Specifically, he says:

> As an anthropologist I have tried to understand poverty and its associated traits as a culture or, more accurately, as a subculture with its own structure and rationale, as a way of life which is passed down from generation to generation along family lines. This view directs attention to the fact that the culture of poverty in modern nations is not only a

---

*A few good reviews of Lewis’s work include: Bourgois (2001), Eames and Goode (1980), Small, Harding and Lamont (2010).*
matter of economic deprivation, of disorganization or of the absence of something. It is also something positive and provides some rewards without which the poor could hardly carry on. (Lewis 1966a: xliii)

One essential feature mentioned here is the positive aspect in the culture that parallels what we often refer to today as individual agency, which helps generate adaptive strategies to deal with challenges in everyday life. In Lewis’s work, we learn about his informants’ struggle against poverty with loans via social networks or by taking a range of odd jobs at the same time. Wives and mothers shoulder the responsibility of housework, child rearing and food provision, and resort to local beliefs and religious practices for health or love. Some parents exert themselves to support their children’s education, but while others do not. With their perseverance:

the lives of the poor are not dull. The stories... reveal.... an intensity of feeling and human warmth, a strong sense of individuality, a capacity for gaiety, a hope for a better life, a desire for understanding and love, a readiness to share the little they possess, and the courage to carry on in the face of many unresolved problems (1961: xii).

Such struggle is intermixed with agency and marginality among impoverished migrants moving internally from the countryside to cities or externally from an underdeveloped country to a developed country. In recognizing constant violence, suffering and deprivation among the poor, Lewis reveals his informants’ hope and courage to fight against numerous odds.

Nevertheless, Lewis also essentializes his interpretation of the “culture of poverty,” as he treats it as an unchanging value-system that perpetuates from generation to generation. He says:
By the time slum children are age six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities. (1966a: xlv)

This advocacy of intergenerational transmission and early childhood socialization is contrary to the ethos of a way of life constituting a set of adaptive strategies for survival while the poor interact with external environments (Eames and Goode 1980:276).

Furthermore, in contrast to the positive aspect mentioned above, Lewis underlines the feelings of despair, apathy and hopelessness, which lead to a kind of fatalism among the poor (1966a: xlix, li). He considers the culture of poor people a “relatively thin culture” (1966a: lii), and lists many negative traits pertaining to it (1966a xlvi-xlviii, 1998:9). He says:

There is a great deal of pathos, suffering and emptiness among those who live in the culture of poverty. It does not provide much support or long-range satisfaction and its encouragement of mistrust tends to magnify helplessness and isolation. Indeed, the poverty of culture is one of the crucial aspects of the culture of poverty. (1966a:lii)

Not only are his explanations unclarified, but they result in misinterpretation or even misuse of his studies. Some politicians tend to see the culture of poverty as the cause of poverty and not as its result. The battles against poverty in the US since the 1960s provide frequently quoted examples. Many poor and minority communities were involuntarily dislocated with the objective of “development” and removal of poverty (Wilson 1991; Zinn 1989).
Looking into the negative traits Lewis attaches to the poor, we discover that they constitute a mixture of different categories. Many of them actually belong to contextual problems, such as underemployment, unemployment, borrowing from local moneylenders, a low level of literacy and living in slums. However, neither Lewis’s stories nor his theoretical discussions sufficiently explore the structural inequality that originates from external systems and causes problems due to marginal accessibility of education, jobs, housing and so on. Moreover, many negative behavior traits attributed to the poor, such as marriage instability, alcoholism, confusion over sexual identification, and early sexual initiation, are not confined only to the lower classes. Eames and Goode thus critique that many of the traits Lewis attributes to the poor are “contradictory, not testable, and negative in tone” (Eames and Goode 1980: 285) and they consider his poverty studies ethnocentric, grounded in the perspective of the American middle class (Eames and Goode: 278).

With regards to Lewis’s theoretical limitation, many scholars have suggested counterbalancing it with investigation of structural contextualization (e.g., Bourgois 2001; Gajdoskiene 2004; Eames and Goode 1980; Stack 1974). Actually Lewis is aware of the difference in historical contexts from society to society; he distinguishes the proletariat’s struggle in Algeria from the struggle among the low-income Puerto Ricans (1966a: 1). Nevertheless, he still essentializes his poverty-culture notion and does not perceive a sense of historical consciousness or class consciousness among the poor. He says:

People with a culture of poverty have very little sense of history. They are a marginal people who know only their own troubles, their own local conditions, their own neighborhood, their own way of life. (Lewis 1998: 7)
When the poor become class-conscious or active members of trade-union organizations, or when they adopt an internationalist outlook on the world, they are no longer part of the culture of poverty, although they may still be desperately poor. (Lewis1966a: xlviii)

Through deeply human and vivid stories, Lewis brings life to his informants and opens up a significant research field. His contributions are undeniable. However, in the face of a more complex, capitalistic and globalized world, his interpretation appears somewhat rigid and oversimplified. For people of the underdeveloped world, migration to wealthy countries has been a primary means to improve their lives. Their mobility through a range of countries, and experiences in multiple life situations have certainly strengthened their awareness of the discrepancy and inequality among people of and within different societies. Many authors in the field of migration have shed light on migrants’ self-reflections on their transnationality and multiple experiences of discrimination as they connect with differences and inequality in culture, gender, ethnicity and socio-economic status. Distinctively, Gloria Anzaldúa brings up “mestiza consciousness” (1987), Luis Guarnizo “transnational habitus” (1997), and Patricia Zavella “peripheral vision” (2011). Despite the above-mentioned shortcomings, Lewis’s works remain useful for comparison and contrast. In reviewing Midi Z’s movies and his filming career in the following sections, I will illustrate his similarities with and differences from Lewis’s writings.

**Midi Z—From Burma to Taiwan**

Historically, Yunnanese from southwestern China have moved back and forth between Yunnan and its neighboring countries for either economic or political undertakings. Because of its contiguity with Yunnan, Burma in particular has been the major
recipient country for Yunnanese migration (Chen 1966; Forbes and Henley 1997; Hill 1998; Wang and Zhang 1993; Sun 2000; Yang 2008). The primary proportion of the Yunnanese migrants in Burma today are descendants of refugees fleeing Yunnan after the Chinese Communist Party took over China.\(^5\) Without legal status, most Yunnanese refugees first settled in rural Shan or Kachin States after arriving in Burma. They made a living by farming or small trade in local markets. In addition, many people, following their predecessors’ engagement in long-distance mule caravan trade, joined the illegal venture to trade between Burma and Thailand mostly also by means of mule caravans during the socialist period (1962-1988) (Chang 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014a, 2014b).

Burma, an ethnically diverse country which gained its independence from British colonization in 1948, has long been politically divided. It was briefly governed by a parliamentary system (1948-1962), but from 1962 to early 2016, it was ruled by a series of military regimes.\(^6\) Even the quasi-civilian government, formed in March 2011, was closely connected with the Burmese military (Callahan 2003; Smith 1993; South 2008; Steinberg 2006; Tagliacozzo and Chang 2014; Thawnghmung 2012; Wilson, ed. 2006). Continuous isolation, suppressive rule and policy mistakes severely set back the nation’s economy, resulting in Burma’s ranking as one of the poorest countries in the world, despite its rich natural resources. Except for a small portion of wealthy people, the great majority are the poor, living in the mire of

---

\(^5\)There is no reliable population figure for the Yunnanese migrants in Burma. Estimates given by informants range from half a million to one million. The descendants of contemporary Yunnanese refugees may account as high as 80 percent.

\(^6\)The new government under de facto leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi as the State Counsellor only commenced on April 6, 2016. Founded on civilian rule, it constitutes a political landmark in Burma’s contemporary history. Yet, numerous social, political and economic problems are unlikely to be resolved within a short period of time.
numerous problems—lacking electricity, clean water, employment, education, health services, security, and so on.

During Thein Sein’s rule (March 2011–March 2016), the government embarked upon a series of reforms, including infrastructure building, loosening of media and press control, release of political prisoners, and negotiations with ethnic armed groups for a ceasefire. Nevertheless, decades of old problems endured. Even today, wide stretches of rural areas are still marked as brown or black zones which bar foreigners. Under such circumstances, access to native voices from the subaltern class in remote areas remains very difficult and yet extremely precious. While some academics risk conducting covert research, some media and film workers are also secretly covering Burmese lives via their cameras and videos. Midi Z, a native Burmese director based in Taiwan, has shot 3 movies about Yunnanese migrants of Burma. Oriented in social realism, his movies transmit a native perspective about his country and its people, and have received much international attention in recent years. How has he cultivated his filming career?

In 1998 at 16, Midi Z came to Taiwan with US$200, which his parents borrowed from friends and relatives. His wish to go to Taiwan has been embedded in his mind from childhood. Although separated by long distance, ethnic Chinese in Burma learn about Taiwan through satellite television. In a public talk, Midi Z mentioned watching Taiwan’s annual Golden Horse Film Festival on television at a neighbor’s house when he was still a kid, and dreaming about being among the audience someday (Zhao 2014a).

---

7The Burmese government divides the country into three zones: the white zones, which are under the control of the Burmese army; the brown zones, which are contested areas; and the black zones where the Burmese army has no control.

8Not only do the ethnic Chinese know about Taiwan from satellite television, they also learn about China, other Southeast Asian countries and societies
Going to Taiwan for education is an enviable choice for many ethnic Chinese students in Burma (especially Yunnanese Chinese), and is considered an upward move. However, most of these students drop out of school after a few months or a couple of years of study, because they are not able to keep up their learning in addition to working and supporting themselves. Like other students from Burma, Midi Z had to make his own living in Taiwan. On the second day after his arrival, he started working at a construction site 20 stories high in order to earn his tuition fees and living costs. He worked part time at his school and in restaurants during semesters, and full time as a construction worker during vacations (Zhao 2014a; Zhao 2015). Despite his busy work life, Midi Z is one of the few among fellow Chinese students from Burma who completed graduate studies with a master’s degree in industrial and commercial design.

Coming to Taiwan was his first trip abroad, but he said he was not afraid at all. “I was very happy about going to Taiwan, because I realized I could make money there to improve my family’s living conditions and even change my own fate…. My goal was to build a house for my family and repay all the debts” (Zhao 2014b). During his studies, he not only supported himself, but also saved 2 million Taiwanese dollars (about US$67,000) by age 24, then still a graduate student, and built a house for his family in Lashio (Fang 2014:55). While at school he always earned excellent grades and received scholarships. Furthermore, he loved reading, and discovered that school libraries were like further afield. Apart from television, telephone is another common means for connection. Both objects repeatedly appear in Midi Z’s films.

Prior to Midi Z’s departure to Taiwan, his parents had spent about $10,000 US dollars to go through many required procedures and acquire a passport for him. The money was in part from the remittances sent back by his siblings working in Thailand, and in part a loan from other people (Sun Zhixi 2014).

Midi Z first went to a vocational high school to learn printing, then to the National Taiwan University of Science and Technology for undergraduate and graduate studies, majoring in design.
treasure houses, facilities he could hardly dream of in Burma. He read many literary works, including world classics, and he expressed his nostalgia for Burma, family members and friends by writing a diary and letters. He also posted essays to school journals to earn extra money. He said he was not interested in going to karaoke or nightclubs as many youth in Taiwan like to do (Fang 2014: 54; Zhao 2014a; my interview with Midi Z).

Midi Z learned moviemaking mainly by teaching himself. Since his undergraduate years, he had watched videotapes and read literary works whenever he had free time. He would decode and analyze every film he watched—its scenes, lenses, lighting, editing, special effects, sound effects, story and so on. Meanwhile he shot graduation and wedding videos for clients. His graduation short film for his undergraduate studies, “White Doves” (8' 39''), was selected for several international film festivals, including Busan International Film Festival, Copenhagen Film Festivals, and Australian International Film Festival. After helping his family repay all debts and building a house for them, he thought seriously about his own future and reflected on what he would really like to do. He gave himself more free time to explore literature and the art of filmmaking. “I could watch 8 or 9 movies a day and read over 100 books a year,” he said (Fang 2014:55).

In interviews, he often stressed that his lived experiences in Burma and Taiwan have provided him with a comparative perspective and sources of creation for his moviemaking. Burma is his homeland, the foundation of his childhood that nourishes his roots and supplies endless stories for his movies. A reporter writes:

\[\text{See } \text{http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%B6%99%E5%BE%B7%E8%83%A4 (access date: 24 September 2014).}\]
Although life there lacked material comfort, frequent contacts in nature left happy memories…. The Buddhist ethos in Burma, its tranquility and tropical force has shaped [Midi Z’s] artistic talents. In comparison, Taiwan has offered him technical training, taught him how to get along with people and educated him with needed knowledge…. [Both sources] are deeply engrained in him. (Xia 2014)

Midi Z in particular appreciates Taiwan’s freedom and democracy, which motivates him to pursue his goals in literary creation and making movies. “If I had not come to Taiwan, I don’t know what I would have been like, perhaps like the characters in my movies involved in drug trafficking,” he said in an interview (Wang 2014). He lamented that “among his 70 classmates of the middle school, 30 of them are in drug business, 5 were caught and executed, 4 died in drug addiction and more than 10 are now in prison…. Drug trafficking is prevailing in Burma’s borderlands. People risk their lives in this engagement because of poverty” (Xiang 2014). In rural areas, growing poppies is simply a way of making a living. Some people who do not own land live on commissions from drug delivery. To make money to buy rice, Midi Z’s mother once carried drugs to another city. She was caught by the police on the way and imprisoned for 16 months. It was a tragedy for the family. Poverty tore the family to fall apart. His eldest brother left home for Hpakant as a jade miner, and two elder sisters and a brother went to Thailand as illegal migrant workers (Fang 2014:56; Zhao 2014a; author interview with the mother).

In contrast, life in Taiwan is quiet and peaceful. Yet, Midi Z constantly misses Burma where life was full of drama (Zhao 2014b). Making movies helps him release his desire for narration. “Through moviemaking, I return to the innocent age of my childhood and the endearment with my family and native land”
Poverty and Migration from Burma

The desire to tell stories about Burma has been so powerful that despite lack of money, technical and logistic support, and the risks of secret filming, he has launched his shooting plans one after another, and has completed 3 movies; each one costing less than 1 million Taiwanese dollars (about US$33,000) to produce.

The immediate positive responses from the audiences of Taiwan and beyond after the release of his first movie surprised him and confirmed that he had succeeded in communicating with people outside his native society, encouraging him to persist with his dream. As of 24 July 2014, his short films and 3 movies had been screened in 120 film festivals, and he himself had been invited to 35 countries (Zhao 2014b). His latest movie Ice Poison won Best Film at the 2014 Edinburg International Film Festival and Best Director at the 2014 Peace & Love Film Festival (Sweden). Moreover, it was selected to represent Taiwan in the best foreign film category of the 2015 Oscars. These opportunities have put him in the spotlight as a talented and promising young director, and the Taiwanese media sometimes compare him with the world-famous Taiwanese-born director Ang Lee.

Midi Z’s reflective thoughts highlight his awareness of and appreciation for the differences between Burma and Taiwan and their respective impacts upon him. This comparative perspective clearly differentiates him from Lewis who saw the poor as being “provincial and locally oriented” (Lewis 1966a:xlviii). In his works Lewis rivets attention on his research subjects’ destitute lives and does not go further to explore their ideas on class inequality as he does not think they are capable of doing so.

For the latter honor, the official statement says: “His direction was commendable for all aspects of the production from the casting of the luminescent Wu Ke-Xi to employing an unconventional cine verita style and shining a light on the brutal existence of an otherwise unknown culture, giving us a truly compelling story.” See: http://www.peaceandlovefilm.se/2014/06/plff-2014-award-winners/ (access date: 28 September 2014).
Being an outsider in terms of class and nationality from the people he studies, Lewis misses a critical dimension. In contrast, not only is Midi Z a native film maker, he himself belongs to the poor.

As mentioned above, we also find that this comparative outlook between the native homeland and host society exists commonly among immigrants in migration and cultural studies. Those who are compelled to escape their countries as refugees especially live in an interstitial state of mind, stranded in dislocation and exile. A captivating example is the autobiography by Pascal Khoo Thwe (2002)—*From the Land of Green Ghosts: A Burmese Odyssey*. The author was a student refugee from the Padaung minority in rural Shan state who participated in the 1988 student democracy movement. After escaping to a refugee camp in a border area of Thailand, he was helped to move to England for further education by a Cambridge University professor. Although granting him new prospects, a life of exile in the new country also entailed cultural shocks and longing for his family and former way of life. Not only did he face frustration in adapting himself to many strange living habits, he was constantly burdened by a kind of guilt for leaving his family members behind.13

Midi Z, though not a refugee, also expresses a kind of mixed feeling as a migrant in Taiwan. He says:

> We often suffer anxiety and pain because of not being able to release our sudden urge to narrate. Even after completing a film, I have only temporarily discharged my narration desire. Forever pain and

happiness coexist, and therefore, our craving for narration persists. (Midi Z’ Facebook page, 27 August 2014)\(^{14}\)

Furthermore, an ambiguous feeling regarding his self-identification always haunts him. He stresses that he has spent half of his life in Burma and half in Taiwan. While acknowledging his ancestral roots in Nanjing (before coming to Yunnan), he questions where his original homeland is. He writes:

> Forever I miss Burma in Taiwan, and while returning to Burma I miss Taiwan. Ever since we were little, grandpa reminded us that our roots are in China.... Because of contingent factors, Chinese overseas have to keep on moving. (Zhao 2015:35)

This mixed feeling, while generating a liminal and even painful state of mind, is also a force of creation that nourishes Midi Z’s narrativity, predicing his filming career. For him, moviemaking is his way of telling life stories and is also a means to explore his own sentiments (Zhao 2015:16). In his book, he says moviemaker is like a storyteller, with the essential concern for human existence instead of filming techniques (Zhao 2015:222). Based on this belief, his movies have tried to present the life-world of his fellow folk, their persistent struggle against a series of constrained contexts.

**Midi Z’s Movies**

Drawing on stories familiar to him or even his own experiences, Midi Z makes movies about his own people. He wrote the scripts for his three movies, which all center on the subaltern class of the Yunnanese migrants of Burma, and his actors are primarily fellow Yunnanese and non-professionals. Prior to the mid-1990s,

\(^{14}\)https://www.facebook.com/ffe.tw?fref=photo (access date: 1 Sept 2014).
RETURN TO BURMA

A film by MIDI Z

Where should we go? Anywhere but here.

Figure 1: Return to Burma (Courtesy of Flash Forward Entertainment)
the majority of Yunnanese migrants in Burma lived in poverty; most of them were farmers, laborers, small traders and muleteers. Even today, although many Yunnanese migrants living in cities have become affluent in business, those living in small towns or rural areas are generally market vendors, small- or medium-level merchants. The ones who remain in the mountains and do not have family members working abroad still lead a difficult life. Grounded in the trend of social realism, Midi Z projects the real lives of his people in his films characterized by poignant stories and natural acting. As works on the everyday lives of different ethnic groups in Burma are still few (e.g., Chang and Tagliacozzo, ed. 2014; Rosalind Russell 2015; Russell 2014; Skidmore 2004), his movies provide a unique window for the audiences of the world interested in this formerly isolated country to learn about a small part of Burma.

Midi Z’s first movie, Return to Burma (Figure 1), released in 2011, is about a Burmese migrant worker who returns to Burma after working in Taiwan for several years. The main character brings an urn containing a fellow friend’s ashes back home with him. That friend worked with him at the same construction site, but died from an accidental fall while working extra hours at night before the Chinese New Year. Sharply contrasting industrial Taiwanese society and Burma in the opening scenes, the movie underlines this returnee’s strong sense of alienation with his family, friends, and Burmese society against a backdrop of rampant poverty. The second movie, Poor Folk (Figure 2), released in 2012, comprises 3 connected episodes, exposing problems of drug and human trafficking that trap many illegal Burmese migrants soon after they arrive in Thailand. These migrants carry hopes and risk their lives to cross the border for a better life, but only find themselves facing cruel realities that end tragically. The third movie, Ice Poison (Figure 3), released in 2014, follows the 2 story lines of a young man and a young
POOR FOLK
a film by Midi Z

Figure 2: Poor Folk (Courtesy of Flash Forward Entertainment)
woman, a farmer and someone tricked into marriage in China. The young man’s father mortgages a cow to a relative for a used motorcycle in order to help his son become a motorcycle taxi driver in Lashio. The young woman returns home from China for her grandfather’s funeral and meets the young man. Out of poverty and a wish for a better future, they are lured into the drug trade and also become drug addicts. After briefly enjoying the happiness of obtaining some quick money with beautiful expectations, both the man and woman sadly are doomed to fall into a trap—the woman is caught by the police and the man becomes insane.

Because of a shortage of financial support, Midi Z shot the first movie with a crew of 3 people (including himself), the second one of 4 people and the third one of 7 people (Zhao 2014a). Moreover, owing to subject sensitivity, each movie was secretly filmed within a short period of time, ranging from between 10 to 20 days (Wang 2013; Zhao 2014b). The director knew that each movie had to be completed in a single trip, as he did not have the money to return and re-shoot any missing or imperfect parts. In addition, it would have likely aroused attention from the local police or military men, a dangerous situation (Sun Shuo 2014; Zhao 2014b).

What was his process as he filmed these movies? In an interview, he told me that for years he kept a diary, sometimes just jotting down random thoughts, a dialogue or an event, other times writing a more complete short story based on personal or friends’ experiences. With an accumulation of connected plots, he develops them into a movie script threaded by a range of scenes. The core of the story embodies his thoughts and state of mind. He said:

The first and third films are located in northern Burma and the second one primarily in a border village of northern Thailand. It is unlikely that a request to film stories of poverty or other social problems would result in an official permit (He 2012; Michaels 2014; author’s interview with Midi Z).
Figure 3: Ice Poison (Courtesy of Flash Forward Entertainment)
Even before shooting, I have already sensed the atmosphere of each scene and my characters’ emotions…. However, you don’t know what will happen while shooting. You cannot fix all the details…. Many uncertainties may occur…. You have to be dynamic and able to handle unexpected incidents. (my interview with Midi Z)

Once while he was filming on the street, the police showed up. Immediately, he had to switch his camera from filming to still picture-taking, pretending to be a tourist. Moreover, apart from a couple of main actors whom he decided on beforehand, he needed to look to local people for actors after arriving on location. To help these amateur actors immerse themselves in acting, he listened to their stories and ideas and allowed them to improvise their conversations, guided by a script outline, thereby applying some techniques of documentary filming.

To enhance the movies’ realism, Midi Z also integrates current events into his movies. This is most clearly demonstrated in his first movie set in early 2011, right after the national election at the end of 2010. The movie depicts the returnee’s prospects in Burma, while sarcastically illustrating ongoing problems in daily life, such as electricity blackouts, unemployment and contraband trade between China and Burma. A mixture of hope and disillusionment are projected via Burmese songs based on political propaganda, characters’ conversations about Burma and low wages, and an unknown

---

16The main male actor in his three movies, Wang Xing-Hong, is his childhood friend. Wang also went to Taiwan for studies and has settled there. The main female actor in his second and third movies, Wu Ke-Xi, is a professional actress from Taiwan. (There is no leading female actor in his first film.) Midi Z demanded that Wu learn Yunnanese beforehand, and sent her to live among the Yunnanese migrants in northern Thailand and upper Burma respectively for a month prior to the shooting of the two movies.
future overshadowing the main character when he explores several economic possibilities: opening an electric appliances shop, driving a scooter taxi and participating in the jade trade. At the end of the movie, he is cutting wood with a friend, and his younger brother is leaving for Malaysia as a migrant worker with another friend. This ending suggests the continuation of existent problems and grueling living conditions that keep haunting the poor.

Is poverty then a kind of destiny? Are the poor in Burma trapped by a “culture of poverty” as Lewis suggests, which obstructs any relief from their destitute lives? At first glance, Midi Z’s movies look much like Lewis’s stories in terms of taking a family-centered approach and conveying a kind of fatalistic tone by stressing the feelings of despair and hopelessness of the poverty-stricken in the face of ongoing adversity. In addition, while one uses written texts and the other films to portray poor people’s lives, both media delineate the characters’ miseries with graphic and gripping effects, transmitting a similar literary milieu. Neither Lewis nor Midi Z target certain readership or audience (such as academics or artists), but aim their works toward the general public. Unlike many ethnographies that are underpinned by abstruse theories and academic jargons, Lewis presents his research subjects’ lives in literary genres—short stories and novels. Comparatively, Midi Z, who is a literature lover, implicitly draws analogies between the lives of his characters and those in Rabindranath Tagore’s, Gao Xingjian’s and Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy’s works in his first and second films.17

However, comparing Midi Z’s movies with Lewis’s writings carefully, we see essential differences. First of all, as mentioned earlier, Lewis perceives the culture of poor people as a “relatively thin culture” (1966a: lii), and lists many negative traits

17Specifically, Midi Z refers to Gao’s One Man’s Bible, Tagore’s The Crescent Moon and Tolstoy’s “Poor People.”
pertaining to it (1966a: xlvi-xlviii, 1998:9). Contrary to this viewpoint, Midi Z portrays in his movies a rich culture among his folk that embodies strong family ties, devotion to traditions and functional social connections. In particular, we see the effort of his characters in observing traditional Yunnanese customs in Burma, particularly shown in the scenes of the Chinese New Year celebration in Return to Burma and of death rituals in Ice Poison (further discussion in the next section). Secondly, Lewis addresses many negative traits of the poor without discerning their differences in nature and also their connection with external social, economic and political mechanisms. Consequently, this led him to overlook the aspect of structural inequality. In contrast, Midi Z’s movies, characterized by a force of rage, provide a critical perspective on how social structures, whether in Burma or societies of immigration, generate influences on the lives of Yunnanese migrants against the backdrop of a more complex, capitalistic and globalized world than that of Lewis’s day. In all his 3 movies Midi Z distinctively illustrates his characters’ awareness of and dealings with the problem of unemployment.

In Return to Burma, a recurrent topic in the conversations between the main character and his family and friends centers on the salary difference between labor work in Taiwan and Burma; the former is ten times higher than the latter. However, a laborer belongs to the underclass in both societies. Even after working several years in Taiwan, the main character is unable to save much money to help his family or start a business. In Poor Folk and Ice Poison, poverty pushes people to migrate illegally and engage in drugs and human trafficking. Both films powerfully display the violence generated from structural inequality, resulting in death, prostitution and insanity. In Poor Folk, even the poor exploit one another. For example, a young Burmese prostitute of Yunnanese descent in Bangkok participates in
human trafficking in an attempt to obtain legal documents via the smuggling syndicate she works for in order to go to Taiwan. She helps the syndicate escort illegal female migrants from northern Thai borders to Bangkok. When a teenage girl sold by her family tries to escape, she captures her without mercy. Furthermore, in *Ice Poison*, the director uses contrasting metaphors of a cow and a motorcycle, respectively symbolizing agricultural economy and capitalistic economy, to reflect structural inequality. At the end of the movie, the main female character, a young woman, is caught by the police while delivering drugs, and the young man who sends her there by motorcycle, though escaping from the police, becomes insane from fear and drug addiction. The cow, which the young man’s father pawned for the motorcycle, is slaughtered, because the father cannot redeem his mortgage. The blood streams down from the cow’s throat and the animal dies helplessly, a cruel and shocking scene, which also hints at the death or loss of the agricultural economy and the poor in Burma.

An unknown future or a tragic ending in Midi Z’s movies seems to indicate unhappy destinies for the poor, parallel to Lewis’s advocacy of a portrayal of poor people as doomed, rooted in a perpetuating culture of poverty. Nevertheless, Midi Z’s movies are more than mere depictions of his impoverished folk’s misfortunes. Rather than presenting a perpetuating culture of poverty in his movies, the director underlines an embedded discourse that points to structural inequality as the primary cause of poverty. From 1962 to 2011 Burma was controlled by a military junta; even during Thein Sein’s period, people still lived under military rule and political division. The director reveals this situation best in *Return to Burma* by using two mocking scenes. In one, a friend of the main character greets the former from behind by holding a toy gun to his head, mocking a shooting (Figure 4). In another scene, a group of children play at
gun fighting. At the end of the game, the children all play dead on the ground. The mimic of gunplay suggests ethnic conflicts and military violence in Burma. In addition to political unrest, decades of policy mistakes, gross mismanagement and prevailing corruption have resulted in economic failure. While reforms have benefitted a tiny population keen to exploit new opportunities, the majority suffer from the speedy rise of daily living expenses. The gap between the poor and the rich is accelerating (Zhao 2015:126-128). Leaving the country remains a common strategy for the poor to escape poverty. In his book the director voices his criticism against Burma’s “wild” situation that he attributes to a structural impasse:

Without democracy and a good legal system, Burmese society is like a wild world. The rich and the privileged ones take advantage of the poor. Men abuse women, and stronger women exploit weaker women. In the face of such a cruel reality, either you accept it or you run away to another society and look for new chances. (Zhao 2015: 80)

Living in this distressing environment, Midi Z’s characters are, however, not at all passive. They have tried hard to improve their lives. They compare and explore different possibilities,

18Appalling news about Burmese illegal migrants abroad is common. In April 2008, 54 migrant workers died by suffocation in the back of a freezer truck to in southern Thailand http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/11/burma.thailand (accessed 17 April 2015). About 550 enslaved fishermen were found on a far-flung Indonesian island in April 2015, and more than 200 are identified as Burmese, http://www.irrawaddy.org/asia/number-of-slaves-found-on-indonesian-island-at-almost-550.html?print=1 (accessed 17 April 2015). Sites of mass graves of Rohingya Muslims were found in Southern Thailand earlier this year. These people were starved to death or killed by human traffickers who demanded ransoms from these destitute migrants’ families in Burma, see https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/01/thailand-mass-graves-rohingya-found-trafficking-camp (accessed date: 19 May 2015).
discuss which foreign country is best to go to—Taiwan, China, Malaysia or Thailand—and respectively what each one’s cost and benefits are. Moreover, they are even willing to risk their lives in illicit ventures. The director said:

They always want to move upward and don’t simply succumb to their environment…. In their mind, they are aware of class differentiation, although they may not use the term. They see some jobs are easier and make more money than labor work, and some lifestyles are more comfortable…. They want to make a change of their lives and break through structural confinements, although this is very difficult. (my interview with Midi Z)

Like numerous migrant workers in different parts of the world, Midi Z’s characters continue to encounter exploitation abroad, but their transnational experiences have sharpened their awareness of class differentiation. This differs from Lewis who denied a sense of historical consciousness or class consciousness among the poor (Lewis 1998: 7, 1966a: xlviii). In the next section I further explore this sense among Yunnanese migrants in relation to their alochtonous status in Burma, and discuss the dialectical impacts of culture and structure on poverty.

**Yunnanese Migrants in Burma**

Yunnanese have been mobile throughout their history. Combined with their economic agency, the long-distance caravan trade was a distinctive undertaking among the people for centuries. While researching the history of Yunnanese migration to Burma, I often hear the older generation, especially those from the border areas of Yunnan, recall a family history of cross-border trade back and forth between Yunnan and Burma
over several generations. Many of these people were muleteers or petty traders, and their narrations reflect a deep historical sense of their predecessors’ migration to Yunnan and Burma, their own commercial disposition and knowledge about local political structures (Chang 2014b). Their ongoing movement has in practice carried on the tradition of Yunnanese mobility.

While taking on some Burmese living habits, Yunnanese migrants have largely maintained their own lifestyle—in education, religious life, and diet.19 A strenuous effort the Yunnanese migrants made was to organize Chinese education for the next generation, even under extreme circumstances (Chang 2014b). They founded Chinese schools or provided tutoring for the children. Even during the socialist period when ethnic education was banned, Yunnanese migrants managed to sustain Chinese education secretly in many places. Chinese schools prevail in upper Burma today, especially in Shan State.20 While the rural

---

19As a migrant group, Yunnanese migrants’ lifestyles illustrate some signs of hybridity. They mostly speak Yunnanese among themselves, but often mix in some Burmese words. Prior to the 1990s, wearing longyi (a sarong-like skirt commonly worn by both men and women in Burma) was common among them. Informants explained it as a way to play down their Chinese ethnicity. But following the economic opening and relaxation of political control, the Yunnanese migrants (both men and women) have by and large changed back to trousers. There is a traditional proverb among the Yunnanese, making fun of Burmese manner of dress—yiwuling kuwudang (衣無領 褲無裁) —as barbarian. In terms of food, while their diet is essentially Yunnanese, occasionally they also eat curry and drink black tea. Regarding religious life, they tend to go to Chinese temples, but some people nowadays also go to Burmese temples. In short, although fundamentally a Yunnanese lifestyle, hybrid features also exist.

20Generally speaking, the maritime Chinese, i.e., the Fujian (Fujianese) and Guangdong (Cantonese), are mostly concentrated in urban areas of lower Burma and have much assimilated to Burmese society because of strict political control in these areas. In contrast, the overland Chinese, i.e., the Yunnanese, have primarily settled in upper Burma and maintained a strong ethnic identity and tradition. Using a religious pretext to obtain a permit, they have managed to register Chinese schools as Buddhist or Confucian schools.
areas only offer a primary school level, cities and towns provide learning in Chinese schools up to the middle school level or even high school. Going to Taiwan or China for further education or work thus offers the younger generation a possibility to escape poverty in Burma. In addition, many Yunnanese migrants also go to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore and work at Chinese and Taiwanese owned companies or local Chinese restaurants. Like Midi Z, they send remittances home to help other family members or to build a house for them.

Modern transportation and electronic media in a globalized world have greatly impacted migrants’ lives as well as those of their family members in the home society. During the time of Midi Z’s grandparents, long-distance travel between China and Burma was still primarily dependent on horses or on foot (by land), and by boat (by sea), but usage of vehicles and airplanes has become commonplace today. Electronic contacts via phone, Skype, e-mail and Facebook have in effect enhanced connection between friends and family members living in different countries. Apart from illustrating adherence to a traditional lifestyle among the migrant Yunnanese of Burma, Midi Z includes features of hybridity in his movies, and skillfully uses contrasting metaphors to highlight socio-economic inequality between different places in a globalized world dominated by capitalism and the impacts of structural changes on the poor as analyzed earlier.²¹

Because of ongoing warfare in rural areas from the 1970s onwards, a large number of Yunnanese migrants have moved from the frontiers or mountainous regions to cities and towns in order to establish a more stable life. Some of them have made further migration abroad for work or for education. Be they in

²¹This aspect is most evident in Return to Burma. While presenting a basically Yunnanese lifestyle with reference to food, healing and Chinese New Year celebration, the director also includes some Burmese elements in their daily life, such as singing Burmese songs and going to Burmese tea shops.
Burma or abroad, their ongoing movement has resulted in mixed feelings regarding their self-identification, as Midi Z confesses (quoted above). Burdened with economic demands in everyday life, this feeling is constantly entangled with worries and anxieties, and further generates a sense of alienation towards environments. This sense of alienation permeates Midi Z’s movies (especially in Return to Burma), reflecting his characters’ ill adjustment or resistance to a range of environments to which they are subjected. Moreover, it affects Yunnanese migrants’ interaction with people of other ethnic groups. Referring to his community’s alochtonous status, Midi Z points out that most Yunnanese in Burma seclude themselves from local society, and regard themselves as superior to other groups in terms of culture and economic talents. Their ethnocentrism has consequently compounded their alien status, contributing to local people’s accusation that Yunnanese economically exploit the country (Zhao 2015:37-38; my interview with Midi Z).

However, another side of the story is that immigrants and ethnic minorities are commonly discriminated against in Burma, especially in terms of citizenship, education and business. Burmanization was a dominant ideology for former military regimes’ governance, as it has always been among most Burmans, the ethnic majority (Berlie 2008; Brown 2013; Gravers 2007; Turnell 2009). The communal conflicts between Muslims and Buddhists in several places in recent years are illustrative examples. Over the years I have also heard my informants recall that prior to 1990 ethnic Chinese were easily abused by local officials and policemen. The latter frequently carried out house searches at night without advance notice. They sometimes created false accusations to jail people in order to make monetary demands. Both Midi Z and his mother also made the same complaint in my interviews with them.
Despite their allochtonous status, many urban Yunnanese migrants, especially those residing in Mandalay and Yangon, have grabbed opportunities, expanded their investments and become wealthy merchants after the military junta’s shift to a market-oriented economy in 1988. They live in grand houses, go to expensive restaurants and drive fancy cars. As a result, they have incited discontent from the local population who accuse them of conducting illegal trade with the aid of cronyism with military officers (Min Zin 2012; Mya Maung 1994). What does Midi Z think about these rich fellow Yunnanese? In my interview with him, he admitted the sharp contrast between the nouveau riche among the Yunnanese migrants and the impoverished folks of his movies. Most of the affluent Yunnanese are in the jade trade, construction business, restaurant business, tourism, transportation, import and export trade, and so on. Midi Z said Burmese laws are complex and change from time to time. On account of Burma’s political division and the question of the ruling regime’s legitimacy, legality is ambiguous. Most of the Yunnanese migrants, especially the older generation, do not know Burmese laws and are not able to speak Burmese well. They are often the targets of extortion by the police and customs officials. Whenever this happens, they have to bribe them or seek help from high-ranking officers. In effect, they have strengthened the practice of bribery and cronyism.

These contextual problems referred to here echo the question of structural inequality discussed in the previous section. But apart from structural factors, does culture also play a role in people’s livelihoods? I asked the director about his viewpoint regarding Yunnanese mobility and engagement in the long-distance caravan trade throughout history. He affirmed its influence and thought that this tradition has contributed to an intrepid disposition among the Yunnanese.
It is a kind of survival instinct. The Yunnanese are unlike the maritime Cantonese or Fujianese who mostly seek a stable livelihood by opening a shop... The Yunnanese are tough. Some of them are so tough that they do not bother about ethical considerations. (Author’s interview with Midi Z)

The director mentioned the late drug warlords such as Luo Xinghan and Khun Sa, and compared them to Mafia leaders in New York. He said that among the caravan traders, some were bandits and preyed on other traders. His great-great-grandfather in Yunnan was a wealthy landlord but was robbed by 3 caravan traders who had helped the family transport raw opium for several years.

I have heard many stories about how people behave like animals, killing one another, because of poverty.... Nevertheless, most poor folk like my mother are very simple.... (Author’s interview with Midi Z)

Comparatively, my informants have also commented on this intrepid disposition with 2 general explanations: the first is positively related to the Yunnanese risk-taking nature in the face of adversity; the other is negatively related to a survival instinct such as the director mentioned. The essential difference seems to be one of degree. As far as I understand the long-distance caravan trade, by necessity it had to be organized and disciplined, with clear division of labor and recognition of traditional taboos (Ma 1985; Wang and Zhang 1993; Hu 1999). These were perilous journeys which would have been impossible without the caravan traders’ respectful acknowledgment of local people and their ways (Chang 2009; Giersch 2006; Hill 1998). This reciprocity between traders and residents enabled this long tradition, “the culture of mule caravan trade” (mabang wenhua 馬
Poverty and Migration from Burma | 77

Poverty and Migration from Burma (Wang and Zhang 1993), to endure, due to consistent interaction with structural factors, socio-political and economic. In other words, the culture of mule caravan trade corresponded with contingent structural factors, and the latter were incorporated into the former as time passed. In practice, the cultural and structural factors evolved in a dialectical relationship, and one may not draw a clear distinction between them.

Midi Z’s movies also touch on the role of culture in his fellow folk’s daily lives as discussed earlier. Significantly, it is underpinned by some traditional values, in particular filial piety and familism. Contrary to Lewis’s concept of poverty culture, the observance of Yunnanese tradition or values does not relate to one’s economic status. For example, in Ice Poison, although the funeral of the young woman’s grandfather is simple (Figure 5), the young woman makes an effort to go to Yunnan and bring back the grandfather’s shroud, which he had prepared earlier. After several decades, the shroud has become a pile of rags, but the young woman’s and the whole family’s devotion to following the tradition is revealing. Another example is from Poor Folk. The brother participates in drug trafficking in order to make money to redeem his sister who has been sold to a smuggling syndicate (Figure 6). At the end the brother is killed by a drug mafia leader. Sadly, the young sister is actually sold by the family because of their poverty. Therefore, the observance of the traditional values may result in tremendous personal sacrifice.

Midi Z said he does not have a theory about poverty; he has simply attempted to record his folk’s living conditions via movies. His basic theme is pessimistic, as he thinks the poor can hardly hold their own against globalism and capitalism, and the military control in Burma will not end soon (author’s interview with Midi Z). One may question Midi Z’s viewpoint and argue that many urban Yunnanese in Burma have progressed econom-
ically or even become wealthy in the last two decades and that he that he himself is a successful case. Although this argument may sound valid, fluctuation of wealth among the rich in Burma is not a normal phenomenon. While some people may gain wealth easily, their business may also go bust quickly because of sudden policy change, extortion or confiscation by the authorities, confidence games and so on. In other words, the flawed economic and political structures of the country do not guarantee stability for its people’s economic development. Even a business based on cronyism with high-ranking officials may topple when a shift in the military or government takes place. The closing of two private banks, Myanmar Mayflower Bank and Asia Wealth Bank, owned by ethnic Chinese are good examples. In addition, I have heard many stories among my informants about the ups and downs of their fortunes. On the other hand, in the case of Midi Z or other Burmese migrants abroad, their success is connected more with the societies of their residence than with Burma. Accordingly, poverty should not be seen as a destiny of doom for the poor. When a society is able to provide better structural assistance, its people will have more chances to develop their potential. Although Midi Z’s movies convey a pessimistic outlook, its projection is not founded on a fatalistic conviction among the impoverished. Rather, with the director’s criticism of Burma and his awareness of what Taiwan, a democratic society, has provided him, it would be better to perceive his movies as a means to voice the marginals’ accusations against the powerful in Burma.

In summary, taking Lewis’s concept of poverty culture as a point of reference for exploration of the issue of poverty and migration via Midi Z’s movies and his own life history, we see some similarities as well as essential differences. The core

22These two banks were accused of having connections to drug syndicates and helping them launder money.
Figure 6: Drug trade in Poor Folk (Courtesy of Flash Forward Entertainment)
finding is that in contrast with Lewis’s stress on a poverty culture, Midi Z emphasizes more structural factors, but underlying this is his attention to the role of culture. In terms of adherence to Yunnanese tradition, there is no essential difference between the poor and the rich. The mere difference may be in a material sense—the degree of luxury. Instead of trying to perceive or reconstruct a poverty culture among the subaltern Yunnanese migrants or the poor in any society, it may be more important to explore how both structure and culture have made an impact on their lives, bearing in mind that there is no clear distinction between these two aspects. In addition, although this paper does not aim to provide concrete solutions, grounded on the analysis given above, we may affirm that poverty alleviation in Burma fundamentally requires betterment of its political and economic structures—moving towards a more democratic framework and a stable economic order—and also a good understanding and respect for each ethnic group’s culture and people’s livelihoods.

References


Jiang Zhaolun. 2014. “Cong miandian dao Taiwan: Zhao Deyin bu yiyang de dianying lu” [From Burma to Taiwan: a different journey of moviemaking for Zhao Deyin]. Radio Taiwan International, August 1st, 2014.


Poverty and Migration from Burma


Urbanization of Yangon has accelerated after 1988 and the process created an increase in the demand of public transport in the city. As a result, the number of bus routes has increased to 336 and that in turn created the need to employ large numbers of bus conductors (called as sa-pe ya ("spare") in Burmese). Bus conductors in Yangon play a crucial role in the daily lives of commuters in Yangon. This paper intends to explore the daily lives of bus conductors, their livelihoods, their social and educational backgrounds and social issues and problems they encounter in their day-to-day relations with their customers, using research methods such as direct observation, interviews and in-depth interviews with a special focus on No. 3 buses.
ရဲဟိန်းတအာင်နိဒါန်းရန်ကုန်မမို့သည် ၁၉၈၈ 'ုနှစ်တနာက်ပိုင်းမမို့သစ်အမားအခပားကို "ဲ့ ထွင်းတ.ာ်တဆာင်လာ" ဲ့သည်။ ထိုတကကာင့်လင်သာယာ၊ ဒဂုံမမို့သစ်(တန်၊ တခမာက်၊ အတရှ့ ၊ ဆိပ်ကမ်းတရ6ခပည်သာ၊ ဝါးစ်ရာစသည့်ခ.င့်မမို့သစ်မားတပ8ထွက်လာ'ဲ့သည်။ ထိုမမို့သစ်မားသို့တခပာင်းတရ6့သွားကကသည်။ ထိုမမို့ခပင်ရန်ကုန်မမို့တန စဉ်တနထိုင်မစရိ်အွက်အ'က်အ'ဲရှိလာသူအမားအခပားလည်း ထိုမမို့သစ်တနရာမားနှင့်ဆင်တခုံးတဒသမားသို့ တကးလက်တဒသမှအမားအခပားအတခ'စိုက်ဝင်တရာက်တနထိုင်လာကကသည်။ ထိုခပင်ရန်ကုန်မမို့တန စဉ်တနထိုင်မစရိ်အွက်အ'က်အ'ဲရှိလာသူအမားအခပားလည်း ထိုမမို့သစ်တနရာမားနှင့်ဆင်တခုံးတဒသမားသို့ တကးလက်တဒသမှအမားအခပားအတခ'စိုက်ဝင်တရာက်တနထိုင်လာကကသည်။

မမို့ခပဧရိယာကယ်ဝန်းလာသည့်နှင့်အရှေ့ရန်ကုန်မမို့တနထိုင်ကကားမားအတနခ.င့်အလုပ်သွားအလုပ်ခပန်၊ ရုံးက်ရုံးဆင်းနှင့်တကာင်းသွားတကာင်းခပန့်မမို့တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းကားမားကိုပိုမိုအသုံးခပုတကကာင်းသိရသည်။ ယ'ုအ'ိန်ွင်ရန်ကုန်မမို့တန စဉ်တနထိုင်မစရိ်အွက်အ'က်အ'ဲရှိလာသူအမားအခပားလည်း ထိုမမို့သစ်တနရာမားနှင့်ဆင်တခုံးတဒသမားသို့ တကးလက်တဒသမှအမားအခပားအတခ'စိုက်ဝင်တရာက်တနထိုင်လာကကသည်။

ခပည်သူလူထု၏တန စဉ်သုံးစွဲမခမင့်မားလာသည့်အွက်တကကာင့်ရန်ကုန်မမို့တနထိုင်မစရိ်အွက်မှလည်း ိုးက်မားခပားလာ'ဲ့သည်။ ယ'ုအ'ိန်ွင်ရန်ကုန်မမို့တန စဉ်တနထိုင်မစရိ်အွက်အ'က်အ'ဲရှိလာသူအမားအခပားလည်း ထိုမမို့သစ်တနရာမားနှင့်ဆင်တခုံးတဒသမားသို့ တကးလက်တဒသမှအမားအခပားအတခ'စိုက်ဝင်တရာက်တနထိုင်လာကကသည်။

၃၃၆လိုင်းန့်ရှိပါသည်။ ထိုတမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းမားစုစုတပါင်းကားစီးတရ ၆၅၂၂စီးရှိမပီးရန်ကုန်းအွင်း၌စ်တနလ=င်ပမ်းမ=ရီးသည် ၂.၂သန်းန့်ကိုသယ်ယူပို့တဆာင်းတပးလ=က်ရှိသည်။ ၁၂၀၄'ုနှစ်ဇွန်လအွင်းတမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လုပ်ငန်တပါင်းစုံထိန်းသိမ်းတရးကကီးကကပ်မဗဟိုတကာမီ(ရန်ကုန်းဒသကကီး)မှတကာက်ယူထားသည့်အ'က်အလက်မားမှ
တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်း စပယ်ယာမား

89

က်လာတသာယာဉ်လိုင်းအတရအွက်နှင့်အူ ထိုယာဉ်လိုင်းအလုပ်လုပ်ကိုင်ကကတသာ ယာဉ်လုပ်သား အတရအွက်မှာလည်း မားခပား လာသည်။ ယာဉ်လုပ်သားမားွင် အဓိကအားခ.င့် ယာဉ်လိုင်း အွင်းရှိ တမာ်တယာဉ်မားအား တမာင်းနှင့်တခပးဆွဲရာပါဝင်သည် ယာဉ်တမာင်း (ဒရိုင်ဘာ) (တမာင်း) မားနှင့် 'ရီးသည်မား ထံမှ ယာဉ်စီး' အ'တကကးတငွတကာက်'ံသူ စပယ်ယာ (लက်မှတရာင်း/ယာဉ်တနာက်လိုက်) (တရာင်း) ပါဝင်သည်။

ယုတလ့လာမသည် ထိုသို့ ယာဉ်လိုင်းမား့မတကကာင်း ပွားလာသည် စပယ်ယာမား၏ တန့်စဉ် လူမဘဝ အတကကာင်းအရာမားကို နားလည်သိရှိလိုခ'င်းတကကာင့်ခ.စ်သည်။ စပယ်ယာမားသည် ယာဉ်လိုင်းအလိုက်တန့်စဉ် လူဦးတရ ရာဂဏာန်းမှ တထာင်ဂဏာန်တကာ်နှင့် ဆက်ဆံတနရခ'င်း၊ တကးလက်တဒသမှ တခပာင်းတရ ဝင်တငွဲရသည့် အမားစု ဝင်တငွဲလုပ်ကိုင်ကကတသာ အလုပ်အကိုင် 'ုခ.စ်တနခ'င်းသည်လည်း တလ့လာရသည့် အတကကာင်းအရင်းမားပင် ခ.စ်ပါသည်။ ထို့ခပင် ရန်ကုန်ိုင်းအွင်း ခ.စ်ပွားတသာ မတားဆမမားမှာ ရာိုင်းနန်အတာ်မားမားပါဝင်လိုက်ရပါသည်။

၂ထိုသို့ စပယ်ယာ ့ ၏ တန့်စဉ် လူမဘဝကို တလ့လာရာ၌ ၎င်း ့ ၏ ဝင်တငွ'ွဲရရှိပုံကို သိရှိနားလည်ရန် လိုအပ်မပီး၊ 
စ်တန့၍ အလုပ်'ိန်၊ ရရှိသည့်။

၂၂၀၀'ုနှစ် ွင် ရန်ကုန်ိုင်းတဒသကကီး၌ တမာ်တယာဉ်မတားဆမ ခ.စ် စဉ်၁၆၇၈မခ.စ်ပွားတကကာင်းကို ပထမအကကိမ် အမိုးသားလ6်တာ ဒုယအကကိမ်ပုံမှန်အစည်းအတဝး ၂၉.၉.၂၀၁၁'ုနှစ် ွင် အမိုးသားလ6်တာကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဦးဝင်းတနာင်၏ တမးခမန်း'က်အား ဗိုလ်မှူး'ုပ်တကာ်ဇံခမင့် (ခပည်ထဲတရး ဝန်ကကီးဌာန၊ ဒုယဝန်ကကီး) တခ.ကကား'က်မှ သိရှိရပါသည်။
ပေါ်လာသည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် အချက်အလက်များကို အနည်းဆုံး စွဲလျော်စွာ ရှိသည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် အချက်အလက်များကို မရှိနိုင်သည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် အချက်အလက်များကို မရှိနိုင်သည်။

Figure 1: စပယ်ယာ အွင်းရှိ စပယ်ယာမား ကိုသာ အဓိကထားတလ့လာသွားမည်ခ.စ်ပါသည်။
Figure 2: Bus route maps for No. 3 Green and Yellow lines
အချစ် (၃) အမျိုးအမားသင့်စေရာ အချစ်တို့သည် အာရုံစိတ်ပြုပြီး စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်ရာ တစ်ခါတစ်ရက် အချစ်တို့သည် တစ်လူမှ တစ်လူသို့ ချမ်းမြင်စေရာ အချစ်တို့သည် အစိုးရသည် အချစ်တို့သည် အပြောင်းအလဲနှင့် အစိုးရသည် ပြောသည်။

Figure 3 ရောင်းချယ်ရာ စင်တခွဲ: minibus
Figure 4: Bus route maps for No. 3 White line and No. 3 Green Minibus line
စပယ်ယာမားအား တလ့လာ တစာင်ကကည့်ခြင်း (direct observation) နှင့်တလ့ လာမခပုလုပ်သည် နှစ်ကကိမ်အွင်း၌ ယာဉ်လိုင်းအွင်း စပယ်ယာဦးတရ (၉၀) နှစ်ကကိမ်းအား အင်ာဗူးခြင်း (face-to-face interview) နှင့်အတသးစိ့နှင့် ဗကစွာတမးခမန်းတလ့လာခြင်း (in-depth interview)ပုံစံကို အသုံးခပုထားပါသည်။

ယာဉ်လိုင်း၏ သိုင်းအကျဉ်းယာဉ်လိုင်းအမှ် (၁) မှ အမှ် (၂၀) အထိ သည် စင်ထူတထာင် 'ိန်ွင်ကုန်းလမ်းပိုတဆာင်တရးတကာ်ပတရးရှင်း (ကပ ရ) လက်တအာင်ွင်ရှိ'ဲ့မပီး မထသမှ စီမံအုပ်တပးရခြင်းခ.စ်သည်။ ၎င်းအထဲမှ အမှ် (၃) ယာဉ်လိုင်းသည် ဟိုင်းလ် (Toyota Hilux)ကားအမိုးအစားမားခြင်းနှင့်စည်ထားတသာ ယာဉ်လိုင်းပါသည်။ ယာဉ်လိုင်းကို ၁၉၉၀ 'ုနှစ် 'န့်ကစင်.ွဲ့စည်း'ဲ့သည်ဟု ယူဆရသည်။ ယာဉ်လိုင်းစင်ထူတထာင်စဉ်က ပါဝင်'ဲ့တသာ ယာဉ်ပိုင်ရှင်မား၏ အဆိုအရ စင်ထူတထာင်စဉ်ကားအစီတရ ဆယ့်ငါးစီး'န့်ရှိမပီး၊ ဂိ်ရင်း (တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်း 'ရီးစဉ်အဆုံးတနရာ)မှာကကည့်ခမင်ိုင်မမိ့နယ်စလင်းအားကစားကွင်းအတရှ့မှခ.စ်မပီး၊ တခမနီကုန်း၊ တရ6 ိဂုံဘုရားကိုခ. ်၍လသာမမိ့နယ်ဂိ်ဆုံး (တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်း 'ရီးစဉ်အဆုံးပါသည်။ ၃ ထိုတမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းအား ၁၉၉၃'ုနှစ်ဂိ်ရင်းအား အလုံမမိ့နယ် ဗဟိုအမိုးသမီးတဆးရုံအနီးရှိ ဗဟိုအမိုးသမီးတဆးရုံကားမှာ ိုင်သိ့ တခပာင်းတရွ့ 'ဲ့မပီး 'ရီးစဉ်နှင့် ဂိ်ဆုံးမှာ ယင်အိုင်းပင်ခ.စ်ပါသည်။ 

၂၀၀၉'ုနှစ်တလ့လာမစင်ခပုလုပ်'ိန်၌ အမှ် (၃) ယာဉ်လိုင်း 'ွင် လိုင်း'ွဲ (၃) 'ုခ.င့်တခပးဆွဲလက်ရှိသည်။ ယာဉ်လိုင်းနံပါ်ပါရှိတသာ ၃ ယာဉ်လိုင်းအွင်းရှိ ဝါရင့်စပယ်ယာမားထံမှ သိရှိရတသာအ'က်ခ.စ်မပီး 'န့်မှန်းတ.ာ်ခပ'က်သာခ.စ်သည်။
Figure 5: Bus route map for No. 3 White minibus line
ရဲဟိန်ေ	ာင် အမှ
် ံဆိ
် ွင် အသုံးခပုတသာ အတရာင်ကိုလိုက်၍ အစိမ်းတရာင်လိုင်း၊ အဝါတရာင်လိုင်းနှင့် အခ.ူတရာင်လိုင်းဟူ၍ 'ွဲခ'ား ထားပါသည်။ တမာ်တ
ာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းမား၏ 'ရီစဉ်သ
်မှက်မားမှာ အစိမ်းတရာင် ယာဉ်လိုင်း၏ ဂိ
်ရင်းမှာ အလုံမမို ့ နယ် ဗဟိုအမိုးသမီးတဆးရုံမှာ စင်၍ တခမနီကုန်း၊ တရ6 ိဂုံဘုရားကိုခ.
်၍ မဂဂလာတာင်ညွန ့ ်မမို ့ နယ် အမဲတစး မှ
် ိုင်ဂိ
်ဆုံးပါသည်။ (Figure 2) အဝါ တရာင် ယာဉ်လိုင်းသည် အလုံမမို ့ နယ် ဗဟိုအမိုးသမီးတဆးရုံမှာ စ၍ လှည်းန်း၊ တကာက်ကုန်းကိုခ.
်၍ တခမာက်ဥက U ာလာမမို ့ နယ်တဘလီံ
ား ဂိ
်ဆုံးပါသည်။ (Figure 4) ယာဉ်လိုင်း၁'ုင်းစီအား တန ့ စဉ် အသုံးခပုတနတသာ 'ရီးသည်း အရည်အ
ွက်မှာအစိမ်းတရာင်ယာဉ်လိုင်း၁၈၃၆၀ဦး၊ အဝါတရာင်ယာဉ်လိုင်း၂၄၁၂၀ ဦးနှင့် အခ.ူတရာင်ယဉ်လိုင်း၈၁၆၀ ဦး။ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၁'ုယာဉ်ပေါ်သည် အမှ
် ၃ ယာဉ်လိုင်းသည် ယ'င်ဟိုင်လ်ကားတလးမားတနရာ
ွင်၂၀၁၃'ုနှစ်မှစင်ကာ မီနီဘက်စ်(minibus) ကားမားခ.င့် အစားထိုးတခပးဆွဲတနမပီးခ.စ်သည်။ ယာဉ်လိုင်းယာဉ်လိုင်းသည် ယ'င်လိုင်'ွဲ၃'ုအစား အစိမ်းတရာင်နှင့် အခ.ူတရာင် လိုင်း(minibus) သည် ယာဉ်လိုင်း၁ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၄ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၁၂ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၇၂ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၄၂ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၃၁ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၁၁ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၄၁ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၃၁ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၁၁ ယာဉ်လိုင်း၄၁ ယာဉ် (Figure 4) သာ နှစ်စဉ် မိုက်လိုင်းတရာမားသာတခပာင်းလည်း 'ဲ့သည်။ အစိမ်းတရာင် ယာဉ်လိုင်း(Figure 4)၏ ဂိ
်ဆုံးမှာ လသာမမို ့ နယ် လသာမှာ
ိုင်သို ့လည်းတကာင်း၊ အခ.ူ
တရာင် ယာဉ်လိုင်းသည် တ
ာင်ဥက U လာမမို ့ နယ် တ
ာင်၄ စ်စံဝင်း။ (၂၀၁၁) ရန်ကုန်'ရီးသွားသမိုင်းထဲက မထသ၊ ပန်းမိုးစာတပ၊ ရန်ကုန်။
တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်း စပယ်ယာမား

ဥကျော် လာဘုရားမှ ိုင်သိုလ် တကာင်း 'ရီးစဉ်တခပာင်းလည်း ထားသည်။

စပယ်ယာဆိုသည်ာမား ခမန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ကုန်းလမ်းသယ်ယူပိုခွင်နှင့် ကိုလိုနီတွင်

တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းမား၊ ထတရာလီလိုင်းမားနှင့် မီးရထားကို အသုံးပြုကကသည်။ ၁၉၁၃ ရန်ကုန်လက်စစ်ဓာမဏီမှ မမိ့းနှင့် ဆင်တခုံးတဒသမားသိုလ် တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်တခပးဆွဲမစင်တပ8

တပါက်လာသည်ဟု 'န်မှန်းရသည်။

၅ ထိုစဉ်က စပယ်ယာမား၏ လုပ်ငန်းာဝန်နှင့် ပါသက်ရတာ့လာတသာ်လည်း 'ိုင်မာသည့် အတထာက်အထားတွ့ရခင်းမရှိတပ။

Spare ဟူတသာ တဝါဟာရသည် ၂၀၁၁ ခမန်စာအ.ွဲမှ ထုတဝသည့် အဂဂလိပ်–ခမန်မာအဘိဓာန်အရ (n) အရာ (ပစ်ည်၊ ဘီး စသည်) ဟူ၍ တ.ာ်ခပထားသည်ကို တွ့ရှိရသည်။ တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်(spare) ဟူ၍ အဂဂလိပ်အသံထွက်ခင့်အသံလှယ် တ'8 ဆိုတကကာင်း ယူဆမိသည်။ အတကကာင်းအရင်းမှ ယာဉ်၏ အတနာက်ပိုင်းွင်ယာဉ်တမာင်းမဟုတာသီခ'ားစ်တယာက်ခ'စ်ခ'င်းနှင့် ယာဉ်ပ်သက်တသာ အခ'ားကိစXရပ်မားွင်ပါ ကူညီလုပ်ကိုင်တပးနိုင်ခ'င်း ့သည်။ 'ိုင်မာသည့် အတထာက်အထားနှင့် သတဘာထားအခမင် ရရှိ'ဲ့ခ'င်းမရှိပါ။ ဤ စပယ်ယာမားကို တွင်အလိုက် အခ'ားတသာအားခင့် လက်မှတရာင်း၊ လက်မှစစ်၊ ယာဉ်တနာက်လိုက်၊ ယာဉ်အကူ စသည့်ခ'င့် တ'8တဝ8ကကသည်။ ၁၉၈၈မီက ၅ ခမန်မွန်၊ တမာင်၊ (ဆူတလ ၂၀၀၉) ။
ရဲဟိန်းတွင် လက်မှ်စနစ်ကို ကင့်သုံးတသာ်လည်း တနာက်ပိုင်းခ.
သိမ်းသည်။ စပယ်ယာဦးတရမှာလည်း ိုးပွားလာသည်။ ထိုစဉ်က စပယ်ယာမားသည် ယ'ုကဲ့သို ရီးသည်မားထံမှ ကားတကာက်ရသည် မဟု်ပဲ။ စီးနင်မည့် ရီးစဉ်အလိုက်လက်မှ်ခ.
တရာင်းရတသာစနစ်သည်။ ထိုစဉ်က လက်မှ်တရာင်းဟုလည်း တ'8ဆိုကကသည်။ ခမန်မာ့ဆိုရှယ်လစ် လမ်းစဉ်ပါ လက်ထက်ွင်အဆိုပါစပယ်ယာ/လက်မှ်တရာင်းအလုပ်ကိုအမိုးသမီးမားပါဝင်တရာက်လုပ်ကိုင်ကကသည်ဟုတွ့်ဆုံတမးခမ်းတသာ သက်ကကီးစပယ်ယာမားထံမှ သိရှိရသည်။ ၁၉၈၈နှစ်တနာက်ပိုင်းွင်ခမ်းနိုင်ငံ၏နိုင်ငံတရးတခပာင်းလဲမားခ.
ပွားမပီးတခပာင်းလဲလာတသာ စီးပွားတရးအတခ'အတနမားအရ ဧရာဝန်ခမစ်ဝကြားတပါ၈တဒသနှင့် အထက်ခမန်မာ နိုင်ငံမှ လူအမားအခပား ရန်ကုန်မမို့ သို့တခပာင်းတရွ့ဝင်တရာက်လာကကသည်။ ထိုတကကာင့်ယ'ုအ'ါွင် 'ရီးသည်င်ယာဉ်လိုင်းတပါင်း ၃၃၆လိုင်း'န့်ရှိလာမပီးတမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လုပ်သားဦးတရမှာ ယာဉ်တမာင်း၅၈၆၈တယာက်န့်နှင့် စပယ်ယာဦးတရ ၇၇၄၂ဦးန့်ရှိသည်ဟု 'န့်ရှိသည်ဟုမ၊ ထ၊ သမှ သိရှိရသည်။ ၅သိုတသာရားဝင်လိုင်စင်ကိုင်တဆာင်ထားခ'င်းမရှိတသာ ယာဉ်တမာင်းနှင့်ယာဉ်တနာက်လိုက်မားလည်းရှိသည်။ ယ'ုတလ့လာတ.ာ်ခပမည့် စပယ်ယာမားမှာ အမှ် ၃လိုင်း'ွဲမားမှခ.
စ်မပီးတလ့လာမစင်ခပုစဉ်က စုစုတပါင်းလူဦးတရ ၇၀န့်ရှိမပီး၊ ၂၀၁၄နှစ်ွင်မကားအစီအတရအွက်တခပာင်းလည်းမနှင့်
တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်း စပယ်ယာမား

| 99 |

လိုင်းပုံစံတခပာင်းလဲမတကကာင့် စပယ်ယာဦးတရ ၄၀တကာ်'န ့ ်သာရှိသည်။ ၎င်းအထဲဝင် ၂၀၀၉ 'ုနှစ်ဝင်လုပ်ကိုင်တနသူများမှ ကန်ရှိတန'ဲ့သူ ၂၇တယာက်'န ့ ်ရှိမပီး အသစ်ဝင်တရာက်လာသူ ၁၃ဦး'န ့ ်ရှိပါသည်။ အဆိုပါ စပယ်ယာမား၏တနစဉ်ဝန်ဝ ရာမားကို သက်ဆိုင်ရာကအလိုက်တခပသွားမည်ခ.စ်သည်။ စပယ်ယာစ်ယာက်ြစ်လာြင်း၂၀၀၉'ုနှစ်ဝင်ခပုလုပ်'ဲ့တသာတ တ ဆုံတမးခမန်မမားနှင့် ၂၀၁၄'ုနှစ်ဝင်ခပုလုပ်'ဲ့တသာတ ဆုံတမးခမန်မမားအရ စပယ်ယာအလုပ်ကို တရွးယ်လုပ်ကိုင်ရခင်း၏အဓိကအတကကာင်းခက်ကို လုပ်ငန်းဝင်တငွရရှိသည်ဟု ယုံကကည်တသာတကကာင့်ခ.စ်သည်။ စပယ်ယာစ်တယာက်ခစ်လာရန်အွက်အဓိကအပ်က်မှာ 'က်မှာ 'န�ကိုယ်ကကံ့ိုင်မပင်ခ.စ်သည်။ အခားအပ်က်မားကိုကန်သာတကကာင့် လုပ်ငန်းဝင်တငွပိုမိုရရှိသည်ဟု ယုံကကည်တသာတကကာင့်ခ.စ်သည်။ စပယ်ယာလုပ်လိုသူစ်ဦးသည် နီးစပ်ရာမိတဆွယ်လုပ်သားမား၊ အုံနာ(ယာဉ်ပိုင်ရှင်)မားမှဆင့်တမာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းအွင်းရှိ စပယ်ယာမားထံမှ အတခံအ'က်မားမှ သင်ယူကကရသည်။ ထိုသင်ယူမမားသည်လည်းကောင်း၊ အိန်ကန် သာတကကာင့်မရှိပဲအနည်းဆုံးငါးရက်မှ ဆယ်ရက်အထိသာကကာခမင်ယူဆခင်းခ.စ်သည်။ အဓိကသင်ကကားရသည့် အ'က်မားမှ မိမိတမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်တဘးကင်စွာခ.င့်မှာ် ိုင်မားသို မိမိဝင်နိုင်ထွက်နိုင်ရန် ယာဉ်တမာင်းအားကူညီရပုံ၊ မိမိဝင်
ရဲဟိန်းတရာက်လုပ်ကိုင်မည့် ‘ရီးစဉ်အွင်းရှိကာမှား’ မားနှင့် ယာဉ်စီး’ သ်မှာပုံမား၊ ဝင်တငွ’ွဲတဝမ ပုံစံမားနှင့် သ်မှာဝင်တငွရရှိရန် ယှဉ်မပိုင်ရပုံမားပင်ခ.စ်သည်။ ထိုသို့ကကားတနစဉ်အွင်းတအာက်ခမန်မာနိုင်ငံကုန်းလမ်းပိ့တဆာင်တရးည6န်ကကားတရးမဦးစီဌာန(က၊ည၊န)ွင်စပယ်ယာမားရရှိရန်တလာက်လိုင်၍လိုင်စင်စာတမးပွဲကိုဝင်တရာက်တခ.ဆိုရပါသည်(Figure 6)လိုင်စင်တအာင်ခမင်မပီးတနာက်မိမိဝင်တရာက်လုပ်ကိုင်မည့်သက်ဆိုင်ရာလိုင်းအွင်းရှိယာဉ်ပိုင်ရှင်ထံမှတထာက်’ံ’က်ရယူမ၊ထ၊သွင်လိုက်’ွင့်(တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လိုက်’ွင့်လိုင်စင်)ကိုခပုလုပ်ရပါသည်(Figure 6)(စပယ်ယာမားအားလိုင်စင်ထုတပးခ'င်းနှင့်သက်ဆိုင်တသာ ဥပတဒမားနှင့်လိုင်စင်ရုပ်သိမ်းခ'င်းဆိုင်ရာ ဥပတဒမားကိုတနာက်ဆက်၁နှင့်၂၇့သည်နှင့်တပးသွင်ရပါသည်။ ဝ်စုံစုံမှာ၅၆၀၀ကပ် ‘န့်ခ.စ်သည်။ ထိုသို့က၊ည၊နလိုင်စင်နှင့်သက်ဆိုင်ရာယာဉ်လိုင်း၏လိုက်’ွင့်ရရှိထားပါကထိုယာဉ်လိုင်းွင်အလုပ်လုပ်ကိုင်နိုင်တသာစပယ်ယာစ်ဦးခ.စ်မပီခ.စ်ပါသည်။ သို့တသာက၊ည၊နနှင့်မ၊ထ၊သို့မှထားတသာစည်းကမ်းမားကိုလိုက်နာခ'င်းမရှိပါကလအကန့်အသ်ခ.င့်လိုင်စင်ရပ်နားခ'င်းနှင့် လိုင်စင်ပိ်သိမ်းခ'င်းခ.င့်အတရးယူပါသည်။(စည်းကမ်းက်မားကိုတနာက်ဆက်၃)ပါသည်။ ထို့ခပင်ယာဉ်ပိုင်ရှင်မားမှလည်း့ို့မိုက်ကိုရုပ်သိမ်းခ'င်းခ.င့်လည်းယာဉ်လိုက်’ွင့်ကို.က်သိမ်းနိုင်ပါသည်။
စီးပွားရေးကောင်းမှုကို ရှင်းပြပါ။

ယာဉ်လိုင်းစပယ်ယာမား

စ်ဦး၏ ေန့စဉ်လုပ်ငန်း ရန်ကုန်မမိုရှိ တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်းမားစင်တခပးဆွဲ'ိန်မှာ အတစာဆုံး ၅နာရီန့် စင်တခပးဆွဲတနတသာ တမာ်တယာဉ်မားမှာ တစးကကို၊ တစးပိုကားမားသာစ်သည်။ အခ'ားယာဉ်လိုင်မားကဲ့သိုပင် အမှ၃ ယာဉ်လိုင်းမှ စပယ်ယာမားသည်မနက် ၅နာရီ န့် စင်တခပးဆွဲရမည့် တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်းအွက် ဂိ်အစည်ရှိရာတနရာသိုအတနာက်ကဆုံး ၅နာရီအတရာက်လာရသည်။ ထိုအ'ိန်မှ စင်၍ စပယ်ယာစ်ဦးသည်လုပ်ငန်း စင်ဝင်တရာက်ရပါသည်။

အုံနာထံမှ ထု်ယူလာတသာ တမာ်တယာဉ်ကို တန့်ပြာကကံ့'ိုင်မအွက် အတသးစားစစ်တဆးမမားကို စင်ခပုလုပ်ရပါသည်။ ဆီ၊ တရ၊ တလ၊ ဝိုင်ဟု အကကမ်းခ.င်းတ'8ဆိုနိုင်တသာ တမာင်းနှင်းတခပဆွဲမည့်ယာဉ်၏စ်တန့်ပြာတလာင်စာလိုအပ်က်ရှိမရှိ ထပ်မံစစ်တဆးခ'င်း(ဆီ), ယာဉ်၏အင်ဂင်'န်းအတအးတပးစနစ်အွက်လိုအပ်တသာတနရာမားအွက် အင်ဂင်ဝိုင်နှင့် စက်ဆီအမိုးမိုး့ကို စစ်တဆးခ'င်း၊ ခ.ည့်ငင်းခ'င်းပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ခ.ည့်ငင်းမပီးတနာက်ယာဉ်ပိုင်ရှင်အမားစု၏သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ယုံကကည်မအလိုက် တန့်အနZရာယ်ကင်းတစရန်နှင့် အခ'ားတသာ ထိ'ိုက်ပက်စီးမမားမခ.စ်တစရန် စပယ်ပန်း၊ တရ6ပန်း၊ တငွပန်းမား ဝယ်ယူ'ိ်ဆွဲခ'င်း၊ အတမ6းင်ထွန်းညှိခ'င်းကိုလည်း ခပုလုပ်ရပါသည်။ ထိုသို့လုပ်တဆာင်မပီးပါက မိမိယာဉ်အလှည့်ကစနစ်ခ.င့်စင်ထွက်'ွာကကပါတာသည်။
အကြောင်းအရာ: ဗားရဲဟိန်းသောင်အပြားတနာရာ 'တပ်ခ'င်း၊ ယာဉ်စီး'တကာက်'ံခ'င်း၊ မိုင်မားမိုင်မိမိတမာ်တယာဉ်ဝင်တရာက်စဉ် မိမိတဘးအနာရာယ်ကင်းတစရန် ဒရိုင်ဘာအားကူညီတပ်ခ'င်း၊ မိမိလိုက်ပါသည့် တမာ်တယာဉ်ဝင်တငွပိုမိုရရှိနိုင်တစ်ရန်အွက်အခ'ားယာဉ်နှင့်အမပိုင်တမာင်းနှင်ရန် မိန့်အားတပ်ခ'င်း၊ မိမိဂိ်ရင်းသိုတရာက်တသာအ'ိန်၌ဂိ်မှ ကုမ္ပဏီရှိသူအ'ိန်မှူး (မ.ထ.သ)န့်အပ်ထားတသာယာဉ်အလှည့်ကထွက်ရှိနိုင်ရန်စီစဉ်သူထံတနာက်ကကိမ် တမာ်တယာဉ်ခပန်လည်ထွက်ရှိရန်အွက်တကကာင်းကကားစာရင်းသွင်းခ'င်းနှင့်ယာဉ်လိုင်းတခပးဆွဲရာမှရရှိလာတသာယာဉ်စီး 'တငွမားကိုစာရင်းမှသိမ်းဆည်ရခ'င်းခ.စ်ပါသည်။

ထိုဂိ်ဆုံးမှမူလဂိ်ရင်သိုခပန်လည်တရာက်ရှိလင်ခ'မ်းဟုတွေ့မပီးထိုနှစ်ခ'မ်းတပါင်းကိုတ'ါက်ဟု သ်မှသည်။ထိုကဲ့သိုတရာက်အတ'ါက်အတရအွက်စ်တနကုန်ရှစ်ကကိမ်မှအမားဆုံဆယ့်န�စ်ကကိမ်အထိတခပးဆွဲကကပါသည်။ညတနပိုင်းအ'ိန်သိုတရာက်၍တနာက်ဆုံးအတ'ါက်တခပးဆွဲမပီး'ိန်သည်'ုနှစ်နာရီနှင့်ရှစ်နာရီ'န့်ရှိတနမပီခ.စ်ပါသည်။

ထိုအ'ိန်၌ဂိ်ရင်းသိုခပန်တရာက်မပီးတနာက်အ'ိန်မှူးထံအတကကာင်းကကားရခ'င်း၊ကကီးကကပ်တရးမှူး (မ.ထ.သ)ထံသိုတယာဉ်လိုင်းဆွဲ'အွက်မ.ထ.သသိုတွေ့ရမည့်ဂိ်တကကး လိုင်းဆွဲ'ကိုတပးရခ'င်း၊ စ်တနကုန်ရရှိလာတသာတငွတကကးမားကိုစုစည်းစာရင်းလုပ်ရာထုယူခ'င်း၊ မိမိရရှိမည့်လုပ်'ကိုထုယူခ'င်း၊ ယာဉ်ကိုတဆးတကကာသန့်စင်တပးရခ'င်းနှင့်တနာက်တနာယာဉ်တခပးဆွဲရန်အွက်တလာင်စာခ.ည့်င်ရခ'င်းခ.စ်သည်။

ထိုကိစ်မားအားလုံးခပုလုပ်မပီး'ိန်ွင်စပယ်ယာစ်ဦး၏စ်တန်းဖြင့်မမှတ်ချက်တော်တော်: ကလေး

တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်း စပယ်ယာမား | 103

လုပ်ငန်းမား အမပီးသ်မပီခ.စ်၍ အတစာဆုံး ည၉နာရီနှင့် ၉နာရီ'ွဲ'န့်ရှိတနမည်ခ.စ်ပါသည်။ ထိုတကာင့်စပယ်ယာစ်တယာက်၏ အလုပ်သည် နံနက် ၅နာရီမှစ၍ ညတန၉နာရီ'ွဲ'န့်ရှိပါသည်။ စပယ်ယာအမားစုသည် အန်းပညာက်တခမာက်မနိမ့်ပါးကကတသာ်လည်း ၎င့့်ပုံစံမားကို အတသးစိ်အာရုံစိုက်နိုင်မားကို တလ့လာမမားအရ တွ့ရှိရပါသည်။ စပယ်ယာပညာတရးအတခ'အတနနှင့်ပ်သက်၍လည်းတအာက်ဆက်လက်တ.ာ်ခပထားပါသည်။

ဝင်ေင!ရ#ိပုံနှင်& ော်ေယာဉ်လိုင်းအင်း ဝင်ေင!!ေဝပုံစပယ်ယာစ်ဦး၏ ဝင်တငွ(လုပ်ရ)ရရှိမကို တလ့လာနိုင်ရန် အွက်တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်းအွင်ဝင်တငွ'ွဲတဝသည့် ပုံစံမားကို သိရှိရန်လိုအပ်သည်။ ရန်ကုန်မမို့ွင်တခပးဆွဲလ=က် ရှိတသာ တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်းမားွင်အဓိကကင့်သုံးတသာ စနစ်မှာ ၃မိုးရှိတကကာင်းသိရသည်။ ၎င့့်မှာအငှားစနစ်၊ ရရှင်းစနစ်နှင့် ကန်ရှင်းစနစ်ခ.စ်သည်။ အငှားစနစ်သည် တမာ်တယာဉ်ပိုင်ရှင်မှ သ်မှ်ထားတသာ နန်းထားခ.င့်လုပ်ကိုင်လိုတသာ စပယ်ယာ(သိ့ဒရိုင်ဘာအား အငှားထားတပးထားတသာ စနစ်ခ.စ်သည်။ ဤစနစ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းအလိုက်သက်မှ်ထားတသာ နန်းထားမူညီကကတပ။ ထိုခပင်တမာ်တယာဉ်ကကံ့ိုင်မသည်လည်း ငှားရမ်းမနန်းထားမူညီကို သ်မှ်ရာ အတရးပါတသာ အ'က်စ်'က်ခ.စ်သည်။ စင်တလ့လာမခပု'ဲ့တသာ၂၀၀၉'ုနှစ်ဟိုင်းလ်အမိုးအစား တမာ်တယာဉ်စီးအွက်စ်ရက်ပမ်းမ=ဝင်တငွရရှိမသည် ကပ်ငါးတသာင်းနှင့် တခ'ာက်တသာင်း
ရဲဟိန်းမှ ဝန်ကင်န့်ခ.စ်မပီး၊ ငှားရမ်းနန်ထားမှာ စ်ရက်အွက် ကပ်နှစ်တသာင်းနှင့် သုံးတသာင်ဝန်ကင်န့်ခ.စ်ရှိမပီး စ်လခင်းရှင်းရသည့် စနစ်ခ.စ်သည်။ ဤစနစ်ခ.င့် လုပ်ကိုင်ရာ စပယ်ယာမားထက် ဒရိုင်ဘာမားကပိုမိုငှားရမ်းလုပ်ကိုင်ကကတကကာင်းသိရသည်။ တန့်စဉ်ရရှိတသာ ဝင်တငွအွင်းမှ အတသးစားခပင်စင်စရိ်းတလာင်စာ.ိုး၊ ဂိ်တကကးနှင့်စပယ်ယာ(သို့)ဒရိုင်ဘာ၏ လုပ်အားကို ငှားရမ်းတခပးဆွဲသူမှ ကက'ံရသည်။

ရရှင်းစနစ်မှာ စ်တန့်ာတမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်တခပးဆွဲရာမှ ရရှိလာတသာဝင်တငွမှ ရာိုင်းနန်းအလိုက် ယာဉ်လုပ်သားမားခ.စ်တသာ စပယ်ယာနှင့်ဒရိုင်ဘာ၏ လုပ်အားမားကို တပးတခ'ခ'င်းခ.စ်သည်။ ကန်ရှင်းစနစ်မှာ မူင်းတမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်၏ စ်တန့်ာကုန်ကကစရိ်အား ရရှိတသာဝင် တငွမှ ထု်န်မပီး ကန်ရှိတသာတငွအတပ၃၈၌ ရာိုင်နန်းအလိုက် လုပ်အားရရှိခ'င်းပင်ခ.စ်သည်။ မည်သည့်စနစ်ကို ကင့်သုံးသည်ခ.စ်တစိစပယ်ယာစ်ဦး၏ လုပ်အားသ်မှ က်မှာ ၁၀ရာိုင်နန်းန့်ခ.စ်မပီး အသုံးခပုတသာ စနစ်တပ8ွင်မူည်၍ ဝင်တငွရရှိမှုခပားတကကာင်း}

အမှ် ၃ ယာဉ်လိုင်းအွင်း စပယ်ယာမားမှ အငှားစနစ်ခ.င့် လုပ်ကိုင်သူမရှိတကကာင်း သိရှိရသည်။ ၂၀၀၉'ုနှစ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းအွင်းစုစုတပါင်း ဟိုင်းလ်တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်စီးတရအစီး ၆၀'န့်ရှိတသာ်လည်းကားငါးစီးန့်သာ အငှားစနစ်ခ.င့် လုပ်တဆာင်တသာ ကားစီးမှ မရှိတပ။ အမှ် ၃ ယာဉ်လိုင်းအွင်းအဓိက အသုံးခပုတသာ ပုံစံမှ ၂၀၀၉'ုနှစ်မိုင်မီက ကန်ရှင်းစနစ်ခ.စ်မပီး၊ တနာက်ပိုင်းဝန်ကင်န့်ခ.စ်သည်။ ငှားရမ်းတခပာင်းလဲအသုံးခပုတနကကမပီးခ.စ်သည်။
Figure 6: Conductors licenses
ကျင်းပသည်။

ရဲဟိန်းက သင့်စနစ်မားကို ကင့်သုံးရာ မထောက်ပါ။ ဒီကျင်းလာသည် မားမှ သာမှတပူထားခြင်းမဟုတ်ပဲ လိုင်းအွင်သည် ယာဉ်ပိုင်ရှင်မှ စ်တန့်လင်အတွက်တရ ၁၀တိုက်မှ ၁၂တိုက်အထိတခြင်းထက်ရာ ယာဉ်မားအွက် စီစီပမ်းမှာ ကပ်တခြင်းတသာင်း ဝန်ကင်ချစ်သည်။ ယုအိန်းမီနီဘက်စီသည် စ်တန့်လင်အတွက်တရ အမားဆုံး ၈တိုက်အထိတခြင်းကိုပီး၊ ကား၏အရွယ်အစားပိုမိုကက်မာလာတသာတကကာင်း "ရီးသည်အတရာအွက်ပိုမိုမားခပားစွာင်တဆာင်နိုင်ခြင်းနှင့် ကားအစီးတရတလန့်နည်းလာခြင်းတကကာင့် စ်စီ၏စ်တန့်ဝင်တငွမှာ ကယ်စ်သိန်းဝန်ကင်ချစ်လာခြင်းတကကာင်း လည်း ကန်ရှင်းစနစ်ကိုကင့်သုံးတသာတကကာင်း တလာင်စာဆီအွက်ကုန်ကကစရိနှင့် အခားစရိန်မပီးတနာက်ကန်တငွမှာ ကပ်တခြင်းတသာင်း ဝန်ကင်သာချစ်မပီး စပယ်ယာစ်ဦး၏ ဝင်တငွမှာ ကပ်၆၀၀ဝန်းကင်ချစ်သည်။ မိမိ၏ လိုင်းဆွဲတနစဉ်အိန်အွင်းပက်ခြင်း၊ ထိုက်မိခြင်းနှင့် ာယာတပါက်ခြင်းစသည်ချစ်ရာ ကားမထွက်နိုင်ခြင်း၊ အတွက်တရနာရှိနိုင်ခြင်းလည်း ရင်ဆိုင်ရသည်။ စပယ်ယာအလုပ်မှာ အလုပ်မိန်ကကာရှည်ခြင်း၊ တနိုးရွာမတရှာင်လုပ်ကိုင်ရခြင်းတကကာင့် စ်ပလင်ငါးရက်န့်သာအမားဆုံးလုပ်နိုင်တကကာင်းသိရသည်။ ထိုတကကာင်းအလုပ်လုပ်ရက်အမားဆုံး ၂၂ရက်ရှိမပီး စ်ရက်ပမ်းမှာဝင်တငွချစ်ကကည့်ပါကလင်စ်က်ပမ်းမှာ လင်စ်
တမာ်တ
ာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်း စပယ်ယာမား

သိန်းသုံးတသာင်းနှစ်တထာင်'န ့ ်သာ အမားဆုံးရနိုင်တကကာင်း သိရသည်။

ထိုခပင့်
စ်ရက်
စ်ဦးခ'င်းဝင်တငွအတနခ.င့် ကပ်၆တထာင်မှာ အခ'ားတသာ လုပ်ငန်းမားခ.င့် န1င်းယှဉ်တသာ မားသည်ဟု ယူဆနိုင်တသာ်လည်းရှည်းလ=ားတသာ အလုပ်'ိန်နှင့် ွက်ဆကကည့်ပါက စ်နာရီအန် ၃၇၅ကပ်သာရရှိတကကာင်း သိရှိရသည်။

စပယ်ယာမား ဝင်တငွရရှိမနှင့်ပ်သက်၍ တမာ်တ
ာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းတလာကအွင် တနာက်တခပာင်တခပာဆိုတသာ စကားမားလည်းရှိမပီး "စပယ်ယာလူရိုး အစိုးနှင့် "အုံနာဂိုင့်တထာက်၊ဒရိုင်ဘာဗိုက်တမှာက်၊စပယ်ယာက်တဆာက်" စသည်ခ.စ်သည်။ စပယ်ယာမားသည်ရရှိတသာ ဝင်တငွမားအတပ8မှ 'ိုးဝှက်က်သည့် သတဘာရှိသည်ဟု ဆိုလိုခ'င်းခ.စ်သည်။ သိ့တသာ်လည်းကယ့်လက်တွ ့ အတန ွင် တမာ်တ
ာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းအွင်ရှိတသာ သူမားအားလုံမှာ ယာဉ်လိုင်းတကကာင်း 'ု၏ ဝင်တငွကို လွယ်ကူစွာွက်ကနိုင်တသာ အတန ွင် လွယ်ကူတသာ အတန ွင် လွယ်ကူတသာ အတနမဟုတပ၊ ထို့ခပင် ယုအ'ါ၌ အုံနာမား၏ လူယုံမားမှာ တမာ်တကားတပ8 ွင်ပါရှိကကမပီး လူင်လူစာရင်ကိုတကာက်ယူတလ့ရှိကကမပီခ.စ်သည်။ ထို့ခပင်နှစ်ရှည်လမားစပယ်ယာလာသူမားနှင့်တမးခမန်မမားအရနှင့်တလ့လာတ၀့ရှိမိကမားအရ ဆင်းရလဲမွဲတမမှ လွ်တခမာက်တသာ အတနသိ့ တရာက်ရှိသွားတသာ အတရ အွက်မှာ အလွန်နည်းပါသည်ကို သိရှိရသည်။ အမားစုမှာ ခ'ားအလုပ်သိ့ တခပာင်းတရ6 ့ သွားခ'င်းနှင့် ထိ့ိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိမတကကာင့် အလုပ်မှ နားယူလိုက်ရသူမာကို တ၄့ရှိ'ဲ့မပီး၊ စပယ်ယာဘဝမှ အုံနာခ.စ်လာ သူအမှ် ၃ ယာဉ်လိုင်း ွင် စ်ဦးမှ မရှိတကကာင်း သိရှိရသည်။ စပယ်ယာမား၏ ကန်မာတရးတစာင့်တရှာက်မနှင့် ထိ'ိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိမ ့ အွက် မ ထ သနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ယာဉ်လိုင်းမားွင် အာမ'ံထားရှိမနှင့် ိကတသာ အစီအစဉ်မူဝါဒမားမရှိတကကာင်းတ၄့ရှိရသည်။
အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကကီးဌာနမှ လူမူလုံးတရးအွက် အဝါး ဝင်နိုင်မပီး လစဉ်ဝင်တငွတကာက်သည့် အစီအစဉ်ရှိတသာလည်း အစဉ်အမဲတဆာင်ရွက်တနခွင်မဟု်ပဲရံမှသာပစ်သည်။

စပယ်ယာ(၏)လူဘဝအမှ(၃)ယာဉ်လိုင်းအွင်းရှိစပယ်ယာမား၏လူမတရးဆိုင်ရာ အတခ်အတနမားကို သိရှိနိုင်ရန် ၂၀၀၉နှစ်နှင့် ဆက်လက်၍ ၂၀၁၄့ွင်တလ့လာမမားခပုလုပ်လျော့ရာ စပယ်ယာလုပ်ငန်းကို ဝင်တရာက်လုပ်ကိုင်သူမားဝင်တရာက်ရန်ကုန်မမို့အတခ်တနထိုင်သူဦးတရမှာ ၃၀ရာခိုင်နန်းန့်ရှိမပီး အခာတဒသမားမှတခပာင်းတရာဦးတရမှာ ၇၀ရာခိုင်နန်းရှိတကကာင်းသိရှိရသည်။

စာပွဲထိုး၊ ကုန်စည်အင်အနှင့်အခာကပန်းလုပ်ငန်းမားနှင့်နတင်ယှဉ်ပါက ဝင်တငွပိုမိရရှိသည်ဟုထင်ခမင်မတကကာင့်ခစ်သည်။

ဤလိုင်းအွင်းရှိ စပယ်ယာမား၏ပညာက်တရာက်မနန်းကိုနှစ်ကကိမ်တလ့လာစစ်မ်းတကာက်ယူမအရ စုစုတပါင်း ၉၀တယ်ွင်အတခ်ပညာအထက်န်းအဆင့်ကိုက်တရာက်ရံသူ ၂၀ရာခိုင်နန်းရှိမပီး၊က်သိုလ်က်သူ ၃.၇ရာခိုင်နန်း(၃)ဦးရှိကာ၊ ၆၀ရာခိုင်နန်းတကာ်မှာအလယ်နှင့်မူလနှင့်က်တရာက်ရံသူမားခစ်သည်ကိုတွံရသည်။

ကန်၁၅ရာခိုင်နန်းတကာ်မှာအစိုးရတကာင်းက်တရာက်ရံခူးခင်းမရှိတပ။
တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်းစပယ်ယာမား ကြည့်စားပါ၀င်ရန် စိတ်ကြီးမှုများကြည့်ထားသော အခြေခံအချက်များအားလုံးကို အနည်းဆုံး သိရှိသော အခါမှာ ဖော်ပြပါသည်။ အခြေခံအချက်များကြည့်ထားသော အခြေခံအချက်များကြား ဖော်ပြပါသည်။ အခြေခံအချက်များကြည့်ထားသော အခြေခံအချက်များကြား ဖော်ပြပါသည်။

ထို့နောက် စပယ်ယာမားနှင့် ဒရိုင်ဘာမားအတွက် ယာဉ်လုပ်သားများစုစည်းကြည့်ရန် နှစ်စဉ် ရဟန်းရာကြီးပိုင်းတပဆိုင်ရာ အလုပ်လုပ်ရာတွင် အိမ်ငှားလာသူတွေကို ပါဝင်ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် စပယ်ယာမားနှင့် ဒရိုင်ဘာမား အပြုပြင်ကြည့်ရန် လူမှုတွင် အခြေခံအချက်များကြည့်ထားသော အခြေခံအချက်များကြား ဖော်ပြပါသည်။
ရဲဟိန်းမာစပယ်ယာမား၏ အနာဂ် ဘဝရည်မှန်းက်မားအား တမးခမန်းရာအသက်အရွယ် ကကီးရင့်သူမားမှာ အလုပ်ပေါင်းတရာ့ရာမှ တခပာင်းတရာ့ရာလည်းခ'ားအလုပ်မားသိုင်းတရာက်ရန်ခ'င်း၊လိုအပ်တရာ့ပညာရပ်ဆိုင်ရာနှင့်အရင်းအနှီးမရှိခ'င်းတကကာင်းတခပာင်းတရာ့ရာကျွန်းမှာလိုင်း၌ပင်ဒရိုင်ဘာပေါင်းတရာ့ရာမှာ အခ'ားယာဉ်လိုင်းမားသိုင်းတရာ့ရာမှာ ဗိုလ်၍လုပ်ကိုင်ခ'င်း၊အငှားယဉ်တမာင်းဘဝသိုင်းတရာ့ကူးတခပာင်းသွားခ'င်း၊အမားစုမှာမိုင်မာတသာရည်မှန်ထားရှိရန်ခ'င်းတကကာင်းသိရှိရသည်။လူငယ်အိုမှာ ဤယာဉ်လိုင်းတရာ့ရာမှာ ပေါင်းတရာ့ရာမှာ ဗိုလ်တရာ့ရာမှာ အတခ'အတနခ်သည်ကိုသိရှိရသည်။

စပယ်ယာစ်ဦး၏ တန့်စဉ်ကကုူ့တန့်တနရတသာခပဿနာမားမှာ ၎င်းခိုင်မဆိုင်ရာခပဿနာ၊တန့်စဉ်ဆက်ဆံကကုူ့တန့်တနရာရီးသည်မားနှင့်ခပွားတသာခပဿနာမားနှင့်ယာဉ်စည်းကမ်းဆိုင်ရာခပဿနာ့ပင်ခ်သည်။

ယာဉ်လိုင်းမှ ရရှိတသာဝင်တငွမားကိုွဲတဝရာွင်ရာခင်နန်းအားခင့်အမားဆုံးရရှိတသာတမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်ပိုင်ရှင်စီအတပ်ည်လက်တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်ကကံ့ိုင်တရးနှင့်ပ်သက်ကွဲခပားခ'ားနားကကသည်။တလ့လာမအွင်သိရှိလာတသာအက်အလက်မားအရာဝင်တငွမားသိုင်းတမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်စီး၏ ကကံ့ိုင်တရးဆိုင်ရာစံနန်းမားမှာယာဉ်ပိုင်ရှင်၊ယာဉ်စည်းကမ်းထိန်းသိမ်းသူအရာရှိ(ယာဉ်ထိန်းရဲ)နှင့်တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်အွင်းရှိကကီးကကပ်သူမား(သက်ဆိုင်ရာယာဉ်လိုင်းအလိုက်မထ)
ကြက်ချင်းကျင်းဥ: အေဒီပျိုး 111

တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်း စပယ်ယာမား | 111

ကကားအင်းနားလည်မအရသာတဆာင်ရွက်တနကကာင်းသိရှိရသည်။ ဤအတခ်အတနွင်ဒရိုင်ဘာနှင့်စပယ်ယာမားမှာသက်ဆိုင်ရာ တမာ်တယာဉ်အွက်အုံနာမားအားအကကံတပးတခပာဆိုခင်းထက်ပို၍တဆာင်ရွက်ွင့်မရှိတပ။ ‘ Ying်က်အတနခင့်အုံနာမှယုံကကည်စွာလောပ်ထားတသာဒရိုင်ဘာနှင့်စပယ်အ့ို့ရှိတသာ်လည်း ၎င်း့ရှိတသာ်လည်း ၎င်း့နိုင်မအတနှင့်သာခစ်တကကာင်းသိရှိရသည်။ တမာ်တယာဉ်ကကာ့ Yingမှာတခပာဆိုင်ရာ တန့စဉ်လိုင်းမဆွဲနိုင်ခင်း၊ လိုင်းဆွဲတနစဉ်ယာဉ့်ယွင်းခင်းတကကာင့်လိုင်းအတာအတရှွက်မခပည့်ပါကယာဉ်လုပ်သားမား၏တန့စဉ်စီးပွားတရးအတပ၈ထိ Yingမမားရှိတကကာင်းသိရှိရပါသည်။ ထိုအခပင်အတရးအကကီးဆုံးကိစ်ရပ်အတနခင့်ယာဉ့်ယွင်းမတကကာင့်ခစ်ပွားတနတသာယာဉ်မတာ်ဆမမားမှာရာ Yingနန်းစ်အတနခင့်ရှိတနသည်။ ယာဉ့်ယွင်းမခင်းစဉ်မားအွင်းမှလအလိုက်နှင့်နှစ်အလိုက် ိကစွာင်ခပပါနိုင်ရန်ယာဉ်ထိန်းရဲပ်.ွဲမှူးရုံးထံမှတာင်း့ဲ့တသာ်လည်းအက်အလက်မားမှာအိန်မီရရှိခင်းမရှိတပ။
ရဲဟိန်ောင် ဒုယခပဿနာမှာ 'ရီးသည်မားနှင့် ခ.စ်ပွားတလ့ရှိတသာ ခပဿနာမားပင်ခ.စ်သည်၊ ဤခပဿနာ၏ အရင်းအခမစ်မှာ စပယ်ယာ လူမ ဘဝအတခ'အတန၊ 'ရီးသည်မား၏ လိုအပ်'က်မားနှင့် ယာဉ်စည်းကမ်းနှင့် ယာဉ်လိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ စည်းကမ်းမား အားနည်းက်တကကာင့် ခ.စ်တကကာင်း တလ့လာမမားအရ သိရှိရသည်။ ဤအပိုင်းကို တ.ာ်ခပရာစပယ်ယာမား၏ လူမ ဘဝအတခ'အတနနှင့် ပ်သက်၍ အထက်င်ခပ'ဲ့မပီး ခ.စ်ပါသည်။ ကန်အ'က်မားအနက်မှ 'ရီးသည်မားဘက်မှ လိုအပ်'က်နှင့်ပ်သက်၍ 'ွဲခ'ားတလ့လာရာတမာ်တာယာဉ်တပ8၌ တနရာယူစီးနင်းခ'င်းနှင့် ပ်သက်တသာ ခပဿနာ့ပင်ခ.စ်ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ 'ရီးသည်မားနှင့် ခပဿနာမားခ.စ်တပ8လာပါက စပယ်ယာမား.က်မှ ုံခပန်မမားနှင့် ပ်သက်၍လည်း အဆင်မတခပမမားခ.စ်တပ8ရခ'င်းခ.စ်သည်။

ဥပမာအားခ.င့်တ.ာ်ခပရလ=င် အမှ်(၃)ယာဉ်လိုင်းအွင်းရှိ တမာ်တယာဉ်မားမှာ ဟိုင်းလ်ကားအမိုးအစားခ.စ်မပီး တဘးနှစ်.က်ွင် လူ(၆)တယာက်'န့်ထိုင်စီးနင်းတသာ'ုံန်း၂'ုပါရှိမပီး၊ အလယ်လမ်းတကကာင်းွင် ထိုင်'ုံ အတသးစားခ.င့် လူတလးဦး(သိ့)ငါးဦးအထိ ထိုင်စီးနိုင်သည်။ ရုံးက် ရုံးဆင်းနှင့် 'ရီးသွားလားမ မားခပားတသာ အ'ိန်မားွင် စပယ်ယာမားမှာ 'ရီးအတဝးသို့ သွားရမည့် 'ရီးသည်မားအား အွင်းဘက်သို့ ဝင်တရာက်စီးနင်းရန် တခပာကကားတသာ်လည်း 'ရီးသည်မားမှာပိုမိုလွယ်ကူစွာဝင်ထွက်နိုင်သည့် တမာ်တယာဉ်၏ အဝင်အဝကို ပိုင်းချုပ်စားချုပ်ယူစားချုပ်မပါက်ကားတသာ်လည်း 'ရီးသည်မားခပားတသာက်လုံးစီးယူမှာ}
တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်းစပယ်ယာမား ရသည် အတကကာင်းခပ'က်မားလည်းရှိပါသည်။ အဓိကအတကကာင်းမှာ 'ရီးစဉ်အွင်းတမာ်တယာဉ်မားမပိုင်ဆိုင်တမာင်းနှင်၍ ဝင်တငွရာ မှ်ိုင်မား၌ 'ရီးသည်မားအား အက်အဆင်း အလွင်အခမန် တဆာင်ရွက်ိုင်းတသာတကကာင့်အွင်း၌ ဝင်မစီးလိုခ'င်းခ.စ်သည်။ ယာဉ်စီး'တကာက်'ံရာ ခ.စ်ပွားတသာ ခပဿနာမားမှာ တငွအတကက ခပန်အမ်းမနှင့် အဓိက သက်ဆိုင်လ=က်ရှိသည်။ စပယ်ယာမားလည်း ခပန်အမ်းတငွကို ပကကကခပန်လည်း တပးအပ်ခ'င်းမခပုမမားရှိသလို ၂၀၀၉'ုနှစ်နှင့် ၂၀၁၀'ုနှစ် ဝန်းကင်ရှိခမန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏တငွစက် ဆိုင်ရာအတခ'အတနမှာလည်းလွန်စွာနိမ့်ကလ=က်ရှိသည်။ ထိုကာလွင်တငွစက်မားအွင်း၌ အတကကရှားပါခ'င်းနှင့် လွန်စွာတဟာင်းနွမ်းခ'င်း့ ကိုအတကကာင်းခပု၍ မကကာ'ဏခပဿနာခ.စ်ပွားကကခ'င်းခ.စ်သည်။ ထိုသို ခ.စ်ပွားပါက စပယ်ယာမားသည်လည်း ခပဿနာကို ရင်ဆိုင်တခ.ရှင်းနိုင်ရန်အွက် ၂၀၁၁-၂၀၁၂ 'ုနှစ်မား ို ့ စနစ်စနစ်ကို အ'ို့တသာယာဉ်လိုင်းမားမှာ စမ်းသပ်အသုံးခပု'ဲ့တသာ်လည်း တအာင်ခမင်မရရှိခ'င်းမရှိ'ဲ့တကကာင်းတလ့လာ တစာင့်ကကည်မမားအရ သိရသည်။ ဤခပဿနာ၏ အရင်းအခမစ်မှာ ယာဉ်လိုင်းမား၌ စည်ကမ်းလိုက်နာမ အားနည်းခ'င်းတကကာင့်သာခ.စ်မပီး စည်ကမ်း ထိန်းသိမ်းသူမားမှာ စပယ်ယာမားနှင့် လာဘ်တပးလာဘ်ယူမမားရှိတနမပီးကကပ်မ်ရန်ပက်ကွက်မမားရှိတနသည်ကို တွ့ရသည်။ ဒုယခပဿနာမှာ ယာဉ် စီး' တကာက်'ံခ'င်းဆိုင်ရာ ခပဿနာခ.စ်မပီး တငွအတကကခပန်မအမ်းခ'င်းနှင့် ယာဉ်စီး'ပိုမိုတနာ'ံခ'င်းတကကာင့်ခ.စ်၍ ဤခပဿနာ၏ ရင်းခမစ်မှာလည်း စည်ကမ်းပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအားနည်းခ်မားတကကာင့်သာခ.စ်သည်။
ရဲဟိန်းသားအထက်ပါ ခပဿနာမားကို တခြင်းရှင်းနိုင်မရှိတစ်ရာ အစိုးရဌာနအလိုက် နိုင်နိုင်တသာ်လည် ခပဿနာမားမှာ တလည်းသွားခင်းမရှိတကကာင်း သိရှိရသည်။

ယာဉ်လိုင်းအလိုက် စည်ကမ်းမားနှင့် ယာဉ်စည်ကမ်းဆိုင်ရာ ခပဿနာမား ခ.စ်မပီး ဤအပိုင်းွင်လည်အားနည်းက်မားရှိတကကာင်းသိရှိရသည်။

ယတန့လက်ရှိကင့်သုံးတနတသာ တမာ်တနာ်ယာဉ် လုပ်သားမားနှင့်ပ်သက်တသာ ဥပတဒမားမှာ ၁၉၆၄နှစ်တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်အက်ဥပတဒနှင့် ၁၉၈၉တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်နည်းဥပတဒမားတပွင် အတခံ တရးဆွဲထားခင်းခ.စ်မပီး၊ ယတန့တကာလနှင့် တလည်ညီတသာ စည်ကမ်းမားကို ခပုခပင်တရးဆွဲရန် လိုအပ်လက်ရှိသည်။

စည်ကမ်းမားထုခပန်မအပိုင်းနှင့် ထုခပန်ထားတသာ စည်ကမ်းမားကို မလိုက်နာပါက အတရးယူမအပိုင်း့ခ်မားရှိတနမပီး ပညာတပးမမားလည်း နည်းပါးလက်ရှိတသးသည်။

အ'က်မားမှာ အဓိကတလ့လာလိုတသာ ဘာသာရပ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာနှင့်ကိုက်ညီမမရှိခင်းတကကာင့် အတသးစိ်အ'က်မားကိုန်းပ်ထားပါသည်။

လုပ်ငန်းေင်းေရးဆိုင်ရာ ြပဿနာျားအမှ(၃)ယာဉ်လိုင်း အွင်းရှိ စပယ်ယာမားသည် အခားတသာတမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်းမားအွင်းရှိ စပယ်ယာမားကဲ့သို ပင် ၎င်း ၏လူမတရးဆိုင်ရာ ခပဿနာမားခ.င့် ကကုံတွ့တနရလည်က်ရှိပါသည်။

စာပိုဒ်ရင်းအချက်အလက်ရင်းမှာ (၆)လိုအပ်တသာ

စီးသန်းသီစ်ဦး(၂၀၁၃)
တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်းစပယ်ယာမား

မိသားစုတွင် စပယ်ယာမား နှင့် အတွက် လုပ်ငန်းများကြားတွင်လုပ်ငန်းပ်ဝင်းကင်၌သာ ကုန်လွန်ကက်ရပါသည်။ စပယ်ယာစ်ဦး၏ တန့်စဉ်လုပ်ငန်းများနှင့် ပါသက်ရှိ့ပဲခ.စ်ပါသည်။ ဆက်စပ်ကိစ်ရပ်ခ.စ်တသာလုပ်ငန်းအတခ်အတန်မှာ ဆိုးရွားလှတကကာင်းကို တလ့လာတွ့ရှိပါသည်။

တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်းမား၏ လုပ်ငန်းအတရာမှာ အဓိကအားခ.င်းသက်ဆိုင်ရာ ယာဉ်လိုင်းမား၏ ဂိုရင်းနှင့် ဂိုဆုံးမှာ ခ.စ်ပါသည်။ အမှန်တရား(၃)ကားမားအွက် အညစ်အတကကူန့်ရန် သီးသန့်တနရာမားမရှိပဲ၊ ဂိုပ်ဝန်းကင်ရှိတနရာမား၊ လုပ်က်ရည်ဆိုင်မားနှင့် ဆိုင်မားအစရှိသည်ကိုသာ အားထားအသုံးခပုကကရပါသည်။

တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်းထွက်ရန် တစာင့်ဆိုင်းတနရစဉ်အွင်းထဲကို ဖန်တီးအရ သိရှိရပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ အတခ်အတန်မှာ အမှန်တရား(၃)ယာဉ်လိုင်းပြီးပါခ.စ်တကကာင့် တလ့လာမမားအရ သိရှိရသည်။

တန့်စဉ်အလုပ်သိန်ကကာရှည်ခ.င်းသည်လည်း ခပဿနာရပ်ခ.စ်မပီးစပယ်ယာအမားစုမှာ မိသားစုနှင့် အူတနရိန်နည်းပါးလှတကကာငါးသိရှိရပါသည်။ အတခ်အတန်ခ.စ်ခ.င်းနှင့် ရန်ကုန်မို့ဆင်တခ်းတနိမ်ကာသေးရိပ်မားနှင့် တမာ်တကားမားတပါ့သာ တနိုင်ရတကကာင့် သိရှိရပါသည်။

အဆိုးဆုံး အက်မှာ တမာ်တယာဉ်လိုင်းထွက်ရန် ဝန်ချင်းမှာ အိမ်ခပန်တရာက်သည် တယဘုယအားခ.င့် ည၁၀နာရီတကာ် ၁၁နာရီန့်ခ.စ်မပီး၊ နံနက် ၅နာရီအမှီ လုပ်ငန်းဝင်ရန်အွက် နံနက် ၄နာရီဝန်းကင်အိမ်မှ စင်ထွက်ရပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ အတခ်အတန်
ဪါးမားဦး ဆိုင်ရာ အပြင်အဝင် အချိန်နှင့် စိတ်ကူးပြောရာတွင် လူမှုဆိုင်ရာ ရွေးမှန်းခြင်းကို ခွဲစိတ် ပြုလုပ်နိုင်သည်။ သို့သော် သူ့အများအပြားအောက်မှ အရက်အတတ်ချက်များ မရှိသော အချိန်ရှည်အပြင် လူမှုဆိုင်ရာ ဝင်တငွတ်မှုများကို ခြင်းချက်များ ဆိုသည်။

ယာဉ်လုပ်သားများသည် အပြင်အဝင် အချိန် အရက်အတတ်ချက်များ မရှိသော အချိန်ရှည်အပြင် လူမှုဆိုင်ရာ ဝင်တငွတ်မှုများကို ခြင်းချက်များ ဆိုသည်။

နိဂုံးများ နှင့် သုံးသပ်ခြင်းတွင် အဓိက မှုတွေနှင့် လူမှုဆိုင်ရာ အချိန်များကို ခြင်းချက်များ ဆိုသည်။
တမာ်တာ်ယာဉ်လိုင်း စပယ်ယာမား

၎င်းပါသည်။ ထိုအခပင် ယာဉ်လုပ်သားမားအွက် လူမူလုံနှင့် ပျက်သက်တသာ တဆာင်ရွက်က်မားမှာလည်း လွန်စွာ အားနည်းလက်ရှိသည်ကို တွ့ရှိရပါသည်။ ထိုအက်မားတကကာင့်ရီးသည်မားနှင့် တန့စဉ်ခပဿနာရင်ဆိုင်ရခင်း၊ ယာဉ်စည်းကမ်းအယောက်ယာဉ် မတာ်ဆမမားခစ်တပ8ခင်းပြ့ခင်းကို တ.ာက်.က်လာခင်း၊ အရက်တသစာအလွန်အကားွင်းတသာက်သုံးခင်းတကကာင့် ယာဉ်မတာ်ဆမမားခစ်တပ8ခင်းပြ့ခင်းကို တ.ာက်.က်လာခင်း၊ အရက်တသစာအကားွင်းတသာက်သုံးခင်းသာက်သုတသနလုပ်ငန်းခစ်လာတစရန်မည်သိုမည်ပုံတဆာင်ရွက်ရမည်ကို သိရှိနိုင်ရန်အွက် ယာဉ်လုပ်သားမား၏လူမဘဝအတခ'အတနကို ပိုမိုသိရှိနိုင်ရန်လိုအပ်မပီး ကယ်ခပန့်တသာသုတသနလုပ်ငန်းမားကို ဆက်လက်တဆာင်ရွက်သင့်ပါသည်။
(၁)

ဝါနောက်စိတ်ကိုလေးသော်လည်း အပြုသဘိုးနှင့် အများများအပြုစိုးသော်လည်း အစိုးရက ပိုခြင်းကားကွယ်ချက်အမှားအားလုံး

အစီစဉ် (၁)

အပြုသဘိုးနှင့် အများများအပြုစိုးသော်လည်း အစိုးရက ပိုခြင်းကားကွယ်ချက်အမှားအားလုံး

မှန်ကန်သည်အချင်းချင်း လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချုံးမှ အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကိုမျှ မပါရှိစေ သူကို အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကို မပါရှိစေ

(၃) အချင်းချင်းအခွင့်အရေးချုံးမှ သေချာစွာ သို့မဟုတ် အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကို မပါရှိစေ

မှန်ကန်သည်အချင်းချင်း လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချုံးမှ အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကိုမျှ မပါရှိစေ သူကို အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကို မပါရှိစေ

(၄) အချင်းချင်းအခွင့်အရေးချုံးမှ သေချာစွာ သို့မဟုတ် အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကို မပါရှိစေ

မှန်ကန်သည်အချင်းချင်း လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချုံးမှ အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကိုမျှ မပါရှိစေ သူကို အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကို မပါရှိစေ

(၅) အချင်းချင်းအခွင့်အရေးချုံးမှ သေချာစွာ သို့မဟုတ် အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကို မပါရှိစေ

မှန်ကန်သည်အချင်းချင်း လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချုံးမှ အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကိုမျှ မပါရှိစေ သူကို အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကို မပါရှိစေ

(၆) အချင်းချင်းအခွင့်အရေးချုံးမှ သေချာစွာ သို့မဟုတ် အခြေခံခြင်းတစ်ဦးကို မပါရှိစေ
အောက်ပါအချက်များကို သိမ်းဆည်းပါအပြီးအစွဲ
(၁) အသုံးပြုခြင်းသာ ယာဉ်အား လိုင်စင်ထုတ်ခြင်းမှ စတင်လိုအပ်ပါသည်။
(၂) ယာဉ်အား လိုင်စင်ထုတ်ခြင်းမှ စတင်လိုအပ်ပါသည်။
(၃) ယာဉ်အား လိုင်စင်ထုတ်ခြင်းမှ စတင်လိုအပ်ပါသည်။
(၁) အိုင်ရေ့စျေးနေသူအကြောင်းအရာသို့မဟုတ် ခြေလျင်မှားခြင်းကို အကူအညီထားစေရန်
(၂) ရဲဟိန်ဣဦး ရဲဟိန်ဣဦးအတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှု့မှ အတွေးအရာများ ပြသရန်
အသုံးချခြင်းကို အကူအညီထားရန်
(၃) ရဲဟိန်ဣဦး ရဲဟိန်ဣဦးအတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှု့မှ အတွေးအရာများ ပြသရန်
အသုံးချခြင်းကို အကူအညီထားရန်
(၄) ရဲဟိန်ဣဦး ရဲဟိန်ဣဦးအတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှု့မှ အတွေးအရာများ ပြသရန်
အသုံးချခြင်းကို အကူအညီထားရန်
(၅) ရဲဟိန်ဣဦး ရဲဟိန်ဣဦးအတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှု့မှ အတွေးအရာများ ပြသရန်
အသုံးချခြင်းကို အကူအညီထားရန်
(၆) ရဲဟိန်ဣဦး ရဲဟိန်ဣဦးအတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှု့မှ အတွေးအရာများ ပြသရန်
အသုံးချခြင်းကို အကူအညီထားရန်
(၇) ရဲဟိန်ဣဦး ရဲဟိန်ဣဦးအတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှု့မှ အတွေးအရာများ ပြသရန်
အသုံးချခြင်းကို အကူအညီထားရန်
(၈) ရဲဟိန်ဣဦး ရဲဟိန်ဣဦးအတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှု့မှ အတွေးအရာများ ပြသရန်
အသုံးချခြင်းကို အကူအညီထားရန်
(၉) ရဲဟိန်ဣဦး ရဲဟိန်ဣဦးအတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှု့မှ အတွေးအရာများ ပြသရန်
အသုံးချခြင်းကို အကူအညီထားရန်
(၁၀) ရဲဟိန်ဣဦး ရဲဟိန်ဣဦးအတွက် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှု့မှ အတွေးအရာများ ပြသရန်
အသုံးချခြင်းကို အကူအညီထားရန်
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>အပေါ်စာရင်းအမျိုးအစား</th>
<th>ဇာတ်လမ်းအမျိုးအစား</th>
<th>အရာအိုင်းအမျိုးအစား</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>၅၀</td>
<td>စာရေးရှင်အသုံးအနေအထိမ်းကွင်း။ စာရေးသားစေ: အမှတ်တွင်:</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၅၀</td>
<td>မလိုင်စင်အသုည်း:</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>အထူးသဖ်စ်ကြီး အဓိကပြင်းထန်</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၅၁</td>
<td>မိုးပတ်: မိုးပတ်ကြီးအလွှတ်စွာ ကြည့်ရှုသည်: အမှတ်တွင်: အ) အမိုးအသုံးအနေအထိမ်း ပြည်သူ၏လူဦးရေ၏ယိုင်သော အချက်အလက်</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၅၉</td>
<td>အမိုးအသုည်း: အမှတ်တွင်:</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>အထူးသဖ်စ်ကြီး အဓိကပြင်းထန်</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၅၁</td>
<td>ထိုည်းသား: အမှတ်တွင်: အစားထိုးသည်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>၂ ကြည့်</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၅၉</td>
<td>အမိုးအသုည်း: အမှတ်တွင်: ဆိုဒ်စ်စောင်မှ:</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>အထူးသဖ်စ်ကြီး အဓိကပြင်းထန်</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၅၈</td>
<td>အမိုးအသုည်း: ဝန်ဆောင်မှုအပါအဝင် ယိုင်ကျင်/ ယိုင်ကျင်:</td>
<td>၃ ကြည့်</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၃၀</td>
<td>အမိုးအသုည်း: အမှတ်တွင်: ပြန်လည်ထိုးကြည့်:</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၃၀</td>
<td>ပြန်လည်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၃၅</td>
<td>ပြန်လည်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၃၇</td>
<td>ပြန်လည်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၃၈</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၇၂</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၇၃</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၇၄</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၇၅</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၇၆</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၇၇</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၇၈</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၉၉</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၇၉</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၈၀</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၈၁</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၈၂</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၈၃</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၈၄</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၈၅</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၈၆</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၈၇</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၈၈</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၈၉</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၉၀</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၉၁</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၉၂</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၉၃</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၉၄</td>
<td>ပေါင်းစပ်လှန်ထိုးကြည့်: (အမှတ်တွင်:)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၁၁၁ မိုင်းကြီးအား ဖြေဆိုခြင်း ဖြင့်တစ်ချုပ်သော် စာမ်းမားမခပည့်စုံ ချင်ခ်စ</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၁၁၆ ယာဉ်မရှိမီ 'ရီးသည်မားသည်ကို မဆင်းတစရ</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၁၁၇ ယာဉ်တပွေး အမိုင်ကြီး မပါ မခပည့်စုံချင်ခ်စ</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>၁၁၈ ယာဉ်အွင်းအခပင် ပ်ဆင်ရမည်စာမ်းမား မခပည့်စုံချင်ခ်စ</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
စိတ်ကူးလင်္ကား

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငံကို နောင်ခံစားပါသည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလွန်အတွင်းသော စိတ်ကူးခွဲမှုများပါ၀င်သည်။


“Fragmented Sovereignty” over Property Institutions: Developmental Impacts on the Chin Hills Communities

ဗိုလ်ချင်းတောင်း ဝါးရင်း မှ အရတ်ဆိုင်သော အစိတ်အပိုင်း “အချင်းချင်းအလွန်ရှင်းမြှင့် အချင်းချင်းမြှင့် အဆင်မြင်မှု” နှင့် အထောက်အပံ့ချင်း အစိတ်အပိုင်း: အဆင်မြင်မှု (SiuSue Mark)
သူမတွေ့ရှိသည်နောက်စုစုပေါင်းစွဲနေသော အချက်အလက်များကို ပြောပြချက်များဖြင့် နောက်ကြည့်ပါ။ “ရှိရှိယုတ်ယုတ်ကို ကျန်ရှိနိုင်ရန်” (Lund 2011)နှင့်တကွ ထိခိုက်ခဲ့သည်။ ပြောပြချက်များဖြင့် ကျင်းပစ်ပါသည်။ “ဒီမှာ ကျင်းပစ်ခံကြသည်။” ဖြစ်ပါသည်။

သူမတွေ့ရှိသည်နောက်စုစွဲနေသော အချက်အလက်များကို ပြောပြချက်များဖြင့် နောက်ကြည့်ပါ။ (Sikor and Lund 2009: 8)

သူမတွေ့ရှိသည်နောက်စုစွဲနေသော အချက်အလက်များကို ပြောပြချက်များဖြင့် နောက်ကြည့်ပါ။ (Sikor and Lund 2009: 8)
အစိတ်စိတ်အမာမျှပန်သည် အချုပ်အခချာအာဏာပိုင်မ—폈폣폴폈평폄폆폞폑폎폦 

127

ဗမာနိုင်ငံပတ်ချစ်လာမည်ဟုတိုင်းရင်းသားအုပ်စုများမပမာ်လင်းခဲ့သည်

ပြာန်ဆန်းအပြန်ခင်ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်ကတိများပးခဲ့နေသည်

နိုင်ပသာလည်းအချက်အလက်အပေါ်ဆိုင်ရာလုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်

ဗမာနိုင်ငံပတ်ကိုလျမ်းမိုးကကီစိုးလာခဲ့သည်။

ယခင်ကိုရာမရှိခဲ့သည့်အုပ်ချုပ်များကိုအဖမဲတည်တံခိုင်ဖျင်ပစေရန်အချက်

နိုင်ငံတစ်နိုင်ငံချင်းကောင်းများတစ်နိုင်ငံချင်း

ဆိုင်ရာပါဝင်သည်။

နိုင်ငံနယ်နိမိတ်တစ်ခုလုံးအတွက်အုပ်ချုပ်များစုနှင့်သစ်တစ်ခုကိုကျင့်ရန်ကျင့်

အုပ်ချုပ်များနှင့်အပြန်ခင်ကိုပါဝင်သည်။

ပျံ့ပိုးနှင့်အပြန်ခင်ကိုအပြင်အဆင်ပိုင်စ်တစ်ခုကိုကျင့်ရန်ကျင့်

နိုင်ငံသည်ဆိုင်ရာလုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်အုပ်ချုပ်စနစ်သစ်တစ်ခုကိုကျင့်

ချုပ်များနှင့်အပြောင်ခင်ကိုပါဝင်သည်။

(Şikor and Lund 2009: 20)
အစိတ်အပိုင်းအချုပ်အခခာအာဏာပိုင်မဆိုင်ရာအင်စတီကျူးရှင်းများစွာပြောပြသည်

ပန်းချင်းချပည်နယ်တွင်အစိတ်ရနှင့်ပခမစမံခန့်ခွဲများမဆိုင်ရာအင်စတီကျူးကြိုးစားသူများစွာကိုပိုမိုခိုင်မာအားပကာင်းပစခင်ခင်ကိုခိုင်မာစွာပြံနွေးမဆိုင်ရာဆက်ဆံပရးများကိုပါသည်လာသခင့်နိုင်ငံပတ်ဝင်သည်ဟူပသာခံစားများကိုပိုမိုခိုင်မာအားပကာင်းပစခင်ခင်ကိုခိုင်မာစွာပြံနွေးမဆိုင်ရာဆက်ဆံပရးများကိုပါသည်

ပန်းချင်းချပည်နယ်တွင်အစိတ်ရနှင့်ပခမစမံခန့်ခွဲများမဆိုင်ရာအင်စတီကျူးကြိုးစားသူများစွာကိုပိုမိုခိုင်မာအားပကာင်းပစခင်ခင်ကိုခိုင်မာစွာပြံနွေးမဆိုင်ရာဆက်ဆံပရးများကိုပါသည်လာသခင့်နိုင်ငံပတ်ဝင်သည်ဟူပသာခံစားများကိုပိုမိုခိုင်မာအားပကာင်းပစခင်ခင်ကိုခိုင်မာစွာပြံနွေးမဆိုင်ရာဆက်ဆံပရးများကိုပါသည်

ပန်းချင်းချပည်နယ်တွင်အစိတ်ရနှင့်ပခမစမံခန့်ခွဲများမဆိုင်ရာအင်စတီကျူးကြိုးစားသူများစွာကိုပိုမိုခိုင်မာအားပကာင်းပစခင်ခင်ကိုခိုင်မာစွာပြံနွေးမဆိုင်ရာဆက်ဆံပရးများကိုပါသည်လာသခင့်နိုင်ငံပတ်ဝင်သည်ဟူပသာခံစားများကိုပိုမိုခိုင်မာအားပကာင်းပစခင်ခင်ကိုခိုင်မာစွာပြံနွေးမဆိုင်ရာဆက်ဆံပရးများကိုပါသည်
“Fragmented Sovereignty” over Property Institutions: Developmental Impacts on the Chin Hills Communities

SiuSue Mark

In a regime in transition with a legacy of civil war, institutions that govern a society are often destabilized as a host of state and non-state authorities vie for legitimacy in order to gain or maintain power. In such a context, the control over land and the institutions that govern it often become central to such power struggles. The idea of “fragmented sovereignty” helps to explain the conflicts over land control between the state and non-state actors (Lund 2011: 887-9). Sovereignty is generally understood “as unlimited and indivisible rule by a state over a territory and the people in it” (Agnew 2008: 437) and where “governments generally claim legal sovereignty [...] in the name of the state” (Lund 2011: 887).1

The dynamics of land control and access in Myanmar will be used to demonstrate this concept. This country has faced

---

1In this study, part of the state is conceptualized in the Weberian tradition, as “a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by an executive authority” (Skocpol 1979: 29). However, the acknowledgement of these structures does not mean that the state should be “taken as a free-standing entity [...] located apart from and opposed to another entity called society” (Mitchell 1996: 94-5). Instead, state structures are more accurately described as a “structural effect” or an “entity [that] comes to seem something much more than the sum of the everyday activities that constitute it, appearing as a structure containing and giving order and meaning to people’s lives” (Mitchell 1996: 94-5).
challenges to state unification since its independence, as demonstrated by six-decades of civil war between the Bamar-dominant state and multiple ethnic groups fighting to gain greater autonomy. These conflicts arose after independence in 1948, but heightened after the 1962 military coup that toppled the nascent civilian government. In an attempt to put an end to decades of civil war, the Thein Sein Government prioritized a national cease-fire, starting in 2011, raising the profile of ethnic politics.

Nevertheless, the long-standing conflicts in Myanmar did not only start off with ethnic-based claims. In fact, in the early decades, Myanmar’s armed conflicts included sizeable insurrections from the Communist Party of Burma, whose members wanted to seize power from the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), the main political party from 1945 to 1964 (Smith 2007: 10-12). But after so many decades of entrenched fighting between the military government and various armed ethnic groups, some like David Keen (2001:8 in Smith 2007: 10) even argue that this “conflict generate[d] ethnicity.” This means to say that over time, conflicts over socio-political issues took increasingly became framed as ethnic in nature—so much so that many people now understand the armed conflicts in Myanmar primarily as ethnic ones. This has led long-term Myanmar political analyst Robert Taylor to argue that “ethnic politics is the obverse of the politics of national unity” (1982: 7) —highlighting the role of ethnicity as the main obstacle to a unified nation-state.

---

2 On 2 March 1962, Ne Win staged a coup d'état and reclaimed power. After his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government collapsed in 1988, and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) came to power, another wave of armed ethnic groups proliferated.

3 The CPB was also involved with the struggles of ethnic armed groups until the 1990s.
Against this backdrop, land reform was initiated in 2012 with the passing of two new laws—the Farmland Law and the Vacant, Fallow, Virgin (VFV) Land Law—which essentially introduced titling-based tenure reforms to create a land market, in large part to support central government’s drive to increase land-based investments. Since the reform started, the contest for land control has become a priority in the country, and is a key issue for ethnic minority groups who continue to compete with the central state for control over resources. Thus, an analysis of the land question in Myanmar and its impact on rural poverty is incomplete without addressing the way ethnic politics challenges sovereignty through the institutions that govern land access and control.4

The first section of this paper will discuss the interaction of state sovereignty, ethnic politics and land control in a regime in transition by elaborating on a) the basis of the ethnic challenge to state sovereignty; b) why property rights is central to state-building in a regime transition; and c) how counter-claims further structures sovereignty. The second section takes an empirical look at how these dynamics play out in the uplands of Chin State by a) describing the evolution of the customary land institutions; b) exploring the way state laws that promote private property impact on social relations and poverty; and c) investigating the emergence of counter-claims to state laws. The article concludes with a discussion of implications for understanding land control and access in dynamic contexts such as this one.

4Institutions are often defined as patterns of formal and informal rules and relations (e.g. North 1990, Steinmo and Thelen 1992), but this study is partial to Lund’s (2011: 886) definition, which sees formal and informal rules: (1) as “manifestations of structures; of power relations which, in the course of (some) time, establish a structure of entitlement and exclusion”; (2) as the configurations of actors acting to define and enforce collectively binding decisions and rules; and (3) as “an arena where competing social actors struggle to influence the way decisions are made.”
State Sovereignty, Ethnic Politics and Land in a Transition Regime

Basis of Ethnic Challenge to Sovereignty

Property indicates that there are relations among social actors (individuals or groups) with regard to the land that “exist at the level of laws and regulations, cultural norms and social values” that are “sanctioned” by “the state or some other form of politico-legal authority” (Sikor and Lund 2009: 4; see MacPherson 1978). This does not only refer to legal-Western forms of property, but also customary forms that are sanctioned by non-state authorities. Like citizen rights, property rights are political in the sense that they influence who gets what resources. Both, “in their broadest sense exist only to the extent that they are produced, endorsed, and sanctioned by some form of legitimate authority,” but since legitimacy must be “continuously (re)-established through conflict and negotiation” (ibid: 8), a central question over property in the context of state-building is: Who has the authority to sanction the rights that determine access and control to land, and what is this authority based on?

Answering this question requires a conceptualization of the state as a “site of contestation” (Jessop 2007: 37) when the post-independence Myanmar state was formed. Martin Smith pointed out in his book, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, “it was more on the basis of city-states than of a nation that any political structure was to develop” (1991: 32). Towards the end of British rule, groups like the Shan, the Karen, and the Chin, aspired to return to the levels of autonomy they enjoyed prior to the colonial rule. One of the Chin leaders, Kio Mang, ex-chief of Hakha, who signed the Panglong Agreement on behalf of the Chin people on 12 February 1947 said, “We want to rule our country by ourselves according to our own political systems” (Sakhong 2003: 212). Partly for reasons of faulty translation and misunderstanding
of the term “federation” (Sakhong 2003: 213-5) and partly for reasons of economic dependence on Burma Proper (Smith 1999: 80), ultimately, Chinland became a Special Division under Burma Proper.

These groups saw themselves as distinct nation-states that opted to create a multi-national state called the Union of Burma by signing the Panglong Agreement in 1947. “A nation is a cultural entity, a body of people bound together by a shared cultural heritage.” Cultural bonds include “a common language, religion, traditions and historical consciousness,” which often go hand in hand with the demand for self-government (Heywood 2004: 98-101). Self-determination is at the heart of these political demands. This could be defined as “the right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development ... [and]... the rights to possess their natural wealth and natural resources in their own respective homelands” (Sakhong 2004).

While Aung San might have held out promises of autonomy, the Myanmar state soon came to be dominated by the Bamar, especially after the military coup of 1962. To this day, the extension of the Myanmar state is seen by many ethnic minority groups as an extension of the interests of the Bamar through the structures of the state.

State’s Guarantee of Property Rights in a Transition Regime

A state’s need to strengthen sovereignty tends to be heightened after a regime transition whose central reason is to shed an old, ineffective regime and to adopt a new one that can increase the state’s chances to strengthen and perpetuate its rule. On 7 November 2010, as part of the seven-step "roadmap to democracy" proposed in 2003 by the State Peace and Devel-

Karen, Karenni, Mon and Arakan States could be said to have signed up to these principles when the first version of the 1947 Constitution was drafted (Sakhong 2004).
opment Council (SPDC), the first general election in twenty years was held in Myanmar in accordance with the constitution (approved in a referendum in May 2008). This military-initiated regime transition “represents change within continuity, the reorganization or restructuring of [...] an institution, rather than its abolition or replacement” (Heywood 2002: 215). Even though the state is relying relatively less on outright force to rule, as demonstrated by a relatively greater use of political rather than military means to address the “ethnic problem” (Keenan 2012), the Bamar-dominant state still seeks to extend its indivisible rule through the extension of its legal authority. However, this does not mean that the state does away with coercion, as the legitimacy of law must always be backed up by force (Heywood 2002). In this way, the state can claim to abide by the “rule of law,” and justify its use of force if the “rule of law” is transgressed.

Extension of its legal authority involves the introduction of a private property model embodied in the two new land laws passed in 2012. Through attempts to shape property institutions that will grant, administer, and guarantee rights, these laws exemplify an approach to state-formation that is particular to this period in Myanmar’s history. The enforcement of a single property regime throughout the territory is central to state-building and has to do with a “recursive constitution of

---

6 The military government changed its names since the 1962 coup when General Ne Win and the 24-member socialist Union Revolutionary Council took power. The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) lasted from 1964 until its demise in the popular student-led uprising of 1988. After that, the military government was headed by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which in 1997 became the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).

7 The first was in 1990, which the National League for Democracy won by a landslide, but the military government refused to transfer power to Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. The second was in 2010, but it was largely considered not free and fair. The most recent elections was held in November 2015 which brought the NLD another landslide victory.
property and institutional authority” (Sikor and Lund 2009: 2). If the state has the ability to secure property for people, the state would be able to constitute citizens’ relationship to public authority (Lund 2011: 887-9) or in a larger sense, between state and citizen (Sikor and Lund 2009: 8). Particularly after a regime transition, such as in Myanmar, the state likely wants its political subjects to know and accept that it is a force with which people must contend and the primary institutional actor that guarantees rights. This should be the case even if subjects do not necessarily approve of this arrangement, particularly in conflict-affected areas.

Private property institutions could provide tenure security to lowland farmers who are more accustomed to a private property model, but this model can also increase the vulnerability and poverty of communities who have practiced customary largely communal tenure and who have farmed largely for subsistence. This includes the hill communities in Chin State, spilling into Rakhine State, and in the forested uplands of Karen, Kayah, Kachin, and Shan States. The Farmland Law of 2012 provides no protection to largely communal customary land systems. In some areas, communities’ claims to customary land have become even more tenuous after the flooding in August 2015, which forced communities to resettle to and cultivate new areas. In addition, the Farmland Law specifically states that the practice of shifting cultivation, a form of uplands agro-forestry cultivation, should be eradicated. As a result, land that does not fit the definitions of the Government of Myanmar laws is considered “empty” and unoccupied, falling under the jurisdiction of the VFV Land Law—which allows the state to transfer up to 50,000

---

8In the lowlands, the need to rationalize the rice and taxes to be extracted from local farmers motivated the British to introduce a system to assess individual land holdings and to introduce the idea of an “individual landholder’s right” (Furnivall 1991 [1939]: 116-31).
acres of land to an investor for up to 30 years. A recent development that may offer an opening to revise these laws is the National Land Use Policy adopted by the government in January 2016. Significantly, the Policy says that “customary land use tenure systems shall be recognized in the National land law in order to ensure awareness, compliance and application of traditional land use practices of ethnic nationalities, formal recognition of customary land use rights, protection of these rights and application of readily available impartial dispute resolution mechanism” (Part VIII).

Given the gaps in the laws, many hill communities fear that their claim to land will be left in a legislative vacuum, which currently makes them highly vulnerable to land dispossession in the wake of Myanmar’s return to the global economy. Since 1991, when the military government started to promote a market economy, much of these land concessions have disproportionately been allocated from ethnic minority states. According to 2012 data from the Government of Myanmar’s Department of Agricultural Planning, 70% of 3.4 million acres is located in the conflict-affected Kachin State and Thanintharyi Region. This has led many ethnic minority groups to interpret the current land reform as the central government’s efforts to use extra-coercive means to gain control of the territory that they have been defending for the last six decades, sometimes described as “ceasefire capitalism” (Woods 2011).

How Counter-Claims Interact with Sovereignty

That being said, even if the state wants to have its authority unchallenged by its subjects, it may not always fulfil its contract to protect the same rights for all citizens—as it assigns

---

9 Public data from the Department of Agricultural Planning, Government of Myanmar 2012. This is the last year that the DAP included state-owned agribusiness concessions into its publicly available Agriculture in Brief.
different rights to different groups depending on identity markers such as ethnicity, race, or political affiliations, leading to an "uneven democratization" (Yashar 2005). This was experienced as incomplete political settlements by Myanmar’s ethnic minorities in the first round of ceasefires which started in 1989. This breaking of the state-citizen contract can, in turn, reinforce the counter-claims of non-state institutional actors competing with the state over control of land. Thus, the state’s attempts to strengthen sovereignty, particularly after a regime transition, “may be successful and consolidate just as they may be challenged and undone.” This is therefore not a straightforward or predictable process. Ultimately, if the state wants to secure its sovereignty in a divisive multi-ethnic country, it will likely have to compromise over who gets to define institutions that govern land access and how these institutions will look—an issue prioritized by ethnic armed groups in the political dialogue that follows the signing of the National Ceasefire Agreement.

This article demonstrates that challenges to the state’s institutions tend to vary with the political interaction between a particular ethnic minority group and the central government. While the Karen National Union (KNU) has been able to mount a strong challenge to the Government of Myanmar, the response in Chin State has been more moderate. As opposed to the KNU’s much better armed and centralized authority—which has presented a formidable challenge to the Government of Myanmar for the last six decades—the significantly smaller armed group the Chin National Front (CNF) and a history of clan-based political structures have prevented it from unifying as a solid political force. In addition, resource-poor Chin State has come to rely on the Bamar state for material support.¹⁰

¹⁰Author interview with township level administrators in Mindat Township, Chin State in February 2013.
Chin State is currently the largest recipient of a poverty alleviation grant from the central government.

While this paper does not seek to compare the way the KNU and the CNF challenge the Government of Myanmar’s land administration, it is worth noting that the KNU already has a land policy that is used to administrate areas that have not been administered by the Government of Myanmar given the history of civil war there. Despite the fact that the CNF never had the resources or as wide a mandate to administrate territory in Chin State, some of the members of the CNF’s central executive committee are taking a lead in the national-level negotiations over the protection of ethnic minorities’ customary land.

**How the Contest Plays Out: The Case of Chin State**

Bordering India in Myanmar’s northwest, Chin State sits on a steep mountain range—popularly known as “the Chin Hills.” Among the hill communities of Myanmar, the Chin socio-economic systems have until now been relatively less disrupted by armed conflict, population increase, and the country’s opening to the market economy.\(^{11}\) Thus, they have largely maintained traditional property institutions that have strong communal elements.

Chin State is considered to be the poorest in Myanmar, as demonstrated by the Integrated Household Living Conditions Assessment (IHLCA 2011) conducted by the United Nations, which found that 73% of its population of 478,690 people is estimated to live below the poverty line.\(^{12}\) However, because this tool measures expenditure levels for food and non-food items, this estimation may not be the most accurate—since an

\(^{11}\) Its growth has been moderated by the simultaneous migration of Chins out of the state into other countries, notably the United States.

\(^{12}\) Per the 2014 Provisional Results of the 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census.
economy that primarily produces for consumption rather than market exchange is likely to measure low on consumption expenditures. This self-provisioning and the fact that there are few labor markets in Chin State likely explain why employment is only 54%.

Here, the clash between customary communal property institutions and private property institutions becomes quite apparent in terms of its impacts on local communities and their risks for greater poverty. This clash is already showing negative impacts on communities’ social and material wellbeing, as the market threatens to undermine the customary property systems and strong “moral economy” (Thompson 1971, Scott 1976) or economic relations rooted in reciprocity and exchange.

This tension between the institutions has provoked a number of nascent counter-claims from a number of Chin political entities, including the CNF, political parties and civil society organizations. This response plays on ethnic politics and could significantly change the state-subject relationship between the Chins and the Bamar state, which has historically been distant.

*From Tribal Past to Nation-State*

In *The Art of Not Being Governed*, James Scott (2009: ix) argues that “the hill peoples of Zomia are best understood as runaway, fugitive, maroon communities who have, over the course of two millennia, been fleeing the oppressions of state-making projects in the valleys—slavery, conscription, taxes, corvée labor, epidemics, and warfare.”

---

13 Chin State does indicate other indicators of poverty, such as child malnutrition—including a 58% prevalence for stunting (low height for age), which is created by chronic malnutrition. Accessed 10 September 2014 <http://www.unicef.org/myanmar/Chin_State_Profile_Final.pdf>

14 *Zomia* is a geographical term covering the uplands of seven nation states in South East Asia and coined in 2002 by Dutch historian Willem van Schendel and popularized by Scott in his book *The Art of Not Being Governed* (2009).
But instead of the oppressors being the Bamar, several historians argued that it was indeed the Shan from whom the Chin fled when the former expanded their control to the Kale Valley with the construction of Kalemyo in 1395 (Luce 1959: 26-7; Carey and Tuck 1896).

Chin society was tribal and ruled by traditional chiefs. Some scholars say that there are six major tribal groups identified as 1) Asho with 6 sub-tribes; 2) Cho or Sho with 8 sub-tribes; 3) Khuami or M’ro with 7 sub-tribes; 4) Laimi with 17 sub-tribes; 5) Mizo or Lushai with 12 sub-tribes; and 6) Zomi or Kuki with 13 sub-tribes (Vumson 1986: 40). Though this is currently under debate, some sources count as many as 63 sub-tribes in total. A tribal group “is a group of the same people whose ancestors made their settlement in a certain place together, after their common original homeland in the Chindwin Valley was destroyed” (Sakhong 2003: 18). For example, the descendants of the settlers in the area called Lailung (central area) are called the Laimi tribe while the descendants of the settlers in the northern part of Chinram are called Zomi. As populations grew, the tribal groups broke up into smaller settlements and relocated. Divided by geography, the tribal groups further differentiated into sub-tribes, each with their own dialects and customs. Though the tribes followed a similar pattern of worship of the Khua-hrum or guardian guard of a community, this was not sufficient to unite the Chin. As a result, “people’s identification with each other was tribally exclusive and their common national identity remained elusive.” (Sakhong 2003: xv).

Chin society was greatly changed by the British annexation in 1896 and the arrival of the Christian missionaries between 1899 to 1905 (Sakhong 2003: 106). Together with Christian conversion, the colonial legacy removed Chinland from its isolation and forced it on a path of de-tribalization (Sakhong 2003: xvi). When the new state borders of Burma, India and
Bangladesh were created, the eastern part became Chin State in Myanmar, the western part became Mizoram State in India and a small area integrated into Bangladesh (Sakhong 2003: xv). The departure of the British and the Chin peoples’ negotiation with the interim government of Ministerial Burma created a significant opportunity to further unify the Chin as a single political entity.

Given the state’s history, there are observable differences in land ownership patterns between Northern and Southern Chin. The north had more elaborate political organization, more permanent settlement, and higher levels of capital accumulation, resulting in the establishment of bigger towns (Lehman 1963). One tribal chief in the north explained that the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896 attempted to abolish concentration of lands in the hands of the tribal chiefs and to make land access more equal in a communal system.\(^1\) In the south, which was less influenced by missionaries, many villages tended to be more traditional. There, chiefs and their descendants continue to claim ownership of large parcels of land. This is corroborated by a recent study on Chin customary land systems which found that certain clans around Mindat Township in the south claim historical ownership to large swathes of land, to which access is granted in exchange for rents (Ewers 2015).

In most parts of the state, where survival was a challenge and infrastructure was at a minimum, management of land and livelihoods via private property arrangements would have also led to a sub-optimal outcome for people.\(^2\) This system would have driven the Chin to struggle in “a game against nature,” instead of working with each other (Ostrom 1990: 12).

---

\(^1\) Interview with tribal chief by author on 7 May 2015.
\(^2\) Here ‘sub-optimal’ borrows from the logic of the “prisoners’ dilemma” from game theory in which lack of cooperation results in all players losing— in this case through the collective destruction of nature commonly referred to as a “tragedy of the commons.”
survive, the Chin developed a “safety-first maxim,” (Scott 1976: 29) in which “living is attained often at the cost of a loss of status and autonomy” (Scott 1976: 7). In this way, customary communal forms of property institutions in many parts of Chin State, evolving over centuries, gained legitimacy in the eyes of those who continue to abide by them. The customary land systems of Chin State were not only recognized as the property institutions by the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896, customary law was also recognized by the Panglong Agreement signed on 12 February 1947 between Chin leaders and General Aung San, with the involvement of the British. Chinland became a Special Division in Ministerial Burma in which it was allowed to follow its own customary laws—an entire set of legal institutions different from those of the central government. Even when the 1953 Land Nationalization Act was passed, which nationalized all land under the name of the state, the actual land tenure practices in Chin State were not affected. In summary, the colonial legacy, the appearance of the armed group the CNF in 1988, and the relatively low interest on the part of the central government to administrate this remote state helped to maintain a parallel system of property institutions up until the passage of the 2012 Farmland Law and VFV Land Law.

Chin Customary Land Systems

In Chin society, land is a territory that symbolizes identity, spiritual value, and culture. These values have been consecrated in a number of nature worship practices that continue to this day—often practiced with the annual farming cycle, even though many Chin people have been converted to Christianity.\footnote{There is a much higher ratio of Christians among Northern than Southern Chin. According to Sakhong (2000), in his book Religion and Politics among the Chin People in Burma (1896-1949), although all the tribes and villages follow the same pattern of belief systems, it is still distinct enough between the tribes that Khua-hrum did not unite the entire Chin people under a single religion.} Based on these values, rules for the collective
management of a common pool of resources were created. While rules varied from village to village and were unwritten, they defined the right-holders and their rights with regard to the land. Passed down through generations, these rules are supervised by a local chief (Food Security Working Group 2010) who is usually a descendant of the founder of a particular clan, and who acts on behalf of Khua-hrum—the guardian god considered the ultimate owner of land (Sakhong 2000). Traditionally, the chief theoretically owned this land on behalf of the Khua-hrum, and he and his council were vested with powers of rights enforcement, dispute resolution, land redistribution, or if necessary, changing the rules in consultation with the community to adapt to new circumstances.

For many upland ethnic groups, including the Chin, household and kinship networks are the foundation of social organization. Thus, rights are derived from the acceptance into a social network through birth, marriage, or various kinds of transactions. A common trait among these communities is that this village land is only meant to be used by those residing in the place, and in principle nobody is allowed to sell the land to anyone outside the community. Land has to be returned to the common pool when someone leaves the community, but land would also be allocated to someone joining kinship networks. Within these parameters, land use rights combine elements of both collective and individual. In other words, land plots can be hereditary, or they can be allocated through a lottery system on a yearly basis when the lopils (plots within the larger village lands) have to be divided (Food Security Working Group 2010). In addition, households can gift, loan, rent or even sell a plot to another cultivator residing in the community.

Each village taungya (hilly uplands) area is divided into lopils, with 1 cultivated by the village each year on a rotational basis. With varying degrees of cooperation, village members
work together to create a path to the chosen *lopil*, a temporary settlement, and to fell and burn trees, after which individual households would cultivate sub-plots. Each household typically has access to a sub-plot each year, the size often determined by the number of members and working adults in each household. This is reminiscent of Chayanov’s labor-consumer ratio or the ratio between the number of working adults and the consumers (adults, children and elderly) (Food Security Working Group 2010; Van der Ploeg 2013).  

Demonstrating an intimate relationship with their land, traditionally, hill communities set limitations on land use to maintain ecological balance. In the past, land that was used for five years was left to fallow for up to forty years, while plots used for one year were left to fallow for up to nine years (Lehman 1963: 56). According to a recent study by the local NGO POINT, on the shifting cultivation practices in two villages Khayaing and Lone Ein Nu in Kanpalet Township in Southern Chin State, after one year of cultivation, the land is left for a fallow period of between eight to nine years (2015). Another reason that the fallow period has been preserved is out-migration from the villages to Kanpetlet, followed by migration abroad. In addition, communities maintain other environmentally sustainable practices. For example, villages replant trees; leave trees around streams to protect the watershed; around the roads to prevent erosion; and make firebreaks when clearing forests with fire. These findings were also echoed by the GRET study of shifting cultivation systems in Northern Chin State (2012). Thus, in contrast to the discourse often employed by state planners that this slash and burn farming is environmentally harmful, these actual practices of the hill

---

18 Despite a principle of access to all community households, there is variation between villages in how land is accessed: while land plots can be allocated through a lottery system on a yearly basis when plots within the larger village lands have to be divided, other plots can be hereditary.
communities—along with studies on shifting cultivation worldwide—show that it has the potential to be environmentally sustainable (see for example Vien et al. 2006).

However, in other areas, it is possible that population growth, climate change and natural disasters can put stress on such a production system and on the environment. Villages with rising populations—generally ones close to town settlements such as Falam Township—have reduced the fallow period to five years, reducing land fertility (GRET 2012: 27-30). This presents a challenge to self-provisioning, which could explain why the state produces about 70% of the grain it needs and hunger is common in poor households for several months each year (IHLCA 2011). This is also the reason that the Chin State 5-year Comprehensive Development Plan (MIID 2014) recommends that new technologies and intensified cropping practices, alongside diversified livelihoods, be introduced to mitigate these problems.

Impact of Private Property Institutions on Poverty and Social Relations

Before the passing of 2 land laws in 2012, the government attempted to change the customary land systems of upland communities several times. In 2002 the government introduced the Upland Farm Mechanization Project. Implemented by the Department of Agricultural Mechanization, its objective was to transform shifting cultivation to permanent farming through field terracing and irrigation (GRET 2012). A state fund provided farmers with 12,000 kyat per acre to develop terra-

---

19 While population figures are hard to verify in the Chin State, in 2008, population in the whole Chin state was estimated to be 533,049, with no significant population growth (GRET 2012). In the same study—which compared the population trends of 16 villages over the last 50 years—it was found that the population of half of those villages remained stable, that of five villages increased slightly, and that of the remaining three villages actually declined.
cning for the 2002–2008 period. However, the Department of Agricultural Mechanization’s 2012 report shows that much of the 7,114 acres included in this project are not usable due to insufficient resources allocated to the transformation of the uplands into permanent terraces (ibid).\textsuperscript{20} The Government of Myanmar also tried to strengthen Chin State’s participation in the market economy. To the alarm of many local communities, the government approved the development of a US$486.7 million Mwe Taung nickel-mine by the Chinese-owned North Mining Investment Company, which began conducting surveys for the project in 2012.\textsuperscript{21}

The transition to a market economy will not likely be quick and straightforward, as the norms that undergird a moral economy may play a role in resisting the rapid integration of the uplands communities into capitalist markets. Hill communities also created “an entire range of networks and institutions outside the immediate family which may, and often do, act as shock absorbers during economic crises in peasant life” (ibid: 27). Such networks take the form of inter-class reciprocity arrangements, i.e. between landlords and their tenant, as well as intra-class reciprocity, i.e. taking the form of communal cooperation. Intra-class reciprocity took the form of cooperative work groups that exist to this day, which take turns working on each family’s plot.\textsuperscript{22} Inter-class reciprocity use to and still take the form of patron-client relationships that allow for a fluid system of support. For example, a landlord “is in principle required to allow his... followers to work plots on his land rent free” or “rents are nominal and do

\textsuperscript{20}From an interview conducted by U San Thein, author of the GRET report (August 2012) and U Swe Win, Director, Upland Farm Development Project for Chin State, Hakha Township, 25 February 2012.

\textsuperscript{21}For more details, see: http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/chinese-backed-nickel-mining-project-draws-concerns-chin-state.html

\textsuperscript{22}This was verified in a field trip conducted by the author in February 2013 in the Mindat Township of the Southern Chin State.
not comprise a share in the crop” (Lehman 1963: 77). A Chin civil society leader whose family still owns land in Chin State confirmed that, “My grandmother used to own hundreds of acres near Falam. Landless neighbors would come in to use her land without needing to inform her in advance; there was an understanding that this was accepted and they would only honor her with a chicken or a pot of wine.”

With the growing presence of market forces, the hill communities are increasingly facing threats to the production systems that have sustained them for generations. One case that exemplifies this threat to social welfare and livelihoods well is the aforementioned 486.7 million US dollar Mwe Taung copper mine project, which is 15 miles from Kalay town, at the eastern foot of the Chin Hills. The Chinese North Mining Investment Company owns 90% and Ministry of Mines owns 10%. The construction of this mine could negatively affect 15 to 17 villages. Many fear a repeat of the infamous Letpadaung mine in Monywa, Sagaing Region, in which villages were forced to move a violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in 2013. Many of these communities also do not see any other feasible means of survival beyond farming.

Under the leadership of Chin Natural Resources Watch, the Mwe Taung Development Association has also been formed for advocacy and monitoring of the project. Efforts included conducting an environmental social impact assessment, which was shared with state and union parliament; public consultations including communities, religious leaders, and political party members; and meeting with the company. Given the lack of response from the regional parliament and from political parties who tend to represent locally-based constituents, the group then met with Upper House Speaker U Shwe Mann in November 2013. He said that this development would be good

---

23 Author interview on 26 December 2013.
for Chin State. Similarly, the Chief Minister, who is from the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), said that they need this money so that they can, in turn, get a larger budget allocation from central government. “They only follow what Naypyidaw tells them,” said Chin Natural Resources Watch, indicating that these leaders are not challenging the legal authority of the central level.

Eventually, civil society managed to get the support of the regional Minister of Forests and Mines, who in turn convinced central-level Forest Department to advocate the Ministry of Mines to put a temporary halt on the project. CSOs also convinced Chin MPs to raise questions at the parliament in June 2014 about the lack of an environmental social impact assessment. While the project has been halted temporarily, villagers recognize the importance of securing legal recognition of their land and are applying for land use certificates known as Form 7. The communities also know that without statutory protection of their customary land systems, they face inevitable displacement.²⁴

As more investments enter these remote regions, there are signs that a small number of large land-holders who have more information and political capital are choosing to respond to the “insurance” offered by the markets instead of that of the community (Popkin 1979). They are thus starting to apply for private land titles to secure the large swaths of land to which they lay claim.²⁵ Members of this small elite group have also joined the dominant ruling party (USDP), and promote the state’s property laws over customary land laws.²⁶ The thinking among these elite households is further facilitated by the migration of family members, which takes the form of

²⁴ Author interview with Chin Natural Resources Watch on 12 February 2013.
²⁵ From an interview conducted by the author with a large land owner in the Mindat Township in the Southern Chin, who explained how he secured rights to several hundred acres of land in February 2013.
permanent movements out of the hill communities abroad rather than the seasonal migration that seeks additional income to maintain the household farm (for a discussion of this phenomenon see Van der Ploeg 2013: 81-2). This results in the return of significant levels of remittances, but not of people. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the remittances from this migration have freed these households from the need to work on the land as shifting cultivators. They are more interested to secure their land holdings in order to sell or rent it out with the expectation that the rental market will become more developed.

In this evolving context, land as a form of social protection for the low-skilled, low-educated poor with few off-farm labor options faces increasing levels of vulnerability. In such a context, land becomes even more valuable because “in the absence of national welfare provisions, even a tiny patch of land is a crucial safety net” (Li 2011: 295). Since the Government of Myanmar’s efforts to convert shifting cultivation into permanent terraced farming have not met with much success, this kind of scenario is likely to increase the numbers of households that will fall into deeper poverty with less social insurance to turn to. This will create more out-migration of locals, who will join those who have already fled to urban centers or further afield for lack of job opportunities, many settling in neighboring countries such as Malaysia and the United States. Ongoing research is needed to track the actual changes in poverty levels over time.

26 From the author’s discussion held with Chin members of the USDP party in the capital of Naypyidaw in August 2013. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was formed on 29 March 2010 by the military-headed State Law and Order Restoration Council to take part in the 2010 elections.

27 From an interview conducted by author with a member of a Chin political party in June 2014, whose own family’s efforts to secure private titles for their land exemplify these changing relations to the land.
The Emergence of Counter-Claims
Political Dialogue Creates an Opening

Within the context of ethnic politics being played out, the outcome of these state-imposed property institutions is not going unchallenged. Since 2011, most of the cease-fires have been signed on a state-by-state basis, some of them more binding than others.\(^{28}\) As of 15 October 2015, the government, the military, opposition parties, and eight major ethnic armed groups, including the CNF, have so far signed a comprehensive cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire is followed by a national political dialogue whose aim is to create a federal union through substantial amendments to the Constitution. In preparation for this, 19 thematic areas for discussion have been prioritized, among which is land—its control and administration.

The leaders of each ethnic group are now working on articulating their group’s position to these issues. On 15 November 2013, the Chin National Conference (CNC) was held in Hakha with 571 delegates from the Chin State government, political parties, civil society organizations, and religious leaders.\(^{29}\) Of relevance to the issue of customary land tenure are two points from the conference:

(1) The CNC urges that the State government be allowed to play a more important role when it comes to rights and issues related to land and

\(^{28}\) According to the website of the Pyidaungsu Institute, which was formed to “provide impartial and independent spaces for building common understanding, resources and assistance to communities in building the Pyidaungsu,” fourteen armed groups have signed a bi-lateral Ceasefire Agreement with the Union and State Governments since 2011. They include the: ABSDF, ALP, CNF, DKBA, KIO, KNPP, KNU, NSCN-K, NDAA, NMSP, Pao, RCSS, SSA-N and UWSA.

natural resources, that priority be given to the consent and involvement of the indigenous people...and that transparency and accountability be ensured when dealing with issues related to land and natural resources;

(2) The CNC agrees that Chin tribal customary laws be collected, documented, published, and amended as needed in accordance with current contexts and practices.

From these statements, it can be interpreted that different Chin political entities want more say in the governing of their land and natural resources, while integrating customary laws into the way these resources are governed. They also recognize that the customary laws under which the majority of their communities are living might need to be reconciled with those of statutory laws through a process of compromise with the government.  

_Emergence of “Indigenous Claims”_

Though the CNF is small in size, its executive committee members continue to play a central role in the peace process and potentially on land issues. In a speech made on 9 August 2015 at the second celebration of International Indigenous People’s Day in Myanmar, the secretary general of the CNF Dr. Sui Khar, and a member of the Asia Indigenous People’s Pact, said that provisions in the United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) coincides with many of the ethnic armed groups demands. The UNDRIP elaborates on collective rights, including the right to self-determination; rights to lands, territories and resources; and cultural rights. Though Myanmar ratified the UNDRIP in 2007, the Government

30This is an opinion of one of the organizing members of the Chin National Conference. Author interview on 20 June 2014.
of Myanmar has not enacted any substantial protections for indigenous peoples. The IP rights discourse remains relatively new in the country’s political discourse, but it is slowly starting to enter into discourse of ethnic minority circles. Yet a number of concerns remain.

Many ethnic minorities are uncomfortable with using the term “indigenous” for several reasons. Many believe that the term conveys a sense of backwardness, and conjures up the oppressed native peoples of other countries. They prefer to emphasize ethnic minority states’ claim to sovereignty as first envisioned in the Panglong Agreement. On the other hand, reference to the Panglong Agreement was rejected in the National Ceasefire Agreement negotiations, making it difficult to re-engage with the original argument of self-governing nation-states.

Besides the UNDRIP, Myanmar is left with few domestic legal instruments that can be used by ethnic minorities to back up their claims. The Constitution, the draft National Land Use Policy, and the recently passed Ethnic Nationalities Protection Law either use the term “ethnic nationality” or “national races”—both translated as “taingyinthar.” While this term was originally created by the Burmese majority to refer to the ethnic minority groups, in recent decades, the term has come to be used officially to also include the majority group. After the Government of Myanmar ratified the UNDRIP in 2007, the Government of Myanmar’s position is either all are indigenous or none are indigenous—potentially weakening claims.

Finally, some ethnic minorities say that claims based on indigeneity could exclude many minorities who hail from a

---

31 The title of this law was misleading translated into English as the Indigenous People’s Protection Law. There is only one place in Article 5 where the Ethnic Nationalities Protection Law refers to the term “taneh taingyinthar,” where “taneh” refers to locale and thus has been suggested as a way to say “indigenous” in Burmese language, but this is not elaborated on in the text.
particularly group, but may not have been raised or live in the original locale. This could exclude possibly half the Chin population based outside the state. They say that if the focus is on a common ethnic nationality, it would be easier to forge alliances between members of an ethnic minority regardless of where they are actually located.

Last August 2014, members of the Nationality Brotherhood Federation (NBF) discussed the meaning of indigeneity and the need to find new terminology to advance ethnic minorities’ claims to land and other rights. It is evident that efforts to use the indigenous rights discourse to protect ethnic minority rights will still require further development.

Role of Civil Society
While the CNF’s role may be strategic, it may face challenges in representing the views of multiple Chin groups. Civil society provides additional counter-claims to the state’s way of administering land. With support from NGOs based in Yangon, a few villages have started to translate communal land tenure to approximate formal regulations. The aim is to survey and register the boundaries of village land with the government. This process requires at least three steps, which have been piloted in villages in Chin State from mid-2013 to early 2014. These are: 1) using GIS mapping of village’s communal lands, both the boundaries in relation to neighboring villages as well as ownership within each village; 2) writing down of the

---

32 Interviews with an analyst who specializes in Myanmar’s ethnic minority politics on 11 June 2014 and a tribal leader in Falam on 7 May 2015.
33 This section summarizes the main steps from a series of three research papers on the formalization of land tenure in the Chin State conducted for the Land Core Group in 2013-14.
34 Because the SLRD has not mapped their lands for a long time and most villages do not have exact information on land acreage or the formal land classification of different parcels of land, many villages continue to observe boundaries established during the British annexation of the Chin State.
village statutes, which define the governance structure of the village as an organization; and 3) writing down the internal rules for communal land management. In a few villages, the mapping exercise only makes clearer the inherent inequality in land ownership—legacies that cannot be easily solved. For the most part, mapping is an initial step in a more complicated process towards securing protection for customary land systems.

**Conclusion**

This article attempts to demonstrate how the idea of “fragmented authority” helps us to explain the dynamics of the current contest over land access and control in Myanmar, a regime in transition affected by decades of armed conflict between the central government and multiple ethnic groups. It does this by looking at the tensions produced when state and customary property institutions interact with each other in the uplands of Chin State.

Customary laws that have governed property institutions in Chin State were formalized by the British in the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896 and the Panglong Agreement of 1947. These alternative property institutions were further solidified by the armed struggle started by the CNF since 1988. The passage of the 2012 Farmland and VFV Land Laws highlighted the contradiction between customary laws and state land laws, creating negative impacts in the lives and livelihoods of the Chin communities. Reflective of the dynamics of a regime in transition, the state’s property institutions are being challenged by a host of political entities, including the Chin National Front, Chin political parties, and civil society.

While the idea of “fragmented authority” may seem to imply that this phenomenon could further weaken the state’s sovereignty, the Chin case demonstrates that the nature of its counter-claims to the state might in fact help to cohere the
relationship between citizens to the state. Except a few attempts by the government to introduce terrace farming and its approval of large-scale extractive projects to enter the state, Chin State’s customary land systems were largely left untouched by state law. It was only with the passage of the Farmland Law and the VFV Law in 2012, as well as the influx of more investments, that political entities in Chin State are starting to engage with the process of shaping the state’s land laws. If it were not for the government’s attempts to title land according to a mainstream private property model—thereby threatening the security of customary land systems—it is unlikely that local communities in Chin State would even be paying attention to the government’s land laws or finding ways to secure their customary land through statutory means.

Returning to the idea of the co-constitution of authority and property, these initial findings in Chin State imply that the response from Chin political entities—to engage with the government on how state law could be used to protect customary land—could very well strengthen state-subject relations as these communities increasingly recognize that the state can create and sustain property rights. Indicative of this evolving dynamic, an executive member of the CNF recently said that one of the reasons it signed the National Ceasefire Agreement was to get more government support for the recovery of Chin State after the floods in July 2015, known among Chin people as the worse disaster in recent history. Thus, state-building in Myanmar, as well as in other countries where state sovereignty might be challenged by multiple institutional actors, the process of state-building is a fluid and evolving process that shapes the way the state and its citizens relate to one another.

In this period of rapid transition, institutions have been thrown into a state of flux as different state and non-state
authorities vie to gain or maintain legitimacy in order to continue exercising authority. The contest over property institutions will still be ongoing for some time. Since “property may bolster claims of belonging and citizenship” (Lund 2011: 889), one can infer that it would be in the interest of the government to extend its sovereignty by strengthening property security for the greatest numbers of ethnic minority populations. In the case of the hill communities of the Chin State, this may mean devising property institutions that can accommodate customary land systems.

References
van der Ploeg, Jan Douwe. 2013. *Peasants and the Art of Farming: A
Poverty And Health in Contemporary Burma

ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အနီးစာရင်းတွင် အစိုးရအဖွဲ့များနှင့် ကျောင်းသားများ

(ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အနီးစာရင်းတွင် အစိုးရအဖွဲ့များနှင့် ကျောင်းသားများ)

(Mollie Pepper)
နလင်းနာ်၊ နာ်လီပပ်ပါးနရာဂါကကိုတင်ကာကွယ်မခင်းနှင့်ကုသမခင်းအတွက်ကျ်းာနရးနာင့်နရှာက် ျားကို ၎င်းတို ့ ၏ကိုယ်ပိုင်နငွထဲ ၅ု ဆု နကျာ် ထုတ်နပးနကကရသည်။

ဤတွင် ဆင်းရဲနွ်းပါးနှင့် ကျ်းာနရး တို ့အကကားအမပ်အလှ် ဆက်နွယ်ကိုမ နိုင်ငံ၊ မပည်ယ်၊ နာ်လပိုင်ပို ့ အီးဆင်းရဲနွ်းပါးသည့်ရပ်ကွက်တုနဆးခ်းတုနဆးခ်းတုန%$်ရပ်သာဓကနလ့လာကို အသုံးမပု၍နဆွးနနွးသွားပါည်။ ဤတွင် ကျ်းာနရးဝ်နဆာင်လက်လှ်းည်ပါးမခင်းနှင့်န$ျးန်းကကီးားသည့်ကျ်းာနရး န$ာင့်နရှာက်လုံနလာက်မခင်းတို ့ကို မ%$်န$မခင်း၊(၂) ကျ်းာနရးအရည်အနသွး ျားသည် အနားနသာအားမ%င့် ိ့်ကျရမခင်းလည်း နလ့ကျင့်သင်ကကားနပးထားနသာကျ်းာနရးပညာရှင်ျားရှိမခင်းနှင့်လုံနလာသည့် ကျ်းာနရးပညာရှင်ျားည်းပါးမခင်းတို ့ နကကာင့်မ%$်သည်၊(၃) တိုင်းရင်းနဆးနှင့်ကိုးကွယ်ယုံကကည်မ%င့်ကုသသည့် အနလ့အထျားကို အားကိုးထားမပုမခင်းသည်လည်း ကျ်းာနရးအတွက်စိုကျိုးျားမ%$်န$မခင်း သို ့ဟုတ်လိုအပ်သည့် ကျ်းာနရးန$ာင့် နရှာက်ကို နနှာင့်နနှး န$မခင်းတို ့ကို မ%$်သည်၊(၄) ကျ်းာနရးကု်ကျ$ရိတ် ျားသည် ကျ်းာနရး စိုကျိုးျားမ%$် န$သည်။
ဆင်းရဲနွ်းပါးနှင့်ကျ်ာနရး 165 သည်ဟု တင်မပထားပါသည်။ မိုင်းနိုင်ငံတွင် ကျ်ာနရးဂဏတွင်အသုံးမပုခဲ့သည့် ည်းျားနှင့်အနမခအနျားကို ဆက်လက်နဆွးနနွနပီးသည့်နာက်လူျား၏အနတွ့အကကုံမရပ်အချိုကိုတင်မပထားပါသည်။ ိဂုံးချုပ်အနမင့်အျိုးသားအဆင့်ကျ်ာနရးနာင့်နရှာက်အရာတွင်ဤမရပ်ျားအနမခအနအရပုံနာ်ကကည့်မခင်းအားမင့်ရဝါအတွက်အနရးပါလှသည့်လုပ်င်းျားအနကာင်အထည်နာ်နိုင်ရ်မုန်းထိုးတင်မပားပါည်။

ပJိတိသ1ကိုလိုီအ$ိုးရသည်နသခံမပည်သူျား၏ကျ်ာနရးနာင့်နရာက်အရည်အနသွားမင့်နားနရ်မန်ကျ်ာနရးဖွံ့ပိုးတိုးတက်တိုးကိုနရးဆွဲပပီးထိုီံကိ်းထဲတွင်ဆင်းရဲနွ်းပါးသည်ကျ်ာနရးနာင့်နရှာက်၏အဓိက$ိ်နခ2ချက်တု့အမ%$်အသိအှတ်မပုခဲ့သည်။ ဤီံကိ်း၏အကျိုးရလ်သည်နရရှည်တွင်ည်သို့မ%$်လာည်ကိုနတာ့န$ာင့်ကကည့်ရ်ကျ်နပါနသးသည်။

၂၀၁၀ခုနှ$်နာက်ပိုင်းနိုင်ငံနမပာင်းလဲနိုင်ငံတကာအ%ွဲ့အ$ည်းအျားနှင့်အလှူရှင်ျားကိုလူသားချင်းနှင့်ကျ်ာနရးကူညီျားကိုပံ့ပိုးခွင့်မပုခဲ့ပပီးသည့်နာက်ပိုင်းတွင်အကျိုးဆက်အမ%$်မန်းျားနိုင်ငံ၏ကျ်ာနရးအနမခအနနှင့်ပတ်
နလင်းနာ်၊ နာ်လီပပ်ပါးသက်ပပီး ကိ်းဂဏ်းအချက်အလက်နိုင်၍ အလွယ်တကူရရှိနိုင်လာနပသည်။ သို့ရာတွင်ဆင်းရဲနွ်းပါးအကကားကျ်းနာင့်နရှာက်အမပုအူနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍သုနတ်သမပုမခင်းနလ့လာမခင်းကန်ကာင့်ကုသရှိနသာ နရာဂါသို့နရာက်သွားနပပပီးထိုအခါပိုမပင်းထ်သည့်အထူးကကပ်တ်ကုသနိုင်သည်။ အချို့ လူးကျ်းနာရာဖွံ့ပ%ိုးတိုးတက်မို့ကိ်းတွင်ချှတ်ထားသည်ကျ်းနရးဆိုင်ရာရည်ရွယ်ချက်မှုနိုးနရ်အသုံးရိတ်ုုပါင်း၏၁.၀၃% ၁.၀၅% နှင့် ၃.၁၄%တို့သာအသီးသီးရှိခဲ့သည်။ အသိအမှတ်ကျ်းနရးဖွံ့ပ%ိုးတိုးမှင့်ရ်လိုအပ်ပါသည်။

ကျ်းနရးနာင့်နရှာက်ကိုလက်လှ်းညီမခင်းဆိုင်ရာမပဿာအနပ်တ်မပ်ရိုက်ခတ်နသည်။ ဤသို့မင့်မပည်သူအသည်ဆင်းရဲနွ်းပါးနှင့်ဆက်ပ်နသည့်ကျ်းနရး၊ပညာနရး၊
အထောက်အမှတ်ကို စိတ်ပြုနေသည်။ သီချင်းသားများနှင့် ကျျော်သားများကိုကိုင်တွယ်နိုင်ရတာဖြစ်သည်။ သီချင်းသားများကို အကားချိတ်ဆက်ကိုလည်း အသိအမှတ်မပုရ်အလွ်အနရးကိုပါသည်။ မိုးနိုင်ငံရှိ ဆင်းရဲသားများ၏ ဘဝအလိုအလျင် ကျျော်သားအနီခုအနီရိုင်းအတွက် နာင်အာဂတ်ဝါနှင့်မူဝါနှင့်မူကာင်းတွင် မလိုအပ်သည်။
Like their counterparts in other poor countries, people in Burma are caught in a vicious cycle of poverty in which limits to health care access and prohibitive health care costs feature as cause and effect. Public health care provisions in Burma are inadequate and of low quality, further exacerbating the health crisis and contributing to poverty. According to the World Health Organization, poverty is strongly correlated with poor health outcomes globally. The World Bank has reported that approximately 85% of the global population lives below the poverty line, but share 90% of global disease. In addition, people from less developed countries pay for more than 50% of their preventive and curative health care costs out-of-pocket (WHO 2003; World Bank 2014).

This paper discusses the mutually reinforcing interrelationship between poverty and health using cases from a clinic in an impoverished neighborhood near Mawlamyine, in Mon State. These case studies are based on the first author’s experiences and observations as a primary care doctor in Mawlamyine as well as conversations with patients, caretakers, medical experts, religious and community leaders, and public health scholars.
Our findings are grouped around four central themes: 1) Poverty results in no or inadequate treatment as a result of inability to pay for care. 2) Health care quality is generally low, resulting from both a lack of trained health professionals and the proliferation of inadequate health care options. 3) Reliance on traditional and spiritual healing practices can result in negative health outcomes or delayed medical care. 4) The costs of health care lead to livelihoods strategies with negative health outcomes. First, we establish a framework that situates poverty and health as connected, and which further situates poverty as a cause and consequence of poor health outcomes. This is followed by a brief discussion of methods and context before presenting several cases of patient experiences. We conclude by contextualizing the implications of these cases for the implementation of the National Health Plan by using it as a framework to draw out the broader implications of this work for policy.

Theoretical Framework
While a thorough discussion of the meaning and definitions of poverty is beyond the scope of this article, briefly, we conceptualize poverty as the deprivation of access to basic necessities including food, shelter, clean water, and health services. Drawing on Amartya Sen (1999), poverty can be understood as a lack of freedom to create and maintain life in a way that is valued. Further, we agree with Nicholas Stern (2004), who argues that the empowerment of individuals and collectivities to lead healthy lives is both a path out of poverty as well as a worthy goal in and of itself.

Medical anthropologist and physician Paul Farmer (2005) argues that poor health is a central cause and driver of poverty. He frames lack of health care options for the poor as a fundamental human rights issue and a common characteristic of unequal societies. Further, Farmer suggests that severe
inequality is maintained through the failure to provide quality health care or public health provisions to the poor and constitutes an essential element of structural violence.

The relationship between poverty and ill health has been widely studied, establishing several key factors. Scholars have found that the need for health care and its related costs are causes of poverty (Jacobs, Ir, Bigdeli, Annear, and Van Damme 2012). Poverty is itself a barrier to accessing health services, but poor access to health care is also a factor in the creation and maintenance of poverty (Peters, Garg, Bloom, Walker, Brieger, and Rahman 2008). Further, when health care is needed but is either delayed or not sought at all because of financial restraints, people’s health deteriorates further, resulting in both higher health care costs and lost income from inability to work (Narayan 2000; Smith 1999). In these ways, access to health care and poverty are part of a vicious circle in which poverty leads to poor health and poor health maintains poverty (Wagstaff 2002).

Low quality care and limited availability of quality care coupled with availability of alternative health care providers also contributes to negative health outcomes of poverty (Chaudhury and Hammer 2004; Hanson 2003). There may be greater availability of informal health care options for the poor, such as the use of pharmacies as primary care providers (Mendis 2007; Akin and Hutchison 1999; Van Der Geest 1987). Limited availability or availability of only culturally inappropriate health care may lead to a preference for traditional providers including spiritual healers (Asharaf 1982; Young 1983), or for private practitioners of varying quality who are readily and affordably available within impoverished communities (Rohde & Viswanathan 1995). Whether pharmacy care, self-treatment, or traditional healing methods, these
strategies emerge in the absence of other options and are associated with negative health outcomes in many cases.

**Healthcare in Burma**

People in poor countries have less access to health services that those in wealthier countries, and that the poor in a given country have less access than others (Peters et al. 2008). This is the case in Burma, where the government officially acknowledged widespread poverty in 2011 and where 27 percent of the population lives on less than one dollar a day (UNDP 2011), meeting the World Bank definition of absolute poverty (Coudouel, Hentschel, Wodon 2002; Haughton & Khandker 2009). The majority of the population lives in rural areas of the country and relies on agriculture for their livelihood.

The British colonial government, in order to improve the quality of healthcare among the local populations, founded Myanmar’s healthcare system. Since 1962, the quality of health care has declined gradually due to mismanagement and lack of investment in the sector. In recent years, the government of Burma has drafted a health development plan, most recently revised in 2010, which includes addressing poverty as a factor in health outcomes, and providing universal health care coverage. It remains to be seen what the outcome of this effort will be in the long term (Ministry of Health 2014).

Political changes since 2010 have allowed international organizations and donors to provide humanitarian and health assistance. Consequently, more data on the health situation in Burma has become available. However, there has been little scholarly work on health care behavior among poor people in Burma. Out of total government spending, health-related expenditures constituted 1.03 percent in 2010-2011, 1.05 percent in 2011-2012, and 3.14 percent in 2012-2013 (UNICEF 2013). These changes are in an effort to meet object-
ives related to health set out in the National Health Development Plan (WHO 2014).

Private expenditure on health care is 93.7 percent of the total expenditure on health care in Burma, indicating that a high proportion of health care costs are borne by individuals and families (World Bank 2014). This percentage is high compared to countries in the region closely ranked according to the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index shown in Figure 1. In addition, the high rate of private expenditure drives inequality in health, where those who can afford to pay for healthcare receive expensive care in private hospitals in Yangon or in neighboring countries. Those who cannot afford such treatment are subject to limited and low quality public healthcare (Xu 2006).

Figure 1: Country Comparison Human Development Index/Out of Pocket Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Human Development Index Ranking*</th>
<th>Out of Pocket Healthcare Expenditure**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>93.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*UNDP 2015
**World Bank 2014

Methodology

This paper emerged from the first author’s observations and experiences as a general practitioner working in clinics serving poor and underprivileged populations in Mawlamyine. The stories included here have been anonymized and details have been changed to protect the privacy of individuals. The intention is not to offer systematically collected data, but rather to provide a broad analysis of the intersection of poverty and health in Burma using a grassroots practitioner perspective.
The clinic that serves as the site of observation for this paper is located in a suburban community of Mawlamyine that was established after the Than Lwin Bridge Project in 2005 resulted in the displacement of a significant population. Bamar, Mon, and Indian are the three largest ethnic groups, with small populations of Kayin, Rakhine, Shan, and Chinese. Buddhism is the majority religion, and there is also a sizable Muslim population. Although the community is made up of mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds, they have coexisted peacefully. The ward administrator and the administrative committee members proportionately represent ethnic and religious diversities and effectively manage cross-cultural conflicts based on religion and ethnicity.

This relatively newly established ward still lacks basic infrastructure for residents. The drainage system is inadequately installed in this quarter and there are frequent floods during the rainy season. The roads are in poor condition, and require collective efforts from the community to be maintained. There is no government health facility, but there are private health care providers, consisting of three doctors (including the first author), all of whom travel from other parts of Mawlamyine to run clinics. The ward also has one nurse, one midwife, one health assistant who owns a pharmacy and an additional pharmacy serving the health needs of the community. In this context, pharmacies are categorized as major health care providers because they recommend and sell medicines to the community.

All of these practitioners are compensated directly by patients and are not associated with government-supported health programming. Most patients are daily wageworkers or are unemployed, and in order to keep the clinic accessible, rates for basic care range between 1,500 and 2,000 kyat. The clinic offers only primary care, with occasional assistance from a laboratory for diagnostics, and surgery in urgent circum-
stances. Resources are limited, which affects the kinds of care provided.

**Poverty and Inadequate Treatment**

In Burma, most patients pay for the costs of health care out of pocket (World Bank 2014). As a result, poverty serves as a barrier to access quality health care. Poor people often avoid visiting the clinic when they are sick to avoid paying the associated fees. The majority of patients who come to the clinic have admitted that they do not seek treatment at the clinic when they are first sick. Instead, they attempt self-care by staying at home and trying short-term recovery strategies instead of consulting with professional and officially recognized health care providers. Many poor people struggle to make ends meet on a daily basis and do not have extra money to pay for unexpected illnesses. While this research was not designed to determine prevalence of such cases, anecdotal evidence and professional experience indicate that it is common for poor people in Burma to avoid health care, and the associated costs, leading to worsening conditions and more expensive or untreatable conditions as the illness progresses.

Even when people do receive medical attention, the cost of care may be too high for them to afford recommended treatments, resulting in noncompliance, premature discontinuation of treatment, or denied treatment altogether. One patient, a 34-year-old man, noticed a wound around his mouth two years ago and consulted with a medical doctor who recommended further tests to identify the cause of disease. It was estimated that the diagnostic process and treatment would cost at least 90,000 kyat. During a clinic visit, he said to the first author, “I would rather die than pay such an amount for medical treatment. I cannot pay that much money.” He could hardly speak with his large mouth wound, which was possibly cancerous. He
Ne Lynn Zaw, Mollie Pepper

passed away from starvation because he was unable to consume food and water through his mouth.

Inadequate treatment is also common in cases where patients cannot afford the costs of treatment. The first author treated a 65-year-old man with a diabetic foot. He needed proper blood sugar control treatment at the hospital until his leg ulcer healed. He explained to the author that he was not able to obtain the treatment because, “I do not have enough money to pay for my stay at a hospital nor do I have children around to look after me.” This man came to the clinic almost every day to receive outpatient treatment for his leg ulcer and medication to treat his high blood sugar. Ultimately, however, this care was inadequate and after several months his health suddenly deteriorated due to the spread of toxic bacteria into his blood. He was taken to the hospital, but passed away immediately after being admitted. This man was unable to receive the intensive treatment he needed due to cost barriers and, as a result, died from a treatable condition.

Untreated morbidity poses a major challenge in Burma. When people delay treatment and seek alternative and cheaper health care, they end up facing higher medical costs from diseases that have progressed. Lack of basic health education, which is also partly a result of poverty, often has serious health consequences. One of the first author’s female patients, a 35-year-old, was separated from her husband. She had 2 children, and had to depend on her mother. Before she was separated, her husband used to give her alcohol to drink whenever she was sick and had difficulty breathing. She became addicted to alcohol, which gave her liver disease. She went to the hospital one or two times for treatment but failed to get regular treatment because she did not have money. She seemed to know nothing about the causes of her disease apart from the fact that her disease was not curable. She died after taking a compound of petroleum sludge and infant feces, which she heard would
cure her disease. These examples demonstrate how poverty can prevent individuals from gaining access to proper treatment. This results in untreated morbidity, premature death, and disability.

**Lack of Quality Care**

The short-term recovery treatment-seeking behavior of the poor has led to “patient-driven treatment” putting pressure on some registered doctors to treat patients according to patients’ preferences. These include the prescription of medicines that may have a short-term curative effect, but have a long-term devastating impact. Some medical doctors and health workers frequently inject patients with colorful but cheap multivitamin fluids to attract patients and increase their profit. These vitamin injections are not harmful, but have no obvious benefit for patient health. Some patients experience good feelings after injections, which can be mildly addicting. Patients willing to spend money for this, and those who provide such treatments can make a significant profit. Other physicians choose to inject drugs that induce feelings of euphoria, like calcium gluconate. There was a medical doctor who used this treatment and was eventually sued by a patient because the patient experienced a blackout after receiving an injection.

People who are poor and cannot access professional and registered health care providers sometimes seek assistance from other healthcare providers who are relatively cheaper or offer alternative remedial solutions. These alternative health care providers include those who do not have proper training, and those who use traditional healing techniques. Some providers have experience working at a hospital or clinic as nurse’s aids or janitors. A former janitor from a private clinic in Mawlamyine began treating patients after his retirement. He used injectable medicines including calcium gluconate, which gives a short-term high, making his patients frequently seek
this treatment with dire health consequences. The first author also treated three patients who suffered from long-term kidney problems resulting from long-term receipt of calcium gluconate injections administered by alternative health care providers.

The lack of physicians in rural areas makes residents depend on these alternative health care workers. Health assistants are common in Burma, and are trained for 3 years on primary preventive health care and the treatment of minor illnesses. Despite limited training, they end up playing the role of primary physician in impoverished rural areas. Lack of quality control mechanisms, patient protections, or continuous medical education of health workers undermines the quality of health care provision for the poor. Many incidences of premature death have occurred due to misdiagnosis by unqualified physicians and health care providers. One health assistant who runs his private clinic in Mawlamyine once treated a patient by local injection at the nape of the neck. Due to the lack of aseptic conditions, the patient suffered an infective inflammation of the bone joints and was paralyzed.

Even if the poor can pay for the cost of treatments prescribed by healthcare providers, there is no guarantee that their health will improve because of the poor quality of health services. One patient, a 50-year-old male construction contractor, experienced an inability to move his limbs and went to one of the well-known clinics in Mawlamyine. He was diagnosed as having had a stroke. He complied with prescribed treatment although it was expensive, but his condition did not improve. He arrived in the end at the author’s clinic, impoverished from the high cost of treatment and still unwell. The author administered vitamin B$_1$ tablets for three days, after which he improved. The misdiagnosis of the patient by substandard healthcare providers resulted in prolonged illness,
depleted resources, and lost income with devastating financial consequences for the patient and his family.

People often try short term and cheap recovery methods to get well from minor illness by buying over-the-counter medicines from the drug store, market, or pharmacies and seeking traditional healing alternatives. In Burma, officially, persons who sell medicines are required to take a month-long pharmacology training course. However, the certificates, even for the short course training, can be purchased by anyone able to pay. As a result, drug vendors often have very little knowledge of the medicines they dispense. At most drug stores anybody can buy drugs by mentioning one or two symptoms to the vendor or pharmacist. These are common short-term recovery strategies that are very cheap and accessible.

**Traditional Healing Practices**

In Burma, especially in rural areas and in communities with lower levels of education, there are widespread traditional beliefs and practices that tend to punish the sick. In some cases, if a patient has been ill for a long time, family members may assume that the person has already died, and that their body has been possessed by evil spirits. Some behaviors in particular, such as insomnia and excessive eating by patients, are considered signs of evil possession of the dead body. Family members may then seek the assistance of traditional spiritual healers, which may cost between 300,000 to 1,500,000 kyats, to deal with evil spirit. The healer may offer prayers, touch, and other practices. A common practice is to administer poison to patients in order to drive the evil spirit out of the patient’s body. Family members may also administer poisons on their own in order to expel the evil. Consequently, the patient passes away. The first author estimates that 3 to 5 people die per year from this practice in the quarter in which his clinic is located.
A 65-year-old man, a retired civil servant, had been paralyzed and was unable to move one side of his body and to control his bladder. The family members rented a house to keep him alone and provided only a food supply. The old man had to take care of himself with a little financial support from sons working in Thailand. He became depressed with an impact on his appetite, and suffered insomnia. He became hostile and used foul language, which family members interpreted as a sign of possession by an evil spirit and sought help. A traditional healer performed a ceremony to drive out the evil presumed to be causing the illness, which resulted in his death.

The poor also seek advice and treatment from astrologers, a widely used and respected resource in Burma, and other spiritual healers for their health issues. If a person becomes sick, a family may go to astrologers to ask for advice, including the name of the doctor whom they should consult. There are currently more than 100 astrologers in Mawlamyine, and several in the ward. This can be expensive practice that has the benefit of psychological encouragement for patients, but which does not contribute to the medical treatment of illnesses.

Spiritual healers can charge high fees for their services. A young Muslim teacher, a university graduate, who suffered loss of movement in his limbs, said he felt better after he received treatment by neurologist in Yangon. However, when he returned to Mon State, he met with a spiritual healer who guaranteed a complete cure. The spiritual healer scraped his whole body with his holy knife, charging 800,000 kyats per treatment and assured the young teacher that he no longer needed to see his physician. After receiving 15 treatments and losing almost all of his money and property, his condition deteriorated. When he went back to his physician, he was told that the disease was in an irreversible condition due to delayed treatment, and the patient is chronically disabled.
In 2013, a mother brought her 11-year-old daughter with cerebral palsy from upper Burma to the clinic. They initially went to spiritual healers and tried traditional medicines before they visited the hospital. Afterwards, her brain growth had stunted, which in turn stunted her physical growth and she became handicapped. Consequently, her elder sister dropped out of school in order to look after her. Her mother took her to several hospitals and sold their property to pay for treatment. After they lost their property and savings, they moved to Lower Burma where they tried to start a new life. “Since she was 1 year old, we have spent all we own and now we are left with nothing. Our child is not getting better either. We have already given up on looking for more treatments because we have no money left. We are just trying to work to meet daily expenses.” In this case, delayed and incorrect treatment resulted from the costs associated with healthcare.

**Livelihoods Strategies and Health**

Illness can result from unhealthy and unsustainable income generating activities practiced by the poor with few opportunities for work. A 46-year-old female patient found out that she could earn money from selling her blood when she took her child with dengue hemorrhagic fever and received a blood transfusion at the government hospital. She had to pay 40,000 kyat for service fees for hospital workers who sought necessary blood for her child. Recognizing the opportunity for income, she began selling her blood, joining other poor people in Mawlamyine who sell their blood several times a month. It is common for these people to develop anemia and some of them suffer heart failure from severe untreated anemia from too-frequent blood draws. She earned 7,000 kyat per draw or more depending on the demand for her blood type. She eventually passed away with anemic heart failure.
The author treated a 29-year-old female who was a sex worker. She told the author that she was once engaged in sex with 15 university students who asked for unprotected sex. Although she was HIV positive she agreed to their request because she was afraid of losing her customers and the potential income, which she needed to raise her three children. Sometimes she forgot to take her medication or failed to make regular clinic visits because she was too busy working or could not afford them. She exposed a number of her clients to HIV and damaged her own health.

In addition to livelihoods strategies that carry health risks, there are many medical emergencies where people are forced to take out high-interest loans to pay for care. For the poor, daily income typically just meets their daily food expenses, so they lack access to cash on short notice. Loans carry high interest rates, and often take years to repay. Borrowers may have to sell their house and other property in order to pay off a loan. In this way, ill health as an exacerbating factor for poverty is clear for those without resources available to assist them in obtaining care in an emergency.

Policy Implications
As noted above, Myanmar has drafted a comprehensive national health plan. The plan includes targets around the provision of universal healthcare, building public-private partnerships for healthcare provision, strengthening oversight of training and certification of health practitioners, and the regulation and promotion of traditional medicine (Ministry of Health 2014). Though the original plan was drafted in 2000 and the Ministry of Health has been working with the World Health Organization and other international health organizations for several years, the themes illustrated in this paper demonstrate that much remains to be done. Using the four themes discussed here, we have several recommendations for implementation of
the National Health Plan to address the central issues we have identified.

Investing in the deployment of universal healthcare is absolutely necessary to ensure that healthcare is available without creating undue hardship in the lives of citizens leading to entrenched poverty and maladaptive livelihoods strategies. This will require significant investment in rural healthcare systems in particular. The National Plan’s goals surrounding health education are promising, but an overall weak educational system in Burma may make this goal especially challenging to meet. Thus, concerted efforts to develop the nation’s educational system, especially for the poorest, stand to benefit the country not only on a human capital basis, but also in terms of securing better health outcomes for the population. Prevention, of course, in the long run stands to decrease health-related costs for individuals and the state overall, and as such, general education as a vehicle for health education could be especially effective in supporting efforts to meet the goals set out in the National Health Plan.

A particular focus on monitoring health services in rural areas is especially warranted, as the poor rural population of the country has least access to affordable, and reliable healthcare. Overall, greater attention to standardized training and regulated certification for healthcare practitioners from physicians to midwives and pharmacists would greatly increase access to quality healthcare for a huge proportion of the population. By focusing on improving the safety and standards of a broad selection of healthcare providers can ensure that care will be available on an affordable basis. The current plan’s provisions for promoting and regulating traditional medicine also has great potential to decrease risks to those who seek such forms of healthcare, while helping to fill gaps in healthcare availability.
Conclusion
As these cases illustrate, poor people in Burma have limited access to quality healthcare. Reduced health access leads to untreated morbidity, which gives rise to the state where more intensive treatment is required or treatment is no longer effective. Some cases of unsought or delayed healthcare even result in death. There are substantial impacts on psychological, social, and economic well-being associated with ill health, which feed back into the problem of healthcare access. In this way, people become trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty and poor health.

As Burma continues to reform and additional attention and resources are devoted to addressing pervasive poverty and the associated issues of health, education, and financial well-being, it will be essential to recognize the link between poverty and health. The current state of health in the lives of the poor of Burma has the potential to inform future policy and programmatic directions for the country, both internally, and with regards to foreign aid.

References
Poverty And Health


On the Frontier of Urbanization: Informal Settlements in Yangon, Myanmar

Eben I. Forbes ၏ ဗျည်းစာ (ဝတ်)
မိုမှားလာသော အချင်းအလ်များကို ရှာဖွေလာသည်နှင့် မိုမှားလာအောက် အများများအားယူသည်နှင့်အတူ ချက်ချင်းချခြင်း ဖြစ်ပေသည်။ ရန်ကုန်မှားလာရောက်စရိတ်ျားသည် လက်ရှိတွင်ပင်ားသလို ဒနာင်လည်း တက်ျချင်သပဖင့် ဒရ4့ဒပာင်းအျားချကကရဒည်။ ရန်ကုန်မှားလာစရိတ်ျားသည် လက်ရှိတွင်ပင်ားသလို ဒနာင်လည်း တက်ျချင်သပဖင့် ဒရ4့ဒပာင်းျားသည်ကို မို့စွန်မို့ဖျားမို့နယ်ျားတွင်သာ အဒပခချကကရဒည်။ ရန်ကုန့်မှားလာရောက်စရိတ်ျားသည် လက်ရှိတွင်ပင်ားသလို ဒနာင်လည်း တက်ျချင်သပဖင့် ဒရ4့ဒပာင်းျားသည် မို့စွန်မို့ဖျားမို့နယ်ျားတွင်သာ အဒပခချကကရဒည်။
မို ပတိုးချဲ နယ်သစ်ဒသ

သားပဖစ်သည်။ သိုဒသာ်ရန်ကုန်မိုလယ်သိုဟုတ်ရန်ကုန်မိုတွင်မိုနယ်ျားသိုသွားဒရာက်အလု်လု်ရသည့်အလု်သားျားအတွက်မိုပင်အစွန်အဖျားမိုနယ်ျားတွင်အဒပခချဒနထိုင်ပခင်းဒကကာင်းအထူးသပဖင့်ဒခတ်ဒနာက်ကျဒနသည့်ဘတ်စ်ကားစနစ်ျားဒကကာင်းစဉ်အလု်သွားရသည့်ခရီးလ်းအလွန်ကကာသပဖင့်ဒရရှည်ှာအချိန်အားပဖင့်သာကဒငွအားပဖင့်ါအလွန်အင်းဝန်ိဒစသည်။မိုတွင်းဘတ်စ်ကားျားသည်လ်းဒလ2ာက်သည့်အပန်နန်းထက်ျ်း2အားပဖင့်တစ်နာရီလ2င်၀၅ိုင်သာိုပန်သည်ဟုဆိုလ်အင်စတီကျူ့ဆိုသည်။အချိုကူရန်ကုန်မိုတွင်း၌ကျူးဒကျာ်ဒနထိုင်ပခင်းပဖင့်လည်းဤပဿနာကိုဒပဖရှင်းရန်ကကိုစားဒသာ်လည်းသိုင်းဒကကာင်းအရဒတာ့အစိုးရသည်ဤကျူးဒကျာ်သူျားကိုမိုစွန်မိုဖျားသိုအင်အားသုံးဒပာင်းဒရ4့ဒနထိုင်ပခင်းပဖင့်ပဿနာျားဒပဖရှင်းရန်အလားအလာျားည်။လ်းန်းဆက်သွယ်ဒရးိုိုဒကာင်းွန်ပခင်းနှင့်ဒရနှင့်လ2်စစ်အားလက်လှ်းီသုံးစွဲရန်ိုိုဒကာင်းွန်ပခင်းတို့ဒကကာင့်မိုတွင်း၌ဒနထိုင်ပခင်းကိုိုိုဒကာင်းသည်ဟုဤသုဒတသနှုန်းရှိသည်။အထူးသပဖင့်မိုထဲတွင်ကျူးဒကျာ်ဒနသူျားသည်မိုစွန်တွင်ကျူးဒကျာ်ဒနသူျားထက်ဝန်ဒဆာင်ျားကိုိုိုလက်လှ်းီရယူနိုင်ပခင်းနှင့်ခရီးသွားလာရသည့်အချိန်ိုိုတိုဒတာင်းပခင်းတို့ဒကကာင့်အဒပခအဒနိုဒကာင်းကိုသွားဒရာက်ဒတွ့ဆုံခဲ့ဒသာအိ်ဒထာင်စုျားကဒဖာ်ပါသည်။မိုတ်ရထားစီးဒသာသူျားအတွက်လည်း(၁၆-၇၅)ဒနသာသူျားထက်ဝန်ဒဆာင်ကဲ့သို့ပေးထားသည်။
အီဘန် အိုင် ဒဖာ့ ဘ်စ် ရန်ပဖစ်ဒစ ဒးျားကို ို၍ လက်လှ်းီ သွားလာ နိုင်ကကသလို အကယ်၍ ဒရာဂါတစုတစ်ရာ ပင်ပင်း ထန်ထန် ပဖစ်ခဲ့လ2င်ဒသာ် လည်း ဒကာင်း ကိုယ်ဝန်ဒဆာင်စဉ် ကျန်းာဒရးချို့ တဲ့လ2င် ဒသာ်လည်း ဒကာင်း ဒဆးရုံျားသို ့ လက်လှ်း ဒဆးကုသခံယူနိုင်ပခင်းတို့ သည် မိ့ စွန်တွင် ဒနသည် ျား ထက်ို၍ ဒကာင်းွန်သည်ကို ဒတွ့ရသည်။ လ်းန်းဆက်သွယ်ဒရး ို ဒကာင်း ဒသာ်လည်း မိ့ တွင် ဒနသူ ျား ထဲှ ဒပခာက်ဦးလ2င် တစ်ဦးသာ ၎င်းတို့ ဒနထိုင်ရာ မိ့ နယ်၏ အပင်ကို ထွက်၍ အလု်လု်ရဒသာ်လည်း မိ့ စွန်မိ့ ဖျား ဒနထိုင်သူ ျားကို ဒးပန်းသည့် အခါတွင် သုံးဒယာက်လ2င် တစ်ဒယာက် သည် ့ မိ့ နယ် အပင် ဘက်သိ့ ထွက်၍ အလု်လု်ရသည်ကို ဒတွ့ရှိရှိသည်။ ဤသည် ှာလည်း မိ့ ထဲတွင် ကျူးဒကျာ်ဒနထိုင် သူ အနီးအနားရှိ အလယ်အလတ်တန်းစားရ်ကွက်ျားထဲ အလု်အကိုင်ရရန် အခွင့်အလ်း ိုိုျားပားပခင်းဒကကာင့်လည်း ပဖစ်နိုင်ါသည်။ အလယ်အလတ်တန်းစားရ်ကွက်ျားသည် မိ့ အစွန်အဖျားရှိ ကျူးဒကျာ် ရ်ကွက်ျား၏ အနီးအနားတွင် ရှိတတ်ကကဒ။ ဤသုဒတသနတွင် စက်ဇုန်ျားရှိရာ မိ့ စွန်မိ့ ဖျားတွင် ဒနထိုင်ကကဒသာ် လည်း ဒပဖဆိုသူျားထဲှ ည်သူတစ်ဦးတစ်ဒယာက် 2 စက်ရုံ ျားတွင်ုံှန်အလု် ရှိကကဒ။ ဥာ-စက်ရုံလု်သာျားကို အစား အဒသာက် ဒရာင်းပခင်းပဖင့်သာ အသက်ဒွး ဝ်းဒကျာင်းဒကကာင်း သုဒတသနှ သိရှိရါသည်။ ဦးတည်အု်စုဖွဲ့ ဒဆွးဒနွးွဲျားတွင် ည်သည့်အတွက် ဒကကာင့် စက်ရုံျားတွင် ုံှန်အလု် ျားလု်ကကသနည်းဟူဒသာ ဒးခွန်းကို သုဒတသန ညာရှင်က ဒးပန်းခဲ့ါသည်။ အဒပဖကူ ထိုအလု်ျားကို လက်လှ်းီ ဒကကာင်း၊ ထို ့ အပင် စက်ရုံျားသည်...
မို့ပတိုးချဲ့နယ်သစ်ဒသ 193 လည်း ၁၈နှစ်း၂၅နှစ်အတွင်းကျန်းာဒရးဒကာင်းသည့်အလု်သားျားကိုသာငှားရ်းဒကကကာင်းဒပဖကကကားခဲ့ကကါသည်။မို့စွန်မိုဖျားတွင်ဒနထိုင်သူကျူးဒကျာ်အျာစုသည်သူတို့အချင်းချင်းစားသုံးသည့်ကုန်စည်ျားနင့်ဝန်ဒဆာင်ျားကိုဒရာင်းချပခင်းပဖင့်လည်းအသက်ဒွးကကသည်။

ဤနည်းအပဖင့်မို့စွန်မိုဖျားတွင်ကျူးဒကျာ်ဒနထိုင်သည်“မို့ကကီးအတွင်းျားမိုတစ်ခု”ကဲ့သို့ပဖစ်ဒနမီးဥဒပဖင့်စနစ်တကျထိန်းဒကျာင်းထားပခင်းရှိဒသာအလွတ်သဒဘာစီးွားဒရးစနစ်လည်းရှိဒနသည်။

ထိုကျူးဒကျာ်ျားတွင်စားဒသာက်ကုန်ျားနင့်ကုန်စည်ျားကိုအိ်နီးနားချင်း,ရ်ကွက်တွင်းဒနထိုင်ဒသာအပခားကျူးဒကျာ်ဒနထိုင်သူျားကိုဒရာင်းချသည်ျား,ဒရဒူဒေသူျားနှင့်တရားဝင်ဟုတ်ဒသာအိ်ွဲစားစသပဖင့်အလု်အကိုင်အျားစုကိုလည်းကျုးဒကျာ်ဒနထိုင်ဖန်တီးလျှက်ရှိသည်။

dt:ကျုးဒကျာ်နှင့်မို့ပတိုးချဲ့နယ်သစ်ဒသ အတွက်ရှိခဲ့သည်။
အီဘန် အိုင် ဒဖာ့ (ဘ်စ်) ထက် ုံှန်အလု်အကိုင် အခွင့်အလ်းိုိုအားဒကာင်းဒကကာင်း သုဒတသန၏ ရလ် ျားအရ ဒတွ ့ ရှိရါသည်။ သုဒတသနလု်ခဲ့သည့်မိ့ တွင်းမိ့ နယ်နှစ်မိ့ နယ်လုံးတွင် အလယ်အလတ်တန်းစား လူတန်း ျားအတွက် အကူအညီဒးဒသာ အိ်ဒဖာ်၊ အိ်အကူ၊ လုံပခု ံ ဒရး အဒစာင့်ကဲ့သို ့ ဒသာ အလု်အကိုင်ျားိုိုျားပားသည်ကို ဒတွ ့ ရှိခဲ့ရါသည်။

မိ့ ပအဒပခခံ ဝန်ဒဆာင်ျားကို တိုးချဲ ့ မိ့ သစ်ျားသို ့ တိုးဒးရန် စွ်းနိုင်ဒသာ အစိုးရဒကကာင့် သာက အလု်သွားချိန် ခံစားနိုင်ဒလာက် ဒအာင် အလွန်ကကာပင့်ပခင်းတိ့ ဒကကာင့် အစိုးရ၏ သိုင်းတစ်ဒလ2ာက် အဒလ့အထ အရ ရန်ကုန်မိ့ ထဲှ ကျူးဒကျာ်ျားကို ဖယ်ရှားမီးအစွန်အဖျားတွင် ရှိဒသာ မိ့ သစ်ျားသို ့ ဒနရာချဒးပခင်းသည် ဒရရှည်တည်တံ့ ခိုင်မဲ နိုင်သည်ကိုလက်ရှိဒပပင်ဒGတွင် ပဖစ်ဒG ဒနသည့်အဒပခအဒနျား၊ သတင်းီီယာတွင် ဒရးသားထုတ်လ4င့်ဒနသည် ျားကိုဂျန်နိုင်ငံတကာ ူးဒါင်းဒဆာင်ရွက်ဒရးဌာန (JICA)နှင့် ရန်ကုန်မိ့ ဒတာ်စည်င်သာယာဒရးဒကာ်တီ (YCDC)တိ့ ဟာစီံကိန်းတိ့ သုံးသ်ချက်တိ့ အရ ဒတွ ့ ရှိခဲ့ါသည်။

စနစ်တကျ စုဖွဲ ့ ထားပခင်း ဟုတ်ဒသာ်လည်း ထုံးနည်းစံ ကျ၊ အလွတ် သဒဘာုံစံှာ မိ့ ကကီးဒါင်းျားစွာတွင် ဒတွ ့ ဒနရသည့် စံနန်းပဖစ်မီး အစိုးရက (ဥာအိနUိယ၊ အီဂျစ်) ျားဒသာအားပဖင့် သည်းခံ ဒးထားသည်။ အပခား သို ့ ဒသာ် ပန်ာနိုင်ငံတွင် တပခားနိုင်ငံျားနှင့် တူဲ ကျူးဒကျာ်ျားကို အင်အား သုံးဖယ်ရ�ားပခင်းသည် ကျူးဒကျာ် ျားအတွက် မခိ်းဒပခာက် အနVရာယ်တစ်ခု ပဖစ်ါသည်။ ထို့ ဒကကာင့်င် ဤသုဒတသနတွင် ါဝင် ဒပဖကကားခဲ့သည့် အွဲဒတဆုံးဒသာ ိသားစု ျားှ ၎င်းတိ့ အနာဂတ် အတွက် အကကီးားဆုံးဒသာဒ2ာ်ှန်းချက်ှ အိုးအိ်ဒနထိုင်ခွင့် လုံပခု ံဟု ဒပာပခဲ့ကကသည်။ ကျူးဒကျာ်ရန်
မိုးပတိုးချဲ့သည့်နယ်သစ်ခသားချဲ့ပြိ့ချဲ့သောနယ်သစ်ချဲ့ပြိ့ချဲ့သော နယ်သစ်ချဲ့ပြိ့ချဲ့သောနယ်သစ်ချဲ့ပြိ့ချဲ့သော နယ်သစ်ချဲ့ပြိ့ချဲ့သောနယ်သစ်ချဲ့ပြိ့ချဲ့သော နယ်သစ်ချဲ့ပြိ့ချဲ့သောနယ်သစ်ချဲ့ပြိ့ချဲ့သောနယ်သစ်ချဲ့ပြိ့ချဲ့သော

| 195 |

စဉ်းစားပခင်းသည့်ဆင်ပခင်းတုံးတရားကိုအဒပခခံဒသာဒရွးချယ်တစ်ခုင်ပဖစ်သပဖင့်ဒတွ့ဆုံဒးပန်းခဲ့သည့်ိသားစုဒါင်းျားစွာသည်အိ်လခဒကကာင့်သာယခုလိုကျူးဒကျာ်ပဖစ်လာရဒသည်။

ထင်န်နှန်ရန်နှင့်ဒကျာင်းစရိတ်တတ်နိုင်ရန်ငှားထားသည့်အိ်ှဒရ4့ဒပာင်းမီးကျူးဒကျာ်အပဖစ်ဒနထိုင်ည်လား၊သို့တည်ဟုတ်ဆက်လက်မီးကကီးပင်လာည့်အိ်လချားကိုဒးည်လား၊နှစ်ခုလုံးဒတ်တတ်နိုင်ဒသာအဒပခအဒနတွင်ပဖစ်ဒနဆုံးပဖတ်ချက်ချရည့်ဒနရာသို့ဒရာက်သွားခဲ့သည်။

ယော့အဒပဖကိုဒရွးချယ်လိုက်လင်ထင်န်နှန်၊ဒလ2ာ့စားရပခင်း၊ကဒလးျားကိုဒကျာင်းထုတ်ရပခင်းစသည့်အနတ်သဒဘာဒဆာင်သည့်ပဿနာဒပဖရှင်းသည့်ဟာဗျူဟာျားလိုအ်လာဒည်။

ကျူးဒကျာ်စဉ်းစားဆင်ပခင်ုံကိုနားလည်သဒဘာဒကကာင့်အာဏာိုင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းျားသည်ကျူးဒကျာ်ဒနထိုင်သူျားနှင့်ထိ်တိုက်ပဿနာပဖစ်ဒနည့်အစားကျူးဒကျာ်သူျားနှင့်အတူအဒပဖျားရှာဒဖွရင်းအတူတကွလက်တွဲဒဆာင်ရွက်နိုင်ဒည်။
On the Frontier of Urbanization: Informal Settlements in Yangon, Myanmar

Eben I. Forbes

Yangon is Myanmar’s commercial hub and its magnetism intensifies as the central government’s political and economic reform process gathers steam. Yangon, like Mumbai and India and Shanghai in China, is and will be the driving force for Myanmar’s integration into the global economy. The upsurge in new construction in Yangon’s center and proliferation of industrial zones on its periphery have been a big draw for unskilled in-migrants from rural areas, especially the delta. But do the newly arrived poor find what they seek in Yangon? This paper looks at the situation if Yangon’s poorest residents, the slum dwellers. It explores what happens to hopeful migrants once they have entered the city limits, and along the way it discovers that other poor residents, priced out of the inner-city are also migrating to other parts of Yangon in search of more affordable living situations.

Yangon is the primary city in Myanmar, over 4 times more populous than the next largest city, Mandalay. Yangon is noted for its sprawl: it covers an area equal to that of Bangkok, even while Bangkok is home to nearly 1.5 million more people. The

—I would like to thank Ian Lloyd for his support during the proposal stage of this research, Michael Slingsby for providing advice throughout the research period, Thet Hein Tun for interpretation and help with survey design.
current population of Yangon is 5.2 million, having grown by 0.7 million since 2006, at an average rate of 1.9% per year. But urban growth is accelerating and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) estimates Yangon’s growth rate at 2% from the present day forward. At this rate of growth, Yangon will double in size by the year 2040, catching up with trends across Southeast Asia.

Myanmar is often perceived to be a rural country. Estimates in 2014 put the urban population as between 29 and 34% of the total population. If the 2010s trend of urbanization in Myanmar continues, the urban population will exceed the rural by the year 2040 (the world as a whole crossed this threshold in about 2005). The pace of urbanization is picking up in Myanmar in part due to the recent political and economic opening of the country, which is in 2016 was leading to unprecedented levels of foreign investment as companies began to arrive to take advantage of the “frontier market” with cheap labor and abundant natural resources. Property values have skyrocketed in some parts of Yangon as the supply of available housing and commercial space was not adequate to meet the increased demand brought by internal migrants to the city, along with foreign businesses and their executives. Economic disparity will likely continue to increase as the newly gener-

1Yangon’s population growth peaked at 3.7 percent per year in the period 1939-1951. In the following three decades the rate slowed, but in recent years has been picking up again.
2Japan International Cooperation Agency, Yangon City Development Committee (JICA and YCDC), The Project for the Strategic Urban Development Plan of Greater Yangon, Final Report 1, Part-II The Master Plan, April 2013.
4There are many reasons for the sudden rise in property values: increased demand (due to increased migration and immigration), increase in Foreign Direct Investment, use of land and property as investment in lieu of a stock market, and land speculation, to name a few.
ated wealth will go first to local elites and foreign business partners, even as the cost of living increases for everyone in Yangon. Nonetheless, the new businesses and industries will generate much needed new jobs, which will, in turn, encourage even more people to migrate to Yangon. Given the high rate of poverty and landlessness in many rural areas, it is assured that migration to the city will increase as people seek better opportunities. One recent study shows that until about 2005, many migrants to Yangon were individuals, whereas more recently whole households are likely to migrate, presumably with intentions of more permanent relocation. But with the cost of housing and cost of living in Yangon already high and rising, most migrants to the city settle in the periphery. Informal settlement is already taking place around the sites of industrial estates that are themselves in the peri-urban areas. But for workers who need access to central Yangon or its sub-centers, settlement in peripheral townships results in long commute times which are a huge burden in terms of both time and money, especially given the outdated bus system. According to the Seoul Institute, inner city buses move only 0.5 miles per hour faster than walking speed, on average. Some try to resolve this by squatting in the inner city, but it is clear from history that these squatters will eventually be forced to relocate to the periphery. It will be important to pay attention to how the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC) handles inner-city squatters in the future, as forced relocation may be more difficult for the government to carry out under the new democratic system.

---

7 Win Hlaing Tun, presentation at Seoul Institute Conference, March 2014. Without any intervention, all traffic will come to a virtual stand-still by 2030 or 2040.
The History of Slums

Informal settlements, historically known as slums, have existed for centuries but became much more widespread with the advent of the industrial revolution when factory jobs lured laborers off the farms and into the cities in large numbers. Scholarly treatment of the issue gained traction in the 1960s, first with scholars who blamed the poor for their own inability to access formal housing, and later with scholars who argued that squatting was in fact a rational response to the phenomena of rapid urbanization, migration and the resulting housing shortages. In 1968, John Turner argued in favor of granting land tenure to squatters, contending that the resulting sense of ownership would lead residents to upgrade their own settlements. While this is undoubtedly true, more recently (and after many slum upgrading experiments worldwide), scholars have increasingly questioned whether the formalization of slums is truly in the best interest of residents because titling can increase the value of land beyond the reach of the same socioeconomic group it purports to help. This can happen in two ways. One way is when landlords realize the higher rent earning potential of the newly titled properties and respond by increasing the rent, forcing out tenants who cannot afford the increase. The other way is when existing residents realize that they can only benefit from the rise in value of their newly titled plot by selling it, thus replacing themselves with...
wealthier residents who can afford the higher price and leading to gentrification of the area before long. Hernando de Soto is a well-known advocate for providing full legal title to squatters. His main argument is based on evidence showing that titling greatly increases the market value of squatters’ plots, value that squatters could theoretically use as collateral for bank loans. But for a variety of reasons, this has not worked out in practice. Instead, lending institutions continue to see these residents as too risky, even after titling. As discussed above, a more common result of the sudden granting of full legal tenure is the raising of land values, which are then passed on to tenants, many of whom cannot afford to meet the costs and are displaced in favor of higher income groups. Or, in a process known as “downward raiding,” wealthier outsiders and speculators buy plots from squatters in anticipation of a titling scheme. Meanwhile the original residents will likely squat in a new location, giving rise to a new slum. Other informal settlers may instead resist titling because they (understandably) fear the many costs and responsibilities associated with property ownership: taxes, building code compliance, municipal fees for trash collection, etc.

Slum upgrading (in-situ upgrading of existing informal settlements) and sites and services schemes (government provision of land with access to services), with or without titling, became popular alternatives to public social housing in the 1970s and 1980s. These schemes were embraced by local governments and often financed by the World Bank and other multilateral donors. Sites and services schemes not only cost

---

much less than public social housing, but also give government control over the resettlement location while giving the residents the ability to construct their own dwellings according to their resources and particular needs. But beginning in the 1990s, sites and services schemes came under criticism as benefitting only the better-off within squatter settlements due to elite capture by landlords and land speculators and for being located on land too far from urban centers resulting in burdensomely long commutes. While multilateral donors have funded slum upgrading and housing consistently, bilateral donors’ support has declined dramatically since 1990, in part because of the complexities mentioned above\textsuperscript{12}.

Until the 1960s, slums were considered to be uniform and little attempt was made to differentiate between them, or to create typologies. This has changed. Beginning in the 1960s researchers such as Charles Stokes and John Turner distinguished between “slums of hope” and “slums of despair.” Alejandro Portes went a bit beyond the dichotomy of good and bad slums and observed a “dual community” within the slum where “the ends of downward careers and the beginnings of upward ones coincide within it” (Portes 239). Portes also went to great pains to identify what gives one settlement a neighborly “we-feeling” and another not. In particular, he found that the struggle and dangers endured during an organized “land invasion” by squatters created strong community cohesion and deep psychological investment in the newly claimed territory. Alan Gilbert and Ann Varley observed that titling programs may undermine community solidarity by promoting individualistic solutions to economic and social problems.\textsuperscript{13} Collective or communal titling may be a better

\textsuperscript{12}Michael Shea, \textit{Multilateral and Bilateral Funding of Housing and Slum Upgrading Development in Developing Countries}. Washington, DC: International Housing Coalition, 2008.
solution, but a detailed analysis of this option for urban informal settlements is beyond the scope of this paper.

**Planning for Urbanization: The Role of Government**

Based on the prediction that Yangon's population will increase from its current 5-6 million to at least 10 million by 2040, the recently drafted Yangon Master Plan proposes new areas of urban expansion including new town centers, and major investments in transportation. The Master Plan targets infrastructure, particularly transportation, water supply, and garbage disposal. However, it does not address land use planning which is at a greater level of detail. Land use planning is a process whereby land for low cost housing should be identified for future development. The increasingly unbearable and unrealistic commuting conditions highlight the importance of allocating residential land for low-income workers in the city center. Clearly transportation needs to be improved as well, and the Master Plan has proposed a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system.

Land use planning as a process is still in its infancy in Myanmar, and in Yangon in particular. But YCDC created a planning department and by 2016 had recruited up to 50 new staff, an indication of its commitment to the function. The UN supports YCDC and the Department of Human Settlements and

---


14The Master Plan makes only perfunctory reference to the two new land laws passed in 2012. While these laws will affect central Yangon minimally, the laws will certainly affect the peri-urban areas included in the Master Plan development zone and that are the focus of this proposed study.

15But JICA and YCDC cannot agree on how the BRT system should be built. Naomi Gingold, “Yangon’s Development is Key” *The Irrawaddy*. 11 September 2013.
Housing Development (DHSHD), which is also involved in urban planning.

Since prevention of slum conditions is less costly than upgrading or relocating a slum later, the best policy would be one that prevents the further growth of slums by setting aside sufficient land for low income housing throughout the city. Planning and policy need to be addressed early so that land may be identified for low income communities prior to the influx of squatters and before speculators purchase and re-sell land at higher prices. For example, a minimum plot size of 40 x 60 feet is unrealistic and unaffordable for lower income households.

There is no new legislation to specify what compensation will be given to persons displaced by infrastructure projects such as the ones proposed by JICA. The Land Acquisition Act of 1894, still in effect, stipulates that compensation for compulsory acquisition of land will be made at market value plus thirty percent. However, market value can be difficult to determine in Myanmar where land administration and hence land valuation has been based on tax value rather than market value. A further complication is that the laws do not specify any protection to landholders who lack documentation, even if that land has been in a family for generations. For instance, in a recent land acquisition for an industrial park, farmers who were unable to show documents received only one quarter of the compensation given to farmers with documents.

16"In addition to the market value of the land...the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centrum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition" 23 (2) Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
17Furthermore, compensation should be given not only for the market value but also for the loss of livelihood. Keith, et.al. “Compulsory Acquisition of Land and Compensation”, FAO Land Tenure Studies 10, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organizations of the United Nations, 2009.
Land speculation is one of the biggest problems facing peri-urban Yangon. In Myanmar, land is often held as an investment and a hedge against inflation because financial institutions are not well enough developed to attract and channel domestic savings into more productive sectors. This use of land as investment fuels speculative activity and drives up land prices. In order to control speculation, the government needs to gather precise land-ownership data. The JICA Master Plan is itself very likely to be fueling speculative land purchases within the development zone defined by the Master Plan. For example, in Dala Township, land values doubled after the announcement that it would be the site of a new urban center, and values are now ten times higher than they were two years ago.19

YCDC does not have a long-term plan for its growing squatter population. Nonetheless, YCDC’s plan to establish sub-centers, 6 in all, to reduce the need for travel to the central business district will not only ease traffic for everyone, but also will result in less hardship for the very low income people in the periphery who need better access to health care, education, and marketplaces.

Two governmental bodies, YCDC and DHSHD manage urban land in Yangon. YCDC administers private land and DHSHD administers government land. However, YCDC (as every government department and ministry) owns land that it holds for various actual and anticipated uses. The longstanding practice of the government was to relocate residents from inner-city slums to the periphery. Concerns about urban sprawl led to reassessment of this practice in 2006. From this point higher-density solutions closer to the central business district were considered. Permits for high-rise apartment

buildings were issued, but few for low-income occupancy. Then in mid-2014, DHSHD announced it would address the shortage in low-income housing nationwide, and US$97 million was set aside to build low-cost housing in the 2015-16 fiscal year. Dagon Seikkan Township is slated to be the largest recipient of this housing at 10,080 units. But as of 2016, even the lowest-cost “affordable” units have been sold for about US$20,000 a sum few working class families can afford without an installment plan and/or low-interest loan. DHSHD would do well to consider less costly alternatives to the construction of public social housing units, such as slum upgrading and sites and services schemes. Many authors have noted that the approach of too many national and municipal housing authorities is to clear slums and then build housing. This approach almost never works because the cost is too high for the government, which, in turn, makes the units too expensive to be an option for slum dwellers. A better alternative would be to provide land with access to water, sanitation and electricity and then allow squatters to build their own dwellings. In addition to lower cost, such sites and services schemes allow residents greater control over their living conditions.

One current example of “affordable housing” is the 900 units under construction by DHSHD and Crown Advanced Construction Company in an area adjacent to Ward 67. At US$20,000 each, none of the informal residents of Ward 67 will be able to afford these units, aside from a few Heads of 100 Households. Nonetheless the 1500 informal dwellings that comprise Ward 67 are all scheduled for demolition to make way for similar “affordable housing.” As the Myanmar Times

---

22Wakely and Riley, “Case for Incremental Housing.”
reported, “Some city residents are already dismissing the affordable housing projects as gifts to the rich. The only people who will benefit from them are the construction companies given the contracts to build them, the speculators who snapped up parcels of land around them before they were (publicly) announced, and the select few who will be able to buy units, most of whom will have links to the government.”

**Yangon's Informal Settlements**

Very few informal settlement areas remain in inner-city Yangon, especially in the historical downtown area. Squatters have been removed over years to make way for the development of office buildings, hotels and apartment buildings. The settlements that remain are very small, consisting of only a few households, or they are comprised of port workers, railway workers, or other direct or indirect employees of government who enjoy a de facto tenure security.

Outside the downtown area, the situation is quite different. There are many small pockets of slums (15-60 households) scattered throughout the zone between the inner city and the periphery, an area referred to in this study as the “mid-city.” The largest slum areas (accommodating many hundreds of residents and often one to two thousands) are located in the periphery of Yangon.

Official figures show that only 37,683 of Yangon’s 5,156,646 residents (0.7 percent), are squatters. However, a 2012 estimate suggested that 10 percent of Yangon residents were squatters, about 500,000 people. Up to 3 times as many households in Yangon are not squatters but are still informal in some way. Informality in this latter sense includes homes built on illegally subdivided land, homes in violation of zoning ordinances,

---

23Ibid.
apartments that are unauthorized additions to existing structures, and so forth. But these residents generally face no threat of eviction. In fact, not all squatters are at risk of eviction. When squatters are protected by powerful, well-connected landlords who illegally subdivide their land in order to profit by informally renting parcels, there is little risk of eviction as long as the squatter pays rent on time.

For the purpose of this paper, the term “slum” refers to an informal settlement area where residents not only lack legal claim to their land or housing and lack basic urban services, but also live in precarious conditions and are at risk of eviction. These settlement areas may be very prone to flooding during the rainy season, and due to their crowded conditions, use of highly flammable building materials (e.g., thatched roofs) and use of wood for cooking fuel, they are also prone to fire in the dry season. Typical slum dwellers live in substandard housing with over 5 family members living in a one-room hut (the average in this study was 5.4, compared to the Yangon average of 4.4 members per household). Average hut size is 15 ft. by 20 ft. Conditions may be visibly squalid with open garbage dumps and inadequate latrines resulting in foul odors. Pit latrines are generally used but rarely maintained. Most residents let them fill up until the rainy season when flood waters clear out the latrines’ pits or holding tanks, resulting in very unsanitary conditions.

It should be noted that all dwellings occupying plots that do not have formal title are considered illegitimate in Myanmar. Most, but not all, residents of such dwellings are at risk of eviction. This contrasts with cities in several countries where housing and land informality are the norm and eviction is a very rare exception. Egypt, where over half of all settle-

---

25 From 1985-9 there were 1106 fire outbreaks in these areas which lead to the destruction of 7737 dwellings. JICA and YCDC, section 2, 181.
ments are informal, is an example of such a country. There, the sheer scale of informality puts it beyond the government’s ability to manage it, and additionally, political considerations prevent the government from acting against slum dwellers. In Myanmar, land informality is less widespread, but the vulnerability to eviction of informal settlers is much higher.

In most cities around the world, informal settlements are located on land that is owned by the government. This may be because squatters perceive that public institutions, which have a weaker sense of ownership or opportunity to gain financially from the sale or rental of land, are less likely to evict squatters than private and commercial landowners. It is also not politically expedient for a government to be seen evicting its urban poor when its ministers have made rhetoric about helping the poor, many of whom are also voters. In Yangon, most squatters have also settled on government owned land, simply because government is the largest landowner. But squatting on government land does not make eviction less likely in Myanmar. In fact, the opposite may be the case. Authorities frequently evict squatters from government-owned land. Authorities consider squatters to be “migrants” and not legitimate residents of the city. Also, democracy is very new in the country, and in any case squatters are not likely to be considered an important voting block as many lack the correct documents to be able to vote. In a few areas visited by the researcher, residents lacked formal title or government-authorized tenure, but faced little or no threat of eviction because they were squatting on private land owned by powerful or politically connected landlords. As stated above, these landlords illegally subdivide their land in order to profit by informally renting parcels. There was little risk of eviction for these squatters as long as they paid their rent on time.

\[26\text{ Wakely and Riley, “Case for Incremental Housing.”}\]
In 2016, Hlaing Thayar had the highest total number of informal settlers of any township (16,000 persons according to government figures), and Dagon Seikkan Township had the largest proportion of informal settlements at 7.6 percent of the total township population. But these are official government figures; anecdotal evidence suggests a much higher percentage. Also, the definition of “informal settlement” varies. For instance, in Nagyi Ward in Shwe Pyi Tha Township, UN Habitat has found that 38 percent of all households have legal claim to their land. But this claim is based on tax receipts, not on official title (or lease, if the land is classified as urban/“La Na 39” land) so it is unsure whether these claims will ultimately be respected by the government. There are many gradations of tenure insecurity in Myanmar. Some informal settlers face immediate eviction, while others face no immediate threat and can expect to remain where they are for another decade or more. Most find themselves somewhere in between. But all residents interviewed were keenly aware of their level of tenure security or insecurity, reflecting the fact that eviction was an everyday reality in Yangon, not just a theoretical possibility.

**History of Informal Settlements in Yangon**

In 2014 there was a new effort to create more urban land in the periphery of Yangon. In September 2014, the Mayor of Yangon announced that the city limits would again be expanded, this time by 30,000 acres. The Mayor was attempting to continue a decades-old government practice: to expand the city’s boundaries in order to accommodate new migrants as well as squat-
ters relocated from informal settlements downtown. The military government created 6 new townships in the late 1980s in this fashion: North, South and East Dagon; Dagon Seikkan; Hlaing Thayar and Shwe Pyi Tha. In the 1950s, a similar process had created the townships of South Okkalapa, North Okkalapa and Thaketa. But, in a sign that the old days of decisions taken at high levels without consultation or transparency were coming to an end, public outcries about awarding the contract for the expansion without any transparency or competitive bidding process led the Mayor to suspend the expansion 2 weeks after it was announced. Still, the case is illustrative because even before the Mayor’s plan was made public, land prices surged in the expansion area, and speculators purchased land from farmers. With the new right to sell land handed to farmers by the 2012 Farmland Law, farmers may oblige speculators’ offers in exchange for quick cash and the right to continue farming the land until it is sold to a developer. But of course farmers are not always fully informed about the expected high value of the land, and speculators are poised to make far more money than the farmers.

The rate of rural to urban migration is on the rise and the prospect of Yangon’s population doubling within the next 25 years is disturbing given the current state of urban problems (traffic congestion being only the most obvious). But it should be remembered that during a nearly equivalent period of time, from 1941 to 1965, the city’s population tripled. The area of the city expanded dramatically, and mostly towards the north due to the physical restrictions of rivers and swamps in other directions. The first major slum clearance of inner-city Yangon occurred in the late 1950s. The population of lower Myanmar

29The mayor was acting on the YCDC/JICA “Master Plan” dividing the city into 7 sections. The 30,000 acres in question were to comprise the Southwest section, or “new town.”
had been swelling since the late 19th century due in part to increased production of rice and the corresponding increase in the demand for labor, in the Yangon and delta regions. Following World War Two and independence, many rural areas were affected by political instability and conflict, which resulted in a further influx of people seeking security in the urban centers. Correspondingly, the squatter population also increased. Rangoon’s squatter population, said to be 50,000 in 1951, was over 300,000 by 1958.\textsuperscript{30} While previous governments had hesitated to move squatters involuntarily, the new military regime moved nearly one third of Rangoon’s population to three new satellite townships in the late 50s and early 60s.\textsuperscript{31} Sites-and-services plots were created in the satellite townships of South Okkalapa, North Okkalapa and Thaketa to accommodate the relocation of these squatters. At the time, these townships were at the periphery of the city. UN Habitat reported in 1991, that a total of 60,000 plots were provided, and although they suffered from inadequate services, especially drainage and sanitation, they had merged into the socio-economic fabric of the city.\textsuperscript{32} The Housing Department attempted to replicate the squatter clearance and relocation of the late 1950s in the late 1980s, by which time the proportion of squatters in the inner city had again reached the levels of the late 1950s. But this second relocation seems to have been more rushed and more politically motivated that its predecessor. In the wake of the 1988 crackdown on political dissent, squatters living around pagodas and monasteries (which were staging points for protests) were forcefully relocated to the


new townships at the urban fringe. Although there are no publicly available official figures, it has been estimated that 450,000–500,000 people were relocated from the city center.

Six townships were created by the military government in the late 1980s to resettle squatters relocated from downtown Yangon: North, South and East Dagon; Dagon Seikkan; Hlaing Thayar and Shwe Pyi Tha. A total of 97,730 plots were created in these new townships, as well as in existing townships. Not all residents of the new towns were involuntarily relocated. Civil servants were awarded plots of land for long years of service; investors purchased luxury housing in gated communities such as FMI City in Hlaing Thayar. But many squatters, victims of fires and middle-class people evicted from their homes suffered great hardship in their new semi-rural locations lacking basic amenities.

In 1991 UN Habitat noted these new resettlement locations were on low-lying ground and adjacent to major waterways, making them subject to seasonal flooding. This created an ongoing hygiene problem still observed today, where pit and septic tank latrines flood in the rainy season, and contaminated water flows into residential plots. Nonetheless, in 1991 UN Habitat postulated that the overall resettlement program was “potentially promising” and that if the new settlements were “sensitively handled by a government which recognizes the role of community participation and acknowledges the urgency of remedial priority actions and the importance of self-

33Myanmar is not the first country to use eviction as a means to political ends. The most famous in the history of urban planning might be that effectively carried out by Baron Haussmann in Paris in the 19th century. There are many more recent examples, such as the Dominican Republic under the leadership of Balaguer in the late 1980s.


36UN Habitat Human Settlements.
sustaining operations and maintenance systems, the new townships could develop into balanced and well-managed communities.” In the section on Dagon Seikkan below, the researcher will consider this prognosis in light of the current conditions found in that township.

Much more detailed data is needed about informal settlements in all townships generally, but perhaps especially peri-urban areas which are relatively new and growing the fastest. The situation is further complicated because cadastral maps and land title registers have not been kept up to date with the fast rate of change in these areas of population influx. While the Farmland Law 2012 is addressing title in rural areas (farmland), no new legislation or other initiative is targeting urban areas, and those living in the fast growing periphery face the greatest risks of eviction by lacking formal title.

Methodology for Field Research

This research is based on analysis of secondary sources, interviews of experts and YCDC authorities, household surveys and focus group discussions. Surveys and individual interviews included 51 individuals (not including focus group discussion participants). These were 5 experts and authorities, 6 key informants, and 40 residents. The researcher met weekly with the Department of Urban Planning at YCDC during most of the 10-week period of intensive field research (December 2014–February 2015). Follow-up research was conducted sporadically through February 2016 to ensure the currency of the original findings.

During the field visit to Yangon from December 2014, approximate locations of informal settlements and resettlement areas were determined in consultation with YCDC staff, NGOs and independent researchers, and through use of Google

\[37\] Ibid., 64.
Earth satellite images. These images were extremely useful in identifying possible informal settlements especially in the mid-city areas where they were hidden amongst formal settlements. Satellite images revealed the lack of a street grid and smaller size of dwellings, both telltale signs of informal settlements. The contrast between the formal and informal areas was clearly visible in the satellite images. These locations were then verified on the ground before beginning the process of selecting study areas.

The criteria for selection for informal settlement areas for this study were as follows:
- The majority of residents are squatters (land informality)
- Majority of households are in the lowest income bracket
- Residents lack access to government-provided basic services (water, sewerage, electricity, waste disposal)
- Households are under threat of eviction

All interviews took place in squatter areas within the 2015 city limits. The formal and informal settlement areas just outside the city limits were outside the scope of this study. However, these rapidly growing areas include villages that are now functionally part of the city, as well as new settlements encroaching on agricultural land can also be considered part of Yangon’s periphery.

The researcher conducted 42 interviews in December 2014 and February 2015. All interviews for this study were conducted personally by the researcher with the assistance of an interpreter. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 38 households, following a standard questionnaire with a varying sequence of questions, with the addition of informa-

---

38 The author continues to be grateful to the 38 households which invited him into their homes for interviews that lasted over one hour each. He was not turned away by a single household, in spite of not offering any compensation, or any direct benefits as a result of participation.
tion and themes brought up by respondents, and not pursuing questions that respondents were reluctant to answer.

Table 1: Locations visited in January and February 2015:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Township</th>
<th>No. of households interviewed</th>
<th>Total households in selected areas (estimate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dagon Seikkan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hlaing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaketa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>60, 30, 20 (three areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamayut</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hlaing Thayar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questionnaire consisted of multiple sections covering basic information about the household (no. of persons in the household, ages, relationships, etc.), condition of housing (floor area, latrine, cooking area, informal payments, relationship to the builder), migration (place of origin, number of years in current house, threat of eviction), employment, debt and coping strategies, level of access to basic services, healthcare, and education.

In addition to the individual household interviews in the table above, three focus group discussions where held: one within an informal neighborhood in Dagon Seikkan, another in Hlaing Thayar, and a third in a semi-formal neighborhood in Hlaing. Interviews of key informants in the study areas included the Ward Administrator and two Heads of 100 Households in Dagon Seikkan, two Heads of 10 Households in Thaketa, one Head of 10 Households in Kamayut, and members of the YCDC Township office in Hlaing. Key informants at the central level included the Director of Urban Planning at YCDC and an Assistant Director. In addition, the researcher met with representatives of several NGOs and international organizations working with the urban poor in Yangon (UN Habitat, WFP, UNICEF, Pyoe Pin, Save the Children, Free Funeral Service
Society, Women for the World, Yangon Heritage Trust, Green Lotus, and Going Forward Together). The researcher met weekly with the Director of Urban Planning at the Yangon City Development Committee and urban-poverty specialist Michael Slingsby (formerly of UN Habitat) who had lived and worked in Yangon for many years.39

**Challenges and Limitations**

The emphasis was on qualitative research. The sample size was too small for significance in quantitative research. Qualitative research cannot provide reliably generalizable results. A second phase of adding quantitative research to the qualitative research which forms the basis of this paper is in development.

There is a grave lack of literature in urban studies on Yangon. Very little has been written about urbanization in Myanmar generally. For this reason, this study relied greatly on primary sources, particularly household surveys and interviews with experts. Sources of demographic data included the UN-managed Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) website, the 2014 Census (conducted by the Ministry of Population and Migration with support from UNFPA), the Project for the Strategic Urban Development Plan of the Greater Yangon (better known as the YCDC/JICA City Master Plan), and additional data given by YCDC.

Demographic data from MIMU and from the Census was available down to the township level, but at the time of writing, ward and village level data was not yet available. For the ward level, the researcher was given access to some YCDC data, but it was given by township and ward officials without verification by headquarters. Unfortunately, few township and ward level officials would freely admit to a large number of

---

39 All ethical guidelines set out by Harvard University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects, which approved the research proposal, were followed.
squatters in their jurisdiction as this could reflect poorly on their administration. Furthermore, commonly Ward Administrators were involved in attracting squatters by turning a blind eye, or even colluding with informal real estate agents on illegitimate sales and rentals. Due to these informal business interests, some Ward Administrators may have concealed the true number of squatters under their jurisdiction. While independent verification of the YCDC data was beyond the scope of this study, the numbers of squatters by ward and township appeared to be greatly underestimated in some cases.

Another challenge of this topic is its condition of continuous change. When this research study was first conceived, in October 2013, the researcher assumed he would be able to study slums located in or very close to the Central Business District. But by the time of field research in January 2015, those slums had nearly all been cleared. The informal settlement areas chosen for this study may no longer exist when and if this researcher, or another researcher, has the opportunity for follow-up research.

Findings on the Periphery:
Dagon Seikkan and Hlaing Thayar Townships

Two periphery townships were included in the research: Dagon Seikkan and Hlaing Thayar. They are roughly equidistant from the central business district, Dagon Seikkan being about 8 miles northeast of the city center and Hlaing Thayar being about the same distance to the northwest.

Dagon Seikkan has a convoluted history beginning about 1991, when DHSHD appropriated land from farmers and gave it to Motion Picture Association members, apparently to reward the Association’s past loyalty (and in expectation of future loyalty) to government interests. Initially 350 plots (60 x 40 feet) were granted on a 60-year lease, but without services (water, electricity, etc.). The evicted farmers, dispossessed of
their farmland, were entitled to housing plots as compensation, but in practice local officials accepted bribes in exchange for granting the plots to outsiders as well. At the same time, a few much larger plots were also created for former Army generals (100 x 100 feet). But a short time later, DHSHD attempted to relocate these new grantees in order to build the ASEAN Hotel. Some accepted the relocation, some declined and received compensation of 200,000 kyats instead, and still other refused to move. The 11 grantees who refused to move were ultimately allowed to stay, as the hotel project was never realized. The other grantees sold or rented their plots (some informally subdivided). When the ASEAN Hotel project was abandoned, some of the evicted farmers were allowed to return as renters. Squatters evicted from the city center began to settle on vacant lands, and around this time the government ceased collecting rent from the farmers. A Head of 100 Households estimated that by 2005 there were 500 dwellings, by 2010 1,570, and in 2014 about 3,500 houses. Almost all were informal, and many were built and rented out by the Heads of 100 Households who function as informal landlords and real-estate developers, with the apparent complicity of the Ward Administrator. Development unfolded on a first-come, first-serve basis like settlers on a frontier. Those who arrived later had to buy or rent from the squatters who came before.

**Dagon Seikkan**

Dagon Seikkan Township (pop. 120,000) is one of Yangon’s fastest growing periphery areas. The township has the highest proportion of informal settlements against the total township population, at 7.6 percent according to government figures. The length of time in residence of the households in this

---

41YCDC, 2012.
survey, which focused on Ward 67, varied widely from a few months to 18 years. All were squatting on YCDC land. The surveyed households reported migrating from rural and urban areas in equal numbers. Many moved from Dawbon or Thaketa Township (townships closer to Yangon center) when development in those townships has caused rents to rise. Some were evicted from Thaketa, some were priced out of the rental market, and others had to give their land to a moneylender when they could not pay their debts. Most of the migrants from rural areas came from the Ayeryawaddy Delta; at least a few of these displaced by Cyclone Nargis in 2008.

At the time of writing, eviction notices were being issued because DHSHD has plans to build “affordable housing” on the site, as it was already doing in adjacent sites. None of the households interviewed will be able to afford a unit of this affordable housing. Nonetheless all 1500 informal dwellings that comprise the research ward in Dagon Seikkan were scheduled for demolition to make way for similar affordable housing. There was evidence of new construction of informal dwellings in early 2015, in spite of repeated issuance of eviction notices in some parts of the ward. It seems that the new occupants were hoping that by erecting a structure, they would be able to claim a share of any compensation or relocation assistance offered by the government.

Some evictions have already been carried out. In early 2014, 50–60 homes were demolished in what appeared to be a pilot eviction or simply a warning to prepare other residents for evictions on a much larger scale. In January 2015, during the period of this field research, about 560 people from 140 homes were evicted in the adjacent Ward 168. But the futility of these evictions became immediately apparent when many of the evictees erected temporary shelters—tarps held up with poles—on the same site the next day. Others were absorbed
into other parts of the ward or adjacent wards. It is unknown whether some moved to other Yangon townships or outside the city limits.

Perhaps aware of the serious complications arising from evictions, DHSHD has been working with NGO Women for the World in Dagon Seikkan. In a non-financial arrangement, the NGO carried out a survey of 200 households. The purpose of the survey was be to determine which squatters have been in residence the longest, and therefore should be spared from eviction or given compensation. It could be that DHSHD recognized that squatters were more trusting of community-based organizations than of government. In addition to having greater trust of the communities they represent, these organizations, close to the community, could better advocate for solutions benefiting residents.

According to the YCDC Urban Planning Unit, a relocation site had been selected, but it was both smaller and further away from the central Yangon than the current Ward 67. Furthermore, only squatters in residence for 10 years or longer would be considered for resettlement. No services would be provided at the new site, but title would be given in the form of a 30- or 60-year lease.42

**Hlaing Thayar**

Hlaing Thayar is reputed to be the fastest growing township in Yangon in terms of both formal and informal settlement populations. It is already the most populous township in Yangon with nearly half a million residents and has the highest squatter population of any township (YCDC gives a figure of 16,000 persons, but the actual number is likely to be far greater). Hlaing Thayar Township was created in 1993 to house

---

42Interview with Dr. Toe Aung, Director of Urban Planning, YCDC, January 2015.
squatters relocated from downtown Yangon. But the residents never got proper access to water and sanitation. Most have not received any documentation of land use rights, making them vulnerable to eviction. Taken as a whole, Hlaing Thayar seems to have a “wild west” quality—a highly dynamic township with as many perils as opportunities. Exclusive gated communities are adjacent to squatter areas large and small. Little community sentiment is apparent in the township, even in the informal areas, perhaps owing to the recent and highly mobile population, and the wealth inequalities observed.

Wealth inequality is not only a feature of the peri-urban townships on the whole, but also within the informal settlements of Hlaing Thayar and Dagon Seikkan. The standard of living is much higher for residents who control water supply sources (wells, pumps and distribution networks), as well as for those who control sources of electricity such as generators. Heads of 100 Households have a financial advantage over their neighbors due to profits from informal real estate transactions. Greater wealth is also visible among those who reside alongside the main roads in the settlement as these huts double as shops and workshops that sell goods and services to other residents in the area. These services include professional lending. Several interviewees reported taking loans from these roadside residents; a fairly lucrative business given the standard 20% monthly interest charged by professional lenders. None of this should be a surprise, as such inequalities are a reflection of the larger society, and these large informal settlement areas can best be thought of as “cities within the city.” But the observation is included here to refute any presuppositions that slums are uniformly poor. Also, wealth inequality has been linked to social tensions.\(^\text{43}\) By contrast, social cohesion was observed in

the “mid-city” informal areas studied, and is discussed in the relevant section below.

Migration from the rural Ayeryawaddy Delta has been largely responsible for the population growth in Hlaing Thayar. This migration increased after Cyclone Nargis ravaged the delta in 2008. Many of the migrants ended up in informal settlements here, some hundreds of times larger than the small “pocket” slums seen in mid-city townships. Some have sprung up nearly overnight. The researcher examined Google Earth historical imagery dating back to 2007, and noticed an apparent “land invasion” that occurred between 7 and 15 November 2013.  

On the former date, open fields are seen. Days later, hundreds of squatters have moved in. By moving en masse, squatters may be relying on the security of numbers to make evictions technically and political difficult. In case of this settlement in Hlaing Thayar, it is likely that the open fields had a single owner who invited a large-scale influx of new informal rent-paying tenants. So the landlord too, benefits from this

---

Figure 1: Satellite images of Hlaing Thaya before and after Nov 2013

---

The term “land invasion” typically describes an organized movement of squatters onto low-value public land. The practice was especially common in Latin America during the 1960s-80s.
security in numbers. Interviews with key informants on the ground confirmed that around 500 households moved into the area at one time. During household surveys in other parts of Hlaing Thayar there were anecdotal accounts of local political aspirants organizing such “land invasions” to garner political support among a large number of local residents.

Evictions were also carried out regularly and sometimes on a massive scale in Hlaing Thayar. On 15 January 2014, 4000 huts built by squatters in Hlaing Thayar were demolished under orders of the divisional government. The rapid cycle of squatting and eviction in this township creates many challenges, including for researchers; it is difficult to research such a fast-moving target. But Hlaing Thayar’s dynamism makes it an ideal place to study the motivations behind migration today in Myanmar, and other researchers have been looking at the “push and pull” factors that underlie the migration to Hlaing Thayar from rural areas. But not all the new migrants are from rural areas. Some are squatters who were cleared from the inner city, and others were formerly formal owners and renters who were priced out of the inner city due to the rising rents and cost of living there.

The poster pictured in Figure 2 is frequently seen on the front of squatters’ homes in Hlaing Thayar. It refers to the 2008 Constitution, which allowed citizens to move from one part of the country to another without having to request permission (Chapter VIII, Article 355: “Every citizen shall have the right to settle and reside in any place within the Republic of the Union of Myanmar according to law”). Residents seem to believe it provides some measure of protection against eviction,

although the 2008 Constitution does not authorize squatting or illegal subdivision.

A recent informal study by UN Habitat also tentatively found that Hlaing Thayar has the highest occurrences in Yangon of disease related to poor environmental conditions and lack of water & sanitation facilities (diarrhea, dysentery, malaria and tuberculosis). Hlaing Thayar has the highest occurrences of diarrhea among all Yangon townships. It also ranks 2\textsuperscript{nd} for malaria and 3\textsuperscript{rd} for dysentery.

According to the YCDC/JICA Master Plan (2013), Hlaing Thayar had 868 factories and workshops, second-highest among the 39 Yangon townships. Most industrial zones were created in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and were located in periphery townships like Hlaing Thayar. The factory jobs are one of the “pull factors” that lure migrants from rural areas, especially landless farm laborers whose work is very seasonal. The prospect of a job that offers stable employment year-round is very appealing to this group who have little or no income for many months of the year on the farms. It is no wonder that they would choose to squat near to the factories to avoid high travel costs. A recent study in neighboring Htantabin Township interviewed factory workers who regarded their new jobs as “clean” (than`) and more “civilized” (yin kyay”) compared to having to work in the muddy fields under the rain or under the
Yet, this research found only a small minority of squatters benefitted directly from factory jobs. None of the respondents in this study had a regular, formal factory job, and few even knew of someone in their ward who held such a job. One woman interviewed worked temporarily at a factory; another sold food to factory workers. Respondents said that factory jobs had a minimum educational requirement that put these jobs beyond their reach, or that factories only hired workers between the ages of 18–25 and in perfect health. So although the new industrial zones attract migrants they do not seem to be supplying the hoped-for regular jobs. Instead, most informal residents of Hlaing Thayar only benefit indirectly, by providing services sold to factory workers such as ready-made food.

Findings in the “Mid-City”: Thaketa and Hlaing Townships

Thaketa and Hlaing townships are located neither in the inner city, nor in the periphery, but rather somewhere in between, in what this researcher has termed the “mid-city.”

Thaketa Township

Thaketa Township is geographically close to downtown Yangon, situated just to the east, although access is somewhat inhibited due to having to cross the Panzudaung Creek by bridge. The township was formed when the government relocated squatters from the inner city in the late 1950s and 1960s. The relocation programs at that time were relatively well managed: 30- and 60-year leases were given to many residents, and services were provided in some places. Decades later, a new generation of squatters is springing up. As rents and cost of living rise in Thaketa, many households are being “priced

---

“out” of the rental housing market and are ending up as squatters within their native township. Historical imagery from Google Earth shows that many of these squatter areas came into existence during the same time period that rents doubled.

The researcher visited 3 informal areas in Thaketa. All 3 areas were relatively small in size, comprising between 30 and 60 households each, and all were built on YCDC land. The researcher and translator found a noticeable sense of community unity in these three areas, perhaps owing to their small size and longer-term residence (average of 8½ years in the location). Most of the squatters were originally from Thaketa itself, which may have helped create affinity. The threat of eviction was relatively low due to good relations with the local authorities. Elsewhere this threat can create divisions where longer-term squatters feel they have more rights than the recent arrivals. Finally, it may be that a greater communal sense is possible in a neighborhood where incomes are more or less equal. As previously discussed, the larger periphery settlements had a greater variation in income. Wealthier residents include the Heads of 100 Households, the owners of wells and electrical generators, and residents along major roads having home-based businesses.

Figure 3: Informal settlements in Thaketa, 2007 (L) and 2015 (R)
The sense of community here was observable in several ways. Most obvious was the way that neighbors visited each others’ huts during the interviews. During the interviews, it was revealed that small loans were sometimes given between neighbors with no or very little interest. In Thaketa Area A, the Head of 10 and Head of 100 Households (latter is outside the community) had helped residents by providing them a formal address for purposes like school matriculation. In Area B, the Head of 100 Households, supported by the Heads of 10 Households, have taken responsibility for cleaning the area and drain clearing, by organizing volunteers. In contrast, Heads of 10 and 100 Households on the periphery seemed adept at leveraging benefits from their positions, but without carrying out any of the community responsibilities of their positions, aside from occasional dispute resolution between neighbors. Possible explanations for the difference are that the study areas in Thaketa were much smaller in size that those in Hlaing Thayar, and also they were older and more stable: the squatters in Thaketa averaged 11 years in their current location versus 5 years in Hlaing Thayar. Due to the much larger size and higher turnover of the population in Hlaing Thayar, the informal settlement areas were less cohesive and the Heads of 100 Households were correspondingly less concerned with the well-being of residents.

Another advantage to squatters in mid-city areas was the availability of water pirated from the municipal supply. In Thaketa Area B for instance, the municipal water supply was right in front of the informal settlement, so access to water was both easy and free. The reservoir, about 100 yards square and 50 feet deep, was the primary water source for 5 wards in Thaketa. The water appeared very clean, containing abundant aquatic flora, and some households drank the water without boiling. This was in contrast to the periphery townships, where
most water was delivered by two paid services: drinking water in large bottles at 200 to 400 kyats per day and washing water in barrels at 400 to 600 kyats per day. A little known fact in the formal community is that the cost of water is less for formal households than for informal households in peripheral areas, because in such areas water has to be carted in containers, which is very inefficient and adds the cost of carriage to the cost of the water.

In Thaketa it was easy to observe that the decision to squat is a rational choice in the vast majority of cases: almost all households interviewed here were squatting as a direct result of rising rents. They reached a decision point—they could either move out and become squatters in order to continue to have enough food and be able to pay school fees, or they could continue paying rent, but not both. If they chose the latter, then negative coping strategies would have been necessary—cutting back on food, keeping children out of school, and so forth.

_Hlaing_

Hlaing is unlike the other townships selected for this study. It is not a resettlement township, but is part of the original city of Yangon. Another “mid-city” township, it is located north of the city center, between Inya Lake and the Hlaing River. The site chosen for interviews is located around an abandoned waste water treatment plant on land owned by Ministry of Education. A distinguishing feature of this area is that it is located very near the railway station, which allows commuting to the central business district within half an hour. To put this in perspective, the trip would be well over an hour by car, due to traffic. In spite of this convenient transportation option, the most common job was laundering clothes and housecleaning in the adjacent middle class apartment buildings. In the survey
sample, 5 individuals were working in the adjacent middle class apartment buildings, 4 were working outside the ward, and 3 were working inside the informal settlement area itself.

The authorities cleared this area every April, at which time residents would temporarily flee to the periphery (Hlaing Thayar), but would come right back as soon as it was safe to do so. The shacks were made of inexpensive materials so they could be erected again without great expense. In addition to the annual clearance by YCDC, the non-resident informal landlords operating there threatened to evict non-payers. There were two informal landlords operating in the 40 household area.

Key Findings
There is a long history of migration from the countryside to the city in Yangon as in most other cities. The factors pushing rural dwellers towards Yangon include the poor economic conditions of landless farmers in the countryside who have suffered stagnating wages and seasonal unemployment. These migrants come to Yangon seeking more stable, year-round employment. Some have also fled drought or environmental disaster. For instance, in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, many former delta residents fled their homes and farms and sought safety, food, shelter, and new livelihoods in Yangon. Given that landlessness was also high in the delta, it is unsurprising that 4 of 7 households interviewed in Hlaing Thayar originated from the delta. Some have also come seeking improved healthcare and education which can also be considered “pull factors.”

Most migrants from the inner city to the periphery in this study were former inner-city residents who were pushed out by rising rents or eviction. To a lesser extent there are also “pull factors” at play, as when inner-city residents are attracted by factory jobs located on the periphery. Of course
not all migrants to Yangon’s periphery are squatters. Some are formal residents who could no longer afford rising downtown rents, and found cheaper rents in the periphery. Others had sold the family home, often after the death of parents, for needed cash. There are even wealthy residents who, seeking to escape the chaos of downtown, move to gated communities in the periphery, such as the housing estate built by First Myanmar Investment (FMI Garden Development) which is adjacent to a large informal settlement area in Hlaing Thayar.\footnote{FMI Garden Development is a self-described “master-planned gated community” housing 7,000 residents.}

The households interviewed in periphery townships were more likely to originate from rural locales. In particular Hlaing Thayar had many migrants from the delta, presumably due to proximity. The most frequent reason cited for migrating was to seek better employment. The majority of households interviewed in mid-city townships originated from inner city areas. The push factors of eviction and rising rents predominated in Thaketa, while the pull factors of better work, healthcare and education predominated in Hlaing.

Migration was somewhat more frequently the result of events that occurred in the place of origin (government relocation/slum clearance, poor conditions or natural disaster in the rural area, etc.) rather than by factors that would normally attract or “pull” rural dwellers into the city: employment prospects, better access to services, and so forth. Nonetheless, all townships studied presented a mixed picture of urban and rural origins and both pull and push factors were at play in motivating migration.

This research also finds the inner city as preferable because of the better transportation options and improved access to water and electricity supply, when pirated from the municipal networks. Specifically, mid-city slum dwellers faring
Table 2: Push and Pull Factors for Rural and Inner-City Emigrations to the Periphery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural Emigration to Urban Periphery</th>
<th>Inner-City Emigration to Urban Periphery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Push Factors</strong></td>
<td>Drought and natural disaster</td>
<td>Eviction, slum clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land loss / Landlessness</td>
<td>Rising rents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seasonal unemployment</td>
<td>Resettlement of civil servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pull Factors</strong></td>
<td>Regular, year-round employment</td>
<td>Perceived demand for factory labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived demand for factory labor</td>
<td>Cheaper land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Village-based migration networks and improved communications between village and city (mobile phones)</td>
<td>Cheaper rent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved healthcare</td>
<td>Cheaper rent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

better than their counterparts in the periphery due to better access to services and shorter commute times held true for the households interviewed. The improved transportation in the mid-city townships was the result of access to the circular train line in Hlaing Township which cut travel time to the central business district by more than half. Even those who did not use the train had better access to marketplaces (for either selling their wares, or sourcing wholesale goods) and hospitals (in the case of serious illness, complicated pregnancies, etc.) than did their counterparts on the periphery. Interestingly, despite the better transportation options, only about 1 in 6 of the mid-city respondents travelled outside their township for work, whereas the figure was about 1 in 3 for respondents in the periphery. This is due to mid-city squatters having more opportunities for work in adjacent middle-class neighbor-

\[\text{Table modified from Boutry “From Rural to Urban poverty.”}\]
hoods. Middle class neighborhoods were not in such close proximity to informal settlement areas in the periphery. On the other hand, access to clinics and schools was mostly the same for each location.

None of the respondents had a regular factory job in the periphery despite of the presence of industrial zones there. The research found many who could be said to be benefitting indirectly from the presence of these industrial zones and their workers, by vending food to factory workers, for example. In focus group discussions, the researcher posed the question of why there were not more people working regular factory jobs. The response was that these jobs have a minimum educational requirement that puts these jobs beyond their reach and that factories only hired workers between the ages of 18 to 25, and in perfect health. The informal settlement on the periphery was like a “city within the city,” with its own informal economy. Much of employment was generated by the informal settlement itself: water distributors, money lenders and informal real estate brokers were at work, and vendors sold produce and goods to other squatters in neighborhood markets. In fact the financially better-off squatters engaged in precisely these activities. They owned the wells and pumps and enjoyed a local monopoly on water. They lent money to other squatters, a service for which there was continuous demand. So, while the industrial zones may attract migrants seeking regular year-round employment, this research casts doubt on whether the zones are meeting expectations with the actual supply of regular jobs. Instead, the results of this research suggest that proximity to middle-class neighborhoods was more strongly correlated with steady employment opportunities for this population than is proximity to factories. In both of the mid-city townships studied, there was a high incidence
of employment in helper jobs for middle-class residents; maids, security guards and the like.

The small size, long history, and resulting neighborly sensibility of the inner-city settlements make them more conducive to communal title. Eviction would be traumatic for the residents, and also bad for YCDC’s relationship with the public. And eviction only leads to squatting in another location. The evicted squatters lose not only their homes, but usually also their livelihood. Finally, evictions of informal businesses (micro-businesses such as vendors, tea stalls, etc.) that happen to be located on the contested land can be just as devastating as evictions of informal dwellings.

The historical practice of the government was to clear squatters from inner city Yangon and relocate them to the new towns at the periphery. This practice is not sustainable due to government’s inability to extend basic urban services to the extension areas and due to increasingly unbearable commute times. This was validated through direct observation of conditions on the ground, media coverage, and through analysis of the JICA/YCDC City Master Plan. Commute times were lengthened by the government’s 2012 decision to reduce import tariffs on automobiles, increasing the number of cars on the road by many-fold without any commensurate improvement of public transportation services. Construction of flyovers was undertaken after the fact, but the traffic situation is due to worsen over the following 10 years before any improvements are seen, even if all the remedial measures proposed by JICA in the JICA/YCDC City Master Plan, such as establishment of bus rapid transit, are implemented.

Conclusions
Unlike other countries (e.g., India, Egypt) where informality was the norm in many cities and largely tolerated by government, eviction was a constant threat in Myanmar. For this
reason, all but the most destitute households in this study stated that tenure security was their highest aspiration for the future. The decision to squat was usually a rational choice: many households interviewed were squatters simply as a result of rising rents. The decision point for many came when they could either move out and become squatters with enough food and able to pay school fees, or they could continue paying rent, but not both. If they chose the latter, then negative coping strategies would have become necessary—cutting back on food, keeping children out of school, and so forth. Understanding their logic can help authorities to work with squatters rather than at odds with them, in the search for solutions.

While local media reveals that eviction normally results in squatting by the same people at new locations, other aspects of informal settlements are much less obvious. Upgrading a slum, for instance, can lead to rise in the land value which creates risk of elite capture by slumlords (informal landlords) who may simply raise the rent when a slum area is upgraded, forcing the poorest renters to move. Along the same lines, the offer of a relocation package to long-term squatters can lead to a sudden increase in squatting in the same area by new squatters who think they can get in on the deal. There can be unintended consequences to every decision taken on informal settlements, so planners must carefully think through all scenarios before acting, and must implement safeguards to mitigate unintended consequences. When eviction is not an imminent threat, then titling is not likely to be the top priority for very poor households. Instead the poorest households will be more concerned about job security and access to enough food and water. Once households have achieved a minimum level of income and access to basic services, they may prioritize titling as their most important aspiration.
References


Kempel, Susanne and Aung Tun. “Myanmar Ward and Village Tract Administrator Elections 2016: An Overview of the Role, the Laws


About the Authors:

**Wen-Chin Chang** is Research Fellow at Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, RCHSS, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. She is an anthropologist and has conducted extensive fieldwork in Burma, Thailand and Yunnan. Her interest in this frontier area, composed of multi-polities, multi-ethnicities, and continuous tension and creation of diverse cultures. She takes the perspective from below in writing ethnography of lives, of individualities, and of a migrant group beyond borders. She has published many journal articles, two co-edited books: *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia* and *Burmese Lives: Ordinary Life Stories under the Burmese Regime* and a monograph: *Beyond Borders: Stories of Yunnanese Migrants of Burma*.

ရဲဟိန်းအာင် is the Editor-in-Charge of the Yangon-based *Myanmar Cultural Research Journal*.

**SiuSue Mark** is a doctoral candidate with the research group Political Economy of Environment, Resources and Population at the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University, the Hague. She has been living in Myanmar since 2008 and working on the country’s land reform issues since 2011.

**Saw Eh Htoo** has been working as independent local consultant for aid agencies and local organizations since 2011. He received a Master of Arts in Anthropology from the University of Yangon and Master of Arts in Christian Studies from Myanmar Institute of Theology. His primary research interests and advocacy works are socio-cultural, peace building and rural development. He has conducted fieldwork in Rakhine State, Chin State, Shan State, Bago Region and Kayin.
State. Currently, he is working as Executive Director at Kaw Lah Foundation, a local NGO in Myanmar.

**Dr. Ne Lynn Zaw** graduated from the Institute of Medicine II in 2006. He opened and operated a small clinic in the suburb of Moulmein between 2006-2016.

**Mollie Pepper** is pursuing a Ph.D. in sociology at Northeastern University. Her work focuses on gender and violence in the context of armed conflict and peacebuilding, with particular focus on transitional societies. Pepper’s dissertation examines the role of ethnic women’s organizations in Burma/Myanmar’s ongoing political transition. Past work experience, including time as a humanitarian aid worker on the Thailand-Burma border, informs her research. She holds a MA in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, Tufts University. Forthcoming work includes a chapter on children displaced by conflict in Burma in *The Realities of Children in Armed Conflict: Theory, Method, and Practice* edited by Myriam Denov and Bree Akesson.

**Eben I. Forbes** is an independent consultant and researcher on urban poverty and land issues, based in Yangon, Myanmar. He began his career in New York, working for the city government as a housing specialist for homeless adults. Years later he earned his master’s degree in International Affairs from Columbia University. In 2003, he moved overseas to work with the urban poor in India, Nicaragua and then Myanmar where he was Program Officer with UN Habitat’s Land Administration and Management Program from 2010-2014. The article presented here is the outcome of a year-long research fellowship with Harvard Kennedy School’s Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation.
A Note on Sources and Citation:

Academic articles include a reference to the sources their facts, information and quotations. These appear so that the reader can look up further information on the topic, but also so that the reader can examine the facts on which the author based the article and evaluate for him or herself whether to be convinced by the author’s argument.

Academic citations have two parts: a part that appears in the body of the paragraph and a list of all the references at the end of the article. Articles can use one of two different citation styles. The author-date system is used in many Social Science articles, and the footnote system is used in many Humanities articles.

In the author-date system, the last name of the author (or full Burmese name) appears in parenthesis followed by the year of the publication at the end of a sentence, like this (Than Tun 1978). The reader can then look up the author and the year in the reference list at the end to find the source.

References

If the information is on specific pages in the source, the page numbers appears after the year, like this (Than Tun 1978, 64-66). If the author wrote more than one piece that year they are listed with letters: (Than Tun 1978a; Than Tun 1978b; Than Tun 1978c). If there is more than one author, sometimes only the first author’s name appears with the abbreviation *et.al.*, to indicate there are other authors.

In the footnote system, a small number appears at the end of the sentence that corresponds to a numbered note at the bottom of the
page, like this. At the bottom of the page the full information for the source appears, with the authors’ name, the title, the city of publication, the publisher, the year and finally the page numbers of the information cited.


The same information appears again in the list at the end of the article. If the author refers to the same source a second time, a shortened version might appear, with just the author’s last name, a short version of the title and the page numbers.


The word *ibid.*, means that the source is identical to the one immediately before it.

In academic writing and citations, the titles of books and journals always appear in italics, like this: *The Art of Not Being Governed, Journal of the Burma Research Society*. The titles of articles, chapters, reports and dissertations appear inside quotation marks like this: “On the Road to Mandalay: A Case Study of the Sinonization of Upper Burma.” In a reference to an article in a journal, the volume number appear first, then the issue number, followed by the month and year of publication in parenthesis like this: *Journal of the Burma Research Society* 33, no. 1 (April 1950).

To avoid confusion, the author’s full name should be used: either the full Burmese name or the full first and last name of non-Burmese people. Honorifics like, Daw, Sayama, Dr, U, Sayagy, Professor, Ashin, can be excluded, or included after a comma, in a reference list without meaning any disrespect.

This journal uses citation formats (both author-date and footnotes) from *The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th ed*. For more examples of citation formats, see: The Chicago Manual of Style, quick guide. http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html Be sure to click on the tab for “Author-Date” or “Footnotes” to see the correct style.
On writing a strong academic article:

Authors write articles based on original academic research, meaning new information that no one has written about before or new interpretations of known facts. Authors want to inform others about what they have found in their research, but the point is not simply to present a lot of new facts. Academic articles seek to help a reader see how she or he might use those new facts to see a particular topic differently or address a problem or a question in a new way.

For this reason academic articles are not just organized around a theme, but around a clear line of argument or persuasion—a thesis. Authors may use different methods to show the reader how the new facts that they present can be helpfully understood. They might put the facts in relation to previous writing on the subject, or in relation to theories presented in that particular academic discipline, or in comparison with a similar situation in a different place or time. In each of these, the point of an academic argument is to not criticize or to prove others wrong, but to build up a conversation between previous writings, the author’s new research and the reader, in order to create new knowledge and different ways of thinking.

Wayne Booth, in *The Craft of Research* suggests that authors think about their thesis in relation to a conceptual problem (a lack of understanding on some topic) and a conversation that convinces the reader of one new way of understanding that topic that will help him or her see the world better. He suggests that authors start thinking about their thesis in terms of both the problem or issue that the article will help the reader understand, but also the importance of that topic and the consequence of what the reader will lose if they do not understand what the author writes. It is equally important to use the evidence well to convince the reader. “In a research argument, we are expected to make claims not just because we believe they are
true but because we think they are new and important enough to change what readers think. Then we support those claims with sound reasons and good evidence, as if our readers were asking us, quite reasonable, *Why should I believe that?* If the article is able to convince the reader, it helps others shape their knowledge and thinking, moving the larger conversation forward.

Authors also need to present their evidence fairly, in a way that others can verify through citations and a clear discussion of the method they used to conduct their research and the kinds of sources they used. Instead of simply presenting a fact, authors need to convince the reader why that fact is valid and relevant to the particular thesis. When they use quotations, they are responsible for citing the source of the quotation, but also providing some context for the quotation and interpreting its meaning. Researchers who conduct interviews with living people have a responsibility to protect the safety and the dignity of their informants. This may require excluding the names of the informants and discussing how the interviews will be used.

---

A note on romanization:

There is no widely used, consistent romanization for Myanmar script. For articles in this journal, authors may choose a romanization system of their preference, as long as it is consistent within the article. Well-known place names, historical names, and preferred spelling of personal names need not follow the overall romanization, and may be capitalized following English conventions. Generally, pronunciation rather than spelling should be followed, as romanization is for convenience, not precision. For consistency, the following romanisation, which draws on common practice, is suggested:

- က ka ခ kha ဂ ga ဃ gha င nga
- စ sa ဆ hsa ဇ za ဈ za ည nya
- ဋ ta ဌ hta ဍ da ဍ dha န na
- ပ pa ဖ hpa ဗ ba ဘ ba မ ma
- ယ ya ရ ya/ra လ la ဝ wa သ tha
- ဟ ha ဠ la အ a

အ+ အ အါ အို: a; ဗေါ ဗြ: l; ဗုိ ဗြာ: u; ဗိုျ ဗြဲ: ay;
အိ အ့ အး: e; အိုျ အိုး အို့: aw; အိး အိး အိး: o

ဗုြ should be romanized i, ay, or e according to the sound.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>finals</th>
<th>finals</th>
<th>finals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>က် final</td>
<td>က် auk</td>
<td>က် aik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>က် အာက်</td>
<td>က် အာက်</td>
<td>က် အာက်</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in finals</td>
<td>in finals</td>
<td>aing finals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>က် int</td>
<td>က် int</td>
<td>က် aung int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>final</td>
<td>final</td>
<td>final</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>က် it</td>
<td>က် it</td>
<td>က် it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finals</td>
<td>finals</td>
<td>finals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>က် အာင် at</td>
<td>က် အာင် eik</td>
<td>က် အာင် ok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>က် အာင် un</td>
<td>က် အာင် an</td>
<td>က် အာင် on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>က် အာင် unt</td>
<td>က် အာင် ant</td>
<td>က် အာင် ont</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Words starting with a half-syllable အ can be written with a-. Most tones cannot be easily represented in a simple romanization. When greater precision is required, it is better to use Myanmar script.

Some examples:
နေဝင်: kon the
စာလုံး: hsan
အကကာင်း: a-kyaung
စာလုံး: sa ok
ပစ်ည်: kyat
စာလုံး: pyitsi
မသွားဘူး: ma-thwa bu